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Preface
This edition of the European Public Investment Outlook was written after the most 
dramatic moments of the COVID-19 pandemic but still during times of considerable 
uncertainty. 
Still, European policymakers seem to have learnt the lessons of the mismanagement 
of the sovereign debt crisis: thus, the pandemic and its awful impact on European 
economy and society resulted in a strong momentum for the European Union in 
tackling the challenge of economic recovery through the adoption of, in some cases, 
unprecedented fiscal policies. These include the activation of the Stability and Growth 
Pact general escape clause, a temporary easing of the rules on state aid, and economic 
stimulus packages, which are financed through the issuance of long-term European 
sovereign debt securities. 
For the first time the taboo of a significant creation of European sovereign debt 
seems to have been overcome, unveiling the strong appetite of global financial markets 
for investment in European sovereign safe assets. 
The result―even if cast as a one-off step―marks an epochal turn from the “fiscal 
austerity plus national reforms” approach to a “European Public Capital spending 
plus national reforms” approach, embedded in the ambitious Next Generation EU 
programme. The issue of “Eurobonds” by the European Commission is also a crucial 
step for financing the investment of Next Generation EU.
For the first time, likewise, it was thus possible to verify the beneficial effects of a 
convergent synergy between fiscal policies and monetary policies, a synergy which 
was, for a long time, evoked and hoped for by many authoritative exponents of 
economic science, as well as by the former president of the ECB, Mario Draghi. In fact, 
the combined action of the European Commission’s expansionary fiscal policy and 
the European Central Bank’s accommodative monetary policy has strongly helped to 
contain the dramatic effects of the epidemic crisis on the economy and on employment, 
and has also, inter alia, contributed to avoiding tensions on national sovereign public 
debts, albeit whilst the latter were consistently increased by the measures adopted by 
all European governments in order to face the epidemic emergency, mitigate its impact 
on households and businesses, and support recovery. 
A main difference with respect to the 2020 edition of this Outlook is that, in 2021, 
European Public Investment has gained a significant European element through the 
financing mechanism of the Recovery and Resilience Facility (RRF), associated with 
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the EU 2021–27 budget. With €672.5 bn, this is by far the biggest item in the Next 
Generation EU package, which totals €750 bn, 5.4% of 2019 European Union GDP. 
This macroeconomically significant and shared approach to public investment is an 
important innovation.
The format of the 2021 edition of the Outlook remains the same as in 2020. The 
Outlook goes to the heart of the subject of public investment, taking two complementary 
angles. The first is to identify public investment trends and needs in Europe and 
in selected countries, addressing the initiatives taken by European governments to 
tackle the COVID-19 related recession and to sustain and rebuild their economies. The 
second is the analysis of key domains where European public investment is needed 
to build a more sustainable Europe, such as transportation, climate change, digital 
transformation, social infrastructures, formation of human capital, etc. Both sections 
shed light on the impact that the Recovery and Resilience Facility is likely to have 
on overall public investment and thus on the overall macroeconomic structure of the 
European economy. 
Taken together, the two parts show the value of public capital both within European 
countries and as a European public good. Public investment is a tool aimed at different 
goals: innovation, sustainable growth and high-quality employment, education, social 
cohesion across European regions and countries, and the fight against climate change. 
While there are some trade-offs between these objectives, they can largely be treated as 
complementary, with single projects achieving multiple goals. 
Three welcome innovations are taking place within the EU as part of the Next 
Generation EU initiative: 
1. for the first time in the history of the EU there is a massive, shared, and 
coordinated action at the European level to finance public investment and to 
boost EU economic growth, with no concerns about specific single-country 
fiscal constraints or deficit-spending limitations;
2. the choice and planning of investments are left to the political decisions of 
the individual member states, but the European Union seeks to orient these 
choices by linking them to a model of sustainable development based on 
social, gender, and intergenerational equity, environmental sustainability, 
and the systematic use of digital technologies; 
3. with the aim of recovering Europe’s strategic autonomy in global competition 
and of repositioning the continent on a path of long-lasting, balanced, and 
sustainable development, the disbursement of European financial resources 
is linked to the approval and implementation of important structural reforms, 
but for the first time the European constraint is associated with the allocation 
of the resources needed to finance the reforms and mitigate their short-term 
impacts; together, reforms and public investment could create the conditions 
for a boost of private investment.
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A crucial issue remains, for the moment, unsolved: the new European policies to 
support public (and private) investment (and the related instruments) have so far 
been conceived as exceptional and temporary. How can they be made structural and 
permanent? This is the question underlying the debate on the Stability and Growth Pact 
reform and on ways to make the NGEU programme permanent, on the development 
of a common EU fiscal policy, and on the creation of a European Debt Agency. These 
are matters, perhaps, for the next Outlook.
This 2021 Outlook was coordinated by Floriana Cerniglia (Cranec), Francesco 
Saraceno (OFCE―Sciences Po), and Andrew Watt (IMK―Hans-Böckler Foundation) 
in a complex environment. The authors of the different chapters of the Outlook, from 
various institutional backgrounds, collaborated in an admirable way, enriching their 
perspectives from different countries. These “diversities” valuably contributed to the 








Floriana Cerniglia, Francesco Saraceno, and Andrew Watt
Recent weather-related catastrophes have underlined the urgent need to stem climate 
change. Together with the massive economic and social impact COVID-19 has had on 
our lives, they have forced the issue of public investment to the centre of the public 
policy debate. The dire condition of public capital in most advanced economies was 
exemplified by the widespread unpreparedness of healthcare systems in facing the 
pandemic. That is why most commentators (amongst whom the editors of this volume) 
welcomed the fact that from the beginning, while doing whatever it took to minimise 
the health and economic effects of the pandemic, European countries quickly moved 
towards ensuring a robust post-COVID recovery, in the hope of avoiding mistakes 
made ten years earlier. 
The Next Generation EU (NGEU) programme, nested in the EU budget, was 
agreed upon―after some difficult negotiations―relatively quickly, and is centred on 
the creation of a Recovery and Resilience Facility (RRF) aimed at financing investment 
for economic recovery. As we write these lines, most national recovery plans have 
been approved by the Commission and the Council and the first instalments of grants 
are being disbursed. This is not the place to discuss the novelty of the programme, 
or whether it truly constitutes a Hamiltonian moment, a founding act for a Federal 
Europe (on this, see Saraceno 2021 and Watzka and Watt 2020). What matters for our 
purposes is the fact that NGEU is a massive effort towards financing public investment 
across Europe, especially in countries currently facing fiscal constraints, and creating 
the incentives, through reforms and complementary infrastructure projects, for a 
renewed boost of private investment.
Of course, the comeback of public investment in the policy debate is not related solely 
to the pandemic. The Global Financial and Economic Crisis of 2008―and in Europe 
the disastrous experience of the subsequent euro crisis―challenged three decades 
of consensus in macroeconomics centred on a limited role for macroeconomic policy 
and, within that limited role, a strong emphasis on monetary policy (Saraceno 2017a). 
The financial crisis, the liquidity trap, and the zero lower bound forced governments 
to resort to providing their economies with massive support, de facto taking fiscal 
policy off the backburner. That, in turn, revived the debate on the effectiveness of 
fiscal policy. The whole “rethinking macroeconomics” discussion revolved around the 
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size of fiscal multipliers (e.g., Gechert and Rannenberg 2014), the return of the policy 
mix, and the long-term impact of macroeconomic policy (Fatàs and Summers 2018). 
Public investment was at the centre of this debate. On the one hand the crisis put in the 
spotlight the degree of degradation of public capital, including in the highly productive 
advanced economies (DIW 2013), while on the other hand, the importance of public 
investment as a stabilisation tool, its impact on potential growth, and the crowding-in 
effects on private investment gradually became the new consensus in the theoretical 
and empirical literature (Le Garrec and Touzé 2020). The most visible result of this 
renewed interest in public investment is the famous IMF World Economic Outlook 
chapter on public investment (IMF 2014), which highlights that the high productivity 
of public investment in a situation of depleted public capital stock, together with all-
time low levels of interest rates, has turned public investment into a “free lunch”.
European policymakers, entangled in their obsession for fiscal discipline which 
permeates the Maastricht architecture, have until recently been largely impervious to 
the rethinking macroeconomics debate raging in academia and the international policy 
institutions. The old consensus was the background, justifying the combo “austerity 
plus reforms” that led to the self-inflicted second recession in 2012–13 and a decade 
of soft, disappointing growth. Some policymakers did pay lip service to the need for 
public investment to sustain recovery (one example being the widely quoted Jackson 
Hole speech by then ECB President Mario Draghi in 2014), but this necessity was 
carefully framed within the need for fiscal discipline as a priority for governments, 
and the respect of the very same fiscal rules that had yielded procyclical fiscal policies 
and curtailed public investment. Thus, it is not surprising that the Juncker Plan, the 
2014 post-crisis EU flagship investment programme, supposedly a pillar for economic 
recovery and sold to the EU citizens as a boost to public investment, was in fact little 
more than an (underfunded) public-private partnership.
The first edition of A European Public Investment Outlook (Cerniglia and Saraceno 
2020) and the project to transform this publication into a permanent observatory on 
public investment in EU countries was born out of frustration regarding the state of 
the public investment debate in Europe. By gathering high-ranking academics and 
policy institutions to discuss the role of public capital in boosting potential growth, we 
aimed to show that, provided European policymakers managed to shrug off their old 
mindset, a public investment push would be not only feasible, but also highly desirable. 
In fact, the first part of the 2020 Outlook showed that, despite the lip service given to 
the need for public investment, following the sovereign debt crisis it had become the 
first casualty of austerity policies in the Eurozone (including in its largest economies).
The first edition, published in 2020, was mainly written before the COVID-19 
pandemic. Nevertheless, the authors of the Outlook collectively (and in a decentralised 
manner!) took the stance of considering public investment in a broad sense as any 
addition to the stock of material and immaterial public capital. Alongside classical, 
bricks-and-mortar infrastructure investment, the authors highlighted the need to 
invest in social capital, education, health, social cohesion, and R&D. 
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The policy reaction to the COVID crisis hinted that the frustration with the 
European debate might be becoming less justified. While many of the old reflexes are 
still present, the swift response to the pandemics, and more importantly the relatively 
quick agreement on the Next Generation EU investment plan, suggest that European 
policymakers might have learnt from the mismanagement of the sovereign debt crisis.
A major difference to the 2020 European Investment Outlook―and indeed to any 
past discussion of public investment in EU member states―comes in the form of the 
Recovery and Resilience Facility: national fiscal policy is no longer the overwhelmingly 
predominant driver of public investment across all EU member states. While in the 
past, EU funding via the structural funds has been an important element of public 
capital spending in some countries during certain periods, for the first time, by means 
of the RRF, the EU is financing public investment in macroeconomically relevant orders 
of magnitude (even considering that they are spread over a multiannual timeframe) 
across member states. 
The total volume of spending that will eventually take place under the RRF is still 
subject to uncertainty. The facility is divided more or less equally into a grant and 
a loan component. While all member states will tap their grant allocation, it is not 
yet clear to what extent they will take up the offer of EU loans (among the largest 
economies, so far only Italy did); they can decide to do so at a later date. That said, the 
total potential volume of the RRF is €672.5 bn, of which €312 bn consists of grants and 
up to €360 bn of loans. This is by far the biggest item in the overall Next Generation EU 
package which totals €750 bn, measured in 2018 prices; this represents 5.4% of 2019 
GDP. 
The required funds are raised by the EU Commission on financial markets. The 
bonds have been in strong demand from investors. This is rightly considered a major 
step forward in the EU integration process. This will be the case, in particular, if it 
proves possible to expand the EU’s own resources―as all the EU institutions have, 
in principle, agreed should happen―so that the debt service will be made out of EU 
rather than national resources. The debt service schedule will run from 2028–58.
In spring 2021, member states had to submit recovery and resilience plans to the 
European Commission detailing their spending plans. These had to be in line with 
country-specific recommendations addressed to them in the course of the European 
Semester process. In addition, there is a requirement for 37% of the project expenditure 
to be targeted at climate-protection measures and 20% related to digitalisation. 
Following Commission approval, the Council greenlights the disbursement of funds 
to individual member states. Initially 13% of each country’s allocation was available 
to kickstart recovery; these resources were transferred to member countries in August 
2021. The remaining funding is made available in stages, depending on the achievement 
of agreed milestones. Disbursement is planned to be completed by 2026. 
The RRF has a strongly redistributive component, favouring countries with below-
average per capita GDP―thus working similarly to the cohesion funds―but also 
those whose economies were hit hardest by the pandemic; there is therefore also a 
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strong stabilisation component and a fair amount of risk-sharing, a real novelty in EU 
policymaking. Consequently, the contribution of the RRF expenditures to total public 
spending varies considerably between member states. The national chapters in this 
Outlook―for France, Germany, Italy, Poland, and Spain―provide detailed accounts of 
the national plans and the priorities the different countries have set. 
A recent analysis by the French Treasury (Bénassy-Quéré 2021) compares national 
discretionary stimulus measures with expected allocations under the RRF. In 
countries such as Greece and Italy or Croatia and Romania, RRF spending dwarfs the 
national stimulus measures. For Nordic countries or Austria, on the other hand, the 
macroeconomic significance of RRF spending is limited. In terms of public investment, 
though, RRF spending, which is more medium-term in nature, will be more important 
than this comparison suggests, as national stimulus measures were often focused 
on short-term income support. Precisely assessing the investment content of RRFs is 
difficult―and arguably somewhat arbitrary given that, as noted earlier, the definition 
of public investment is a matter of debate―but is expected to be high; see the first 
chapter in this report.1 
An early study of the impact of the RRF, looking only at the grants component and 
assuming that all measures took the form of public investment, estimated a significant 
impact to annual GDP, of the order of 0.3 pp in each year of the programme (Watzka 
and Watt 2020). This average concealed a substantial spread across countries, with 
the hardest-hit member states benefiting from a considerable boost to output and 
employment; in Greece, for example, the boost was more than 1% of GDP per year. A 
more recent study by the European Commission (Pfeiffer, Varga, and in’t Veld 2021) 
focuses on the spillover effects between countries. (It also goes beyond the RRF to 
consider other spending programmes within the overall Next Generation EU package.) 
A country-by-country assessment neglects the fact that countries also benefit from the 
support given to neighbouring countries with which they have close trading relations. 
The authors estimate that this spillover effect adds, on average, one third to the impact 
of RRF spending. This proportion is higher in countries where the direct impact is 
lower. In the main scenario, EU GDP after three years is 1.5% higher than without the 
NGEU programme.
This European Investment Outlook, like the first edition of 2020, is organised 
in two main parts. Part One assesses the state of public investment in Europe as a 
whole (Chapter 1) and in a specific group of countries: France (Chapter 2), Germany 
(Chapter 3), Italy (Chapter 4), Poland (Chapter 5), and Spain (Chapter 6). The 
common thread of these chapters is to update the data presented in the prior edition, 
and provide a description of the policy response to the COVID-19 crisis and of the 
respective economic recovery plans as part of NGEU.
1 The RRF has, alongside spending measures, a structural reform component which may prove 
important for raising potential output in some countries but is not assessed in this report.
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Chapter 1 by A. Brasili, A. Kolev, D. Revoltella, and J. Schanz highlights that wide 
public investment gaps have opened in the European Union over the past couple of 
decades despite a recent uptick in 2019 and 2020. Increasingly ambitious targets for 
the digital and green transition have contributed to these gaps. The EU Commission 
estimates that an additional annual investment of about €350 bn is needed to meet 
the current 2030 climate and energy targets. In the EIB’s Municipality Survey, two 
thirds of respondents see gaps in climate change mitigation and adaptation, 47% in 
digitalisation, and 46% in transport. The pandemic offers the opportunity to “rebuild 
better”. Public investment is the focus of member states’ Stability and Convergence 
Programmes and of the Recovery and Resilience Facility. Exceptionally low interest 
rates and the ECB government bond-buying programme make it easier to fund these 
expenditures. They create a window of opportunity in which governments, through 
wise investment, can gradually shift their debts onto sustainable paths. Governments 
should, however, recognise that these benign conditions are not the new normal and 
can quickly change. Hence the authors emphasise the urgency to make the best use of 
the EU funds to strengthen economic growth. 
Chapter 2 by M. Plane and F. Saraceno traces the trend of public investment and 
public capital in France since the 1970s, summarising and updating the analysis of 
the chapter from the previous Outlook. Compared to other OECD countries, both the 
level of public capital and the quality of infrastructures in France are high. But the 
trend has not been favourable. Gross public investment has been on the decline for 
years, and net public investment has seen an even greater drop, becoming negative: 
the depreciation of public capital is not compensated by new investment. The net 
worth of public administrations is still positive but has suffered a significant fall and 
reached a worrying low point. Indeed, since 2005 public debt has grown faster than 
public capital. A recovery in public investments only began two years prior to the 
COVID-19 crisis, with an increase of nearly 14% between the end of 2017 and the end 
of 2019 (linked to the electoral cycle of municipal elections). A partial reverse in public 
took place after the municipal elections. Furthermore, the crisis linked to COVID-19 
led to an unprecedented dip of nearly 10% in public investment during the first half of 
2020 compared to the last half of 2019. Overall, public investment contracted by 4.1% 
in 2020. It is in this context that the French government unveiled, in September 2020, 
the contents of its recovery plan of €100 bn over two years, part of which (€40 bn) is 
financed with funds from the Next Generation EU programme. Like all other major 
EU countries (except for Italy), France chose only to access RRF grants. Out of the €100 
bn, around €36.7 bn will be dedicated to public investment. This is quite considerable, 
but certainly inadequate to complete the modernisation and the greening of the 
French economy. Once the worst of the pandemic passes, the emphasis must return to 
national fiscal policy.
K. Rietzler and A. Watt, in Chapter 3, begin with the analysis of the German situation 
presented in last year’s edition of Outlook and describe the role of public investment 
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and public capital stock since German reunification, demonstrating that public 
investment has been insufficient for more than a decade. The country needs massive 
public investment in a number of fields to modernise its infrastructure and ensure that 
Germany meets its own climate policy goals. This year’s chapter looks at the most recent 
developments and presents an analysis of public investment across policy fields and 
activities at different levels of government. The authors focus on the massive stimulus 
package, which the German government launched in summer 2020―the so-called 
“Konjunktur- und Zukunftspaket” (stimulus and future package). They assess the 
investment content of the package and the progress made in its implementation. 
They summarise the German Recovery and Resilience Plan (Deutscher Aufbau und 
Resilienzplan, DARP) as part of the EU’s NGEU programme, noting the substantial 
overlap with the domestic stimulus plan. Finally, recent simulations with the National 
Institute’s Global Economic Model (NIGEM) are presented, which show that under the 
current financial conditions, a significant credit-financed public investment initiative 
is compatible with a reduction in the debt-to-GDP ratio. The authors conclude that, 
while nobody knows when the pandemic will finally end, the debate on post-crisis 
fiscal consolidation is in full swing in Germany and a key issue in the autumn election 
to the Bundestag. Some political positions in support of rapid budget consolidation 
are incompatible with the enhanced investment and more ambitious climate policies 
which Germany, and the whole of the EU, need. 
In Chapter 4, F. Cerniglia and G. Barbieri take up the case of Italy, which, of all 
the EU countries, has suffered the most from the coronavirus pandemic, causing a 
contraction of its GDP unparalleled since WWII. The authors assess the measures 
taken by the Italian government to tackle the economic fallout caused by the 
pandemic. The year 2020 was a turning point for public investment in Italy, thanks to 
the widespread conviction that a robust socioeconomic structure, capable of resisting 
exogenous shocks such as those caused by the pandemic, could be constructed with a 
thorough and consistent policy, comprising tangible and intangible public investment. 
The authors have updated the data on public investments in Italy from the previous 
Outlook (Cerniglia and Rossi 2020). Public investments, which declined from 3.7% to 
2.1% from 2009 to 2019, gained a slight momentum. In 2019 they went up to 2.3% of 
GDP. During 2020, notwithstanding the slowdown due to the pandemic in the first 
half of the year, public investment increased again and the investment-to-GDP ratio 
climbed to 2.7%. In the south of Italy investment expenditure still remains stagnant. The 
National Recovery and Resilence Plan (PNRR)―presented by the Italian government 
at the end of April 2021―is an ambitious plan (more than €200 bn, of which €191 
bn is from the Recovery and Resilience Facility) and identifies six main missions 
(digitisation, innovation, competitiveness, culture and tourism, green revolution and 
ecological transition, infrastructure for sustainable mobility, education and research, 
social inclusion and cohesion, and health) and three transversal priorities: decreasing 
territorial, gender, and generational inequalities. Southern Italy is considered one of the 
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most economically depressed areas in the EU, and 40% of the PNRR’s “territorialisable 
funds” (i.e., €82 bn) will be allocated to the south, which accounts for 34% of the 
national population and only 22% of Italy’s GDP. Overall, there are encouraging signs 
of strengthening both the planning of public investment and redefining the regulatory 
framework, which has made public investment in Italy a slow, cumbersome, and 
ineffective process. However, one of the elements to which greater attention should be 
paid in the following months is the governance of the PNRR, as well as the decision-
making process at all levels of government.
In Chapter 5 A. Czerniak and S. Płóciennik analyse the Polish case. First, it must 
be emphasised that high GDP growth and accelerated structural changes in Poland’s 
economy after joining the EU have been largely driven by public investment. Nearly 
three decades of constant and relatively high economic growth have made it possible 
for Poland to partially catch up with the level of development of the most advanced 
European economies. To continue this positive trend, Poland must fulfil several 
requirements including a stable demography, a higher degree of innovation, more 
efficient infrastructure, and a better supply of public goods, like healthcare. Remaining 
on the convergence path requires further increases in expenditure, especially for energy 
and digital transformations. The chapter analyses what prospects exist for increasing 
the scale of public investments and indicates the most promising areas of state activity. 
The chapter analyses the National Recovery Plan (Krajowy Plan Odbudowy, KPO), 
which foresees a public investment increase of around €87 bn. The authors point 
out some of the risks linked to the existing plan: a polarised political landscape and 
uncertainties linked to the implementation of some of the current reforms.
In Chapter 6 on Spain, J. Villaverde and A. Maza update last year’s data and focus 
on the key characteristics related to the evolution of public investments in Spain 
from 2000 to 2020. In 2020, due to a more relaxed and counter-cyclical policy stance 
from Brussels, the investment effort grew by 2.6%, and its 2020 level of investment is 
larger than the 2000–09 average. They also assess what Next Generation EU funds can 
imply for public investment for Spain. For the 2021–26 period, the EU has approved a 
disbursement of up to €140 bn, about half in direct transfers and the other half in loans. 
As pointed out in the Spanish RTRP (Recovery, Transformation, and Resilience Plan), 
the investment foreseen, with its cumulative nature, will make it possible to reach a 
public investment effort of around 4% of GDP; this will not only imply closing the gap 
with the EU average, but also means that net investments will be positive for the first 
time since 2011. According to the authors, the arrival of EU funds will provide a big 
push for the economy, helping it to become more modern, productive, resilient, and 
competitive. 
The second part of the 2021 edition of A European Public Investment Outlook focuses 
on the challenges caused by the pandemic and the pillars of the Next Generation 
EU investment plan. The chapters on digitalisation (Chapter 10), energy and green 
transition (Chapters 11 and 12) and territorial cohesion (Chapter 13) mirror the NGEU 
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priorities (that in turn follow the workplan of the Von der Leyen Commission, which 
took office in December 2019). The chapters on healthcare (Chapter 8) and education 
(Chapter 9) contribute to the debate on the need for social capital, an aspect that the 
pandemic has cruelly highlighted. It is worth mentioning that the researchers working 
on the Outlook start from a broad definition (i.e., both tangible and intangible) of 
public capital: a chapter on social capital was already included in the first edition of 
Outlook, written before the pandemic. 
The underlying theme of the entire study is the impact of public investment on 
GDP and on private investment. In this year’s edition we decided to dedicate a specific 
chapter on multipliers (Chapter 7) written by L. Durand, R. Espinoza, W. Gbohoui, 
and M. Sy. This chapter confirms that public investment stands out as an instrument 
for boosting growth. Not only can it raise economic activity in the short-term, it can 
also increase the productive potential of the economy by expanding the capital stock 
and thus improving productivity. This is especially important for countries seeking 
to support their economies through crises while simultaneously boosting long-term 
growth and protecting their fiscal space (IMF 2020). This is the situation many 
advanced economies face as they kickstart their economies after having shut them 
down in an attempt to prevent the propagation of COVID-19.
Prior to Keynes, conventional wisdom believed that an increase in public 
investment would lead to an equivalent decrease in private investment so that the 
level of aggregate output would remain unchanged: this so-called Treasury view of 
crowding-out underpinned the idea that deficits should be reduced in order to trigger 
confidence and private investment. 
However, the chapter shows that the Keynesian view, according to which public 
investment crowds-in private investment by boosting short-term growth and triggering 
positive expectations, has quite strong empirical support. A few examples of the 
literature are provided and the results of a meta-analysis are reported. The authors 
discuss some of the conditions that can lead to strong crowding-in. Moreover, they 
assess the EU structural funds and Recovery Fund and discuss, in light of the recent 
literature, whether the EU Recovery Fund is likely to crowd-in private investment and 
which private activity in the sectors will be most hit by the fallout of COVID-19. 
P.-Y. Geoffard in Chapter 8 discusses healthcare. In a broad sense, any healthcare 
intervention that improves patients’ health may be qualified as an investment. Good 
health, a major component of individual welfare, could also increase labour supply, 
especially at an older age, and labour productivity. In this sense, health is a key 
component of human capital. However, the author points out that such an approach 
raises many issues. Not every good or service that improves welfare can be qualified 
as an investment. Many treatments can alleviate pain, and improve or restore the 
autonomy of the patient, without increasing their future productivity. The value of 
healthcare cannot be reduced to the effect it may have on future production. Hence, 
in this chapter the author focuses on a narrower definition of health investment as the 
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current expenditures that may improve future health. Such a definition encompasses 
disease prevention, human capital investment in healthcare and long-term care labour, 
and capital expenditure in healthcare. 
The issue of investing in education is considered in Chapter 9 by L. Fransen, R. 
Prodi, and E. Reviglio. One among the many heritages of the pandemic is the impact 
of digital distance learning and tele-education during COVID-19, along with the 
urgent need to transform current education and learning models, and to invest in 
physical and intangible infrastructure for the future based on new needs and growing 
digitalisation. These evolutions show up in recent data on capital expenditures in 
education in the EU, as well as in the likely change of the Stability and Growth Pact, 
especially regarding social investment and infrastructure. The new expansionary 
policy that is taking place within the EU will increase the supply of “safe assets”, 
which includes financial instruments for social and green infrastructure. Another point 
of interest in this dynamic is the role of multi-lateral and national promotional banks 
and institutions in becoming new “market makers” by increasing “patient capital” 
going into the real economy. Finally, the InvestEU programme and Next Generation 
EU (NGEU) fund both have the potential to impact on investment in education.
Turning to the chapters that mirror the spending priorities established by NGEU, in 
Chapter 10 D. Rückert, R. Veugelers, A. Virginie, and C. Weiss tackle the issue of digital 
technologies and digital transformation, as the COVID-19 crisis is likely to play a dual 
role in the adoption of digital technology. On the one hand, the crisis has led to a wider 
recognition of the importance of innovation and digital transformation. According to 
the 2020 results of the EIB Investment Survey (EIBIS), the majority of firms in the 
EU and the US expect COVID-19 to have a long-term impact on the use of digital 
technologies. On the other hand, many firms have experienced a fall in revenues and 
liquidity during the pandemic. This may force firms to focus on short-term survival 
strategies, leading them to delay or cancel investment projects. The chapter uses EIBIS 
data on more than 13,000 companies from the 27 EU countries, the UK, and the US. 
EIBIS monitors firms’ use of various advanced digital technologies, allowing them 
to capture the digital adoption rates and assess the impact of digital transformation 
on different economies. In 2020, EIBIS also asked firms about their future digital 
perspectives. First, the authors identify four corporate digitalisation profiles based on 
firms’ current use of digital technologies. A substantial share of non-digital firms do 
not consider investment in digital transformation as an urgent priority, even beyond 
the COVID-19 crisis. This share of “persistently non-digital” firms is larger in the EU 
than in the US, in particular small firms. Second, results show that dynamics along the 
digital divide matter for firm performance and employment. “Persistently non-digital” 
firms are less likely to create new jobs, and tend to pay lower wages and invest less in 
the training of employees. They are also less likely to invest in innovation activities. 
Finally, looking at the major obstacles to investment perceived by firms in the EU, the 
findings suggest that addressing barriers to skills and digital infrastructure should 
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also be a priority for policymakers. Similarly, addressing the regulatory burden and its 
associated uncertainties should be high on the digital policy agenda.
The EU has committed to reducing greenhouse gas emissions by at least 55% 
compared to 1990 by 2030, and being climate neutral by 2050. The 2030 reduction 
goal cannot be reached without a massive expansion of renewable energy generation 
in Europe, requiring annual investment of around €150 bn. This is the main concern 
of Chapter 11 by C. Jaeger, D. Mangalagiu, and J. Teitge. The authors argue that 
the unprecedented EU response to the COVID-19 crisis could contribute to the 
indispensable stream of public investment by nearly €50 bn annually, and specifically 
to the investment flow needed for renewable capacity expansion. The authors discuss 
three challenges that need to be tackled. First, to reduce unemployment and counter the 
dangerous divergence in the Eurozone, Italy, Spain, and the other main recipients of EU 
funds, need, among other things, to prioritise the construction sector and digitalisation, 
rather than generating power from renewable energy. Second, the present EU support 
will decrease in two years and end in three, and countries will have to begin paying 
back in 2028, before they can generate a reasonable return. Finally, inevitable setbacks 
will require new solutions that go beyond the present plans. Therefore, an EU public 
investment flow for renewable generation needs to go beyond 2023. Effective demand 
in high-unemployment countries needs to be prioritised while renewable generation 
is expanded in countries with available national resources. Last but not least, a variety 
of European regions should be supported in the spirit of experimentalist governance 
rather than being forced into a “one size fits all” approach. With these three strategic 
components, the European Green Deal can be implemented as the historical mission 
that it was conceived as.
The EU goal to be climate neutral by 2050 includes a target 90% reduction in 
greenhouse gas emissions caused by transport (EC 2019). The transport sector alone 
accounts for around 25% of the global carbon (CO2) emissions and more than half of 
the global demand for fossil fuels (IEA 2019). In Chapter 12, M. Holzner, K. Weber, 
M. U. Zahid, and M. Zangl discuss this theme, building on a previous study, and 
propose the construction of a European Silk Road, including a high-speed rail network 
extending almost 11,000 kilometres, with a northern route from Lisbon to Uralsk on the 
Russian-Kazakh border, and a southern route from Milan to Volgograd and Baku. The 
focus of the contribution in the Outlook is on an assessment of the emission reductions 
achievable with a line from Lyon to Moscow. Setting out their assumptions for various 
parameters, they determine the GHG emissions of constructing and operating an HSR 
network, and provide an estimation of how many tonnes of CO2 could be saved as 
compared to road and air travel, over a life cycle of sixty years. The results suggest that, 
in addition to economic benefits, the CO2 savings are very substantial.
As in the previous edition of the Outlook, a chapter has been dedicated to the 
EU’s cohesion policy, given its decisive importance in the EU budget. G. Coco and 
R. Lagravinese show in Chapter 13 that the EU is a significant contributor to public 
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investment in every member state, but not all cohesion expenditure translates into 
investment. The authors try to disentangle the investment component by looking at the 
policy themes for the 2014–20 programming period. On an EU scale, they find that 67% 
of programmed expenditure is investment in a statistical sense, while 7% is in human 
capital development. However, there are large differences among member states in 
the share of the investment component, probably explaining the heterogeneity in the 
estimated impact of cohesion policy among the member states. Moreover, they tackle 
the issue of the cohesion policy’s ability to increase overall investment at the regional 
level. They compare investment at the NUTS2 regional level, normalised to regional 
output and to the national level of the same variable, by isolating a group of regions 
that have been the largest recipients of the cohesion fund over time. Here again they 
find significant heterogeneity in the results. While in some countries, underdeveloped 
regions have been able to raise investment (as defined above) beyond the national level, 
in others (notably Italy and Greece) this has not occurred. This could be considered as 
an indirect signal of a lack of additionality of cohesion policy in the public investment 
component. According to the authors, it is important that Eurostat develops a measure 
of public investment at a regional level to allow for a direct assessment of this issue.
The EU is not a federal state; therefore, it is not surprising that member states 
were at the forefront in combating the pandemic. For the same reason, the fastest 
way to channel European resources towards investment was to borrow jointly and to 
finance national investment plans through the Recovery and Resilience Facility. At the 
same time, investment in public goods with a strong cross-border component, such 
as healthcare or transportation networks, should naturally have a genuine European 
dimension (Creel et al. 2020). Among the priorities for the medium term, European 
policy makers should therefore think about possible ways to implement EU-wide 
investment projects. A European Debt Agency (Amato et al. 2021), establishing a 
permanent borrowing capacity, could be complemented by a European investment 
agency capable of designing and implementing European investment projects. Such an 
agency would need to be very carefully crafted to guarantee the accountability typical 
of fiscal policy by national governments. Some form of oversight by parliament and 
the Council in determining (or at least validating) investment projects would certainly 
make the procedures more cumbersome, but that seems unavoidable.
It is clear that, while waiting for a system to genuinely implement European public 
investment, European support for public investment via the RRF/NGEU can only be 
a complement to, and never a substitute for, effective and sustained national public 
investment. One of the consequences of Europe’s fiscal framework―notwithstanding 
declared intentions to the contrary―has been to curtail public investment. In 
particular, countries coming up against one of the fiscal rules pertaining to (structural) 
deficits or debt levels have been forced to cut back on spending. In the short run the 
easiest option, economically and politically, is simply to not implement planned, new 
investment projects.
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At the start of 2020 the EU Commission launched a process to evaluate and revise 
its fiscal rules, which in any case have been suspended until 2022 due to the pandemic. 
It is vital that, as part of the reforms, effective measures are put in place to protect and 
promote public investment. For this reason, many reform proposals include some form 
of “golden rule”, i.e., the principle that, while (cyclically adjusted) current spending 
is balanced, governments may―indeed, should―borrow to finance productivity-
enhancing public investment (e.g., Dullien et al. 2020; Creel et al. 2013; Saraceno 
2017b). While there is currently considerable momentum behind such a stance in 
principle, the devil is very much in the detail. Critics fear that, given the difficulties in 
arriving at an economically satisfactory, easily operationalisable definition of public 
investment, a golden rule would open the floodgates to higher public borrowing. Most 
proposals, therefore, either have a quantitative upper ceiling (as a share of GDP), 
operate with a restrictive definition, or impose some form of “double-lock”, i.e., prior 
EU-level approval of specific investment spending. This will certainly be a subject of 
intense political discourse in the coming months as the debate on economic governance 
reform heats up once again after, hopefully, economic conditions begin to normalise. 
Whatever solution is finally reached, protecting national public investment from being 
squeezed by injunctions from Europe’s fiscal rules is vital if European countries are 
to sustain the public investment needed to dynamise their economies and face the 
challenges of climate change in particular.
Europe faces serious challenges in maintaining its position in the global economy, 
in the face of competitive pressures both from developed partners, such as the USA, 
and from other powers, some with authoritarian systems of government, of which 
China is clearly the most important. Major steps forward will be required if Europe 
is to attain the “strategic autonomy” in a variety of fields which is necessary to meet 
that challenge. Among these, the measures described in this Outlook which are needed 
to strengthen public investment at national and European levels are by no means 
the least important. In the new global scenario, completely different from the time 
in which the Maastricht order was designed, the European Union needs to redefine 
its mission, identifying with greater precision and selectivity the areas in which to 
concentrate its common activity in the face of the new global competition. All this is 
essential to avoid single European countries, including the major ones, from sliding 
into a condition of global weakness and even marginality in various sectors. Putting 
emphasis on planning and implementing large European public investment projects 
(or missions) is not just a matter of growth tout court; it instead means thinking in a 
new global geopolitical context and about the role of Europe in that context. Once the 
pandemic is over, we do not believe we can return to the status quo ante. To think this 
would mean underestimating both the depth of the transformation that the current 
crises have impressed on the world economy (including mainstream economic 
thought) and the impact of the new post-pandemic geopolitical configuration, marked 
by a radicalisation of the confrontation between the US and China.
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1. Public Investment in the Pandemic—
Europe at a Glance 
A. Brasili, A. Kolev, D. Revoltella, and J. Schanz
Introduction
Wide investment gaps have opened in Europe after a long period of subdued 
government investment and increasingly ambitious targets for the digital and green 
economic transition. By 2016, EU government investment had declined to a twenty-five-
year low of 2.8% of GDP. Since then, it has recovered only marginally. Without large 
public and private investments, the economy cannot reap the benefits of digitalisation 
nor adapt to climate change. According to the EU Commission, about €350 bn of 
additional investment is needed annually during 2021–30 relative to the previous 
decade if 2030 climate and energy targets are to be met.1 Survey data also confirm 
sizable investment gaps. In the European Investment Bank’s (EIB) Municipality Survey, 
two thirds of respondents see gaps in climate change mitigation and adaptation, 47% 
in digitalisation, and 46% in transport.2 
As the pandemic adds to existing challenges, it also offers the opportunity to 
rebuild better. To accompany the recovery, member states’ Stability and Convergence 
Programmes and the EU’s Recovery and Resilience Facility emphasise public 
investment. The slogan is to “rebuild better” with investments that support 
digitalisation and more sustainable production. If well-managed, such an emphasis 
on public investment would be a welcome novelty. It benefits from the monetary 
policy environment, in which central banks lowered refinancing costs by setting 
ultra-low interest rates and by purchasing large amounts of government bonds and 
other financial assets. However, history tells us that such a window of opportunity, 
created by the need and ability to spend, might close fast. Hence the urgency to make 
best use of the available resources to strengthen economic growth sustainably.
To be successful, investment programmes need to be properly operationalised, 
monitored, and evaluated. In the current environment, access to finance to fund 
1  See EC (2020) and EIB (2021), Chapter 4.
2  See EIB (2021), Chapter 9.
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public investments is not an issue for most member states. The challenge lies in 
operationalising investment plans and in executing, monitoring, and evaluating them. 
Public investment should be catalytic, crowding in private investment. As such, any 
investment program needs to be well-coordinated and should be complemented by 
structural reforms that lower barriers to private sector investment. 
1.1 Government Investment Since the Global Financial Crisis
Despite a recent uptick, government investment in the European Union has been 
subdued since the Global Financial Crisis (GFC). EU government investment had 
fallen to 2.8% of GDP in 2016, the lowest level in twenty-five years. This trend was 
reversed only very recently: relative to GDP, government investment recovered to 3.3% 
of GDP in 2020 (Figure 1).3,4
Southern Europe is in the spotlight. Following the GFC, investment fell in all 
countries that had experienced some sort of investment boom in the previous decade 
but especially in Southern Europe following the European sovereign debt crisis. As 
markets questioned countries’ ability to roll over debt, their borrowing costs rose. 
Government investment rates in Southern Europe fell 1.2 pp of GDP in the years 
following the sovereign debt crisis relative to the average before GFC, a 34% decline. 
While the recent uptick in Southern Europe by 0.4 pp of GDP is magnified by the sharp 
decline in GDP due to the pandemic, real government investment in Southern Europe 
in 2020 rose 6.7% relative to 2019.
3  We use the ratio of investment to GDP and the investment rate interchangeably here. The same is true 
for investment and gross fixed capital formation. Unless stated explicitly, government investment 
refers to gross fixed capital formation of the general government, where general government includes 
all levels of government within a country―local, regional, and central.
4  This increase in the investment rate was only partially due to the large decline in GDP in 2020, because 
EU real government investment in 2020 increased by 2.9% relative to 2019. 
During the fiscal consolidations following the sovereign debt crisis, government 
investment accounted for the lion’s share of the cut in government expenditures in the 
EU, even though it only comprised 5% of total expenditures. In 2016, six years after the 
start of the fiscal consolidation, the share of capital expenditures in total expenditures 
was about 5 pp lower than the average share over 2000–07 in Southern Europe (Figure 
2). By 2020, it reached -2 pp below the pre-GFC average. This decline occurred despite 
falling interest expenditures. The mirror image of these declines is the increase in total 
primary expenditures, which remained more than 5 pp above their pre-GFC average. 
While not as large, this expenditure shift was present in most of the other EU member 
states. 
Government gross fixed capital formation fell more where fiscal consolidations 
were larger. In western and northern countries, despite fiscal consolidation efforts, 
gross fixed capital formation of the government remained broadly stable, as a share of 
GDP. In Central and Eastern Europe, the fiscal consolidation started later, lasted for a 
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Fig. 1 Gross Fixed Capital Formation (GFCF) of the General Government, % GDP.5
Source of data: EC Macroeconomic Database (AMECO), and authors’ calculations.
5  We group countries as follows: Southern Europe comprises Cyprus, Greece, Italy, Malta, Portugal, 
and Spain. Western and Northern Europe consists of Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Germany, Finland, 
France, Ireland, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, and Sweden. The group of Central and Eastern 
Europe comprises the remaining EU member states―Bulgaria, Croatia, Czechia, Estonia, Hungary, 
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shorter time, and was much more abrupt: government investment fell by 14% in just 
two years (2012–13). In the two years that followed, however, it rebounded, increasing 
by 12%. These large swings can be mostly explained by the importance of European 
Structural and Investment Funds for government investment in this group of countries. 
Southern Europe, in turn, experienced the largest decline in real government GFCF in 
the EU: in the six years between 2010 and 2016, it fell by 46%. 
Investment of subnational governments fell disproportionately more after the GFC. 
Averaging over member states with a centralised and a federal institutional structure, 
local government investment accounts for about half the investment of the general 
government in the EU. State government investment, which comprises the remaining 
subnational investment, accounts for about 11%. The remaining 42% is for central 
governments. In the years following the GFC, investment of subnational governments 
fell disproportionately more. In the EU, the decline of subnational government 
investment accounted for about 77% of the decline of the investment of the general 
government (Figure 3). 
Fig. 3 Total Change in GFCF of the General Government and Contributions by Levels of Government, 
2009–16, %.
Source of data: Eurostat Government finance statistics and authors’ calculations.
The quality of infrastructure suffered. Infrastructure investment fell in lockstep with 
government investment across the EU (Figure 4a), driven by the decline in subnational 
investment spending. The deterioration and lower availability of infrastructure services 
led, in turn, to dissatisfaction with infrastructure provision (Figure 4b). Declining 
government investment reinforced the negative effect on the economy exerted by 
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Such declines in government investment during fiscal consolidations are common. 
Governments are pressed to reduce deficits typically in periods of economic hardship 
or immediately after such periods, when unemployment levels are high and many 
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Fig. 4 Infrastructure Investment in the EU, % GDP (Panel a) and Adequacy of Infrastructure Stock 
of Transport Infrastructure (Panel b). 
Source of data: Eurostat, European PPP Expertise Centre (EPEC), IJ Global, and EIB staff calculations 







2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019




















Satisfactory Slightly lacking Substantially lacking
people still feel the negative consequences. In such periods, reducing investment 
expenditures instead of entitlements and social expenditures remains the politically 
easier choice despite the negative future consequences of reduced investment.
These declines are typically large and protracted. We estimate the effects of fiscal 
consolidations on the government investment rate using local projection methods 
(Jordà, 2005). To identify fiscal consolidations, we use a narrative approach based on 
over 3500 fiscal measures for sixteen OECD countries following Alesina et al. (2017). 
Our analysis shows that fiscal consolidations result in large and persistent declines in 
the ratio of government investment to GDP (Figure 5). Results illustrate the substantial 
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and persistent effects of fiscal consolidation on government investment. Seven years 
after the start of a fiscal consolidation, government investment remains 0.5 pp of GDP 
lower, which represents a 14% decline from an average government investment of 3.6% 
of GDP. 
Fig. 5 Response of Government Investment Following a Fiscal Consolidation, Cumulative pp of 
GDP.
Source of data: Authors’ calculations.
Years of underinvestment and increasingly ambitious climate targets created wide 
investment gaps. According to the EU Commission, about €350 bn of additional 
investment is needed annually during 2021–30 relative to the previous decade if 2030 
climate and energy targets are to be met. At the same time, most EU municipalities 
report investment gaps in the EIB’s Municipality Survey. Two thirds see gaps in climate 
change mitigation and adaptation, 47% in digitalisation, and 46% in transport. 
1.2 Rebuilding Better: The Response to the Pandemic and the 
Outlook for Public Investment 
EU fiscal policy responded to the pandemic in two phases: dealing with the emergency 
and laying the foundation for a sustainable recovery. During the emergency phase, 
starting in March 2020, member states increased fiscal spending and postponed 
revenues. The resulting deficits were financed by debt issuance. The EU backed their 
actions by suspending state aid rules and borrowing limits.6 In the following weeks, 
various EU institutions complemented member states’ policies by offering their own 
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support schemes. The ESM extended a safety net for sovereign borrowers via the 
Pandemic Support Scheme. The European Commission created a support scheme for 
workers in its SURE programme, while the EIB provided liquidity support for SMEs 
by creating a €25 bn Pan-European Guarantee Fund (EGF). 
Having dealt with the emergency, the EU Commission presented its proposal 
for a recovery plan, Next Generation EU (NGEU), at the end of May 2020. This plan 
became the core of the EU’s fiscal strategy during the recovery phase.7 The centrepiece 
of NGEU is the Recovery and Resilience Facility (RRF), under which member states 
have access to grants and loans worth about €672.5 bn. The RRF is funded through the 
issuance of debt by the European Commission. Member states with lower per capita 
GDP and higher pandemic-related economic damages will receive a larger share of 
the funds. 
The aim of the recovery plan is to “rebuild better”. The idea was to stimulate 
aggregate demand with measures targeted at increasing the economy’s supply 
capacity―to “rebuild better”―by fostering digital and other infrastructure and by 
tackling climate change. While the Commission set out the themes for this recovery 
package, including minimum investment thresholds for climate (37%) and digital 
(20%) investments, it was up to member states to set out how they intended to spend 
the funds in their Recovery and Resilience Plans. The European Commission’s role 
also included approving the plans and monitoring their implementation. Finally, 
the European Commission tried to ensure that the various EU member states’ fiscal 
policies were coordinated. It required that RRF-funded spending should not replace 
but add to existing public investment, and that it should be accompanied by the 
reforms proposed as part of the European Semester. 
As a result of national and EU-wide fiscal policy measures, public investment is 
forecast to rise, in particular during 2021–23. Relative to GDP, the intended level of 
spending―around 3.5% of GDP in 2021–2023―is about €80 bn larger than the 2.9% 
average for 2016–19 (Figure 6). The countercyclical nature of the RRF is visible in the 
concentration of GFCF spending during the first three years of the RRF’s life span. As 
allocations under the RRF are tilted towards member states that have a lower per capita 
GDP, and suffered more from the crisis, the increase in spending is more pronounced 
in Southern and Eastern Europe. In Southern European countries, GFCF is expected 
to rise from an average 2.2% in 2016–19 to 3.0–3.1% of GDP in 2021–23. In Central and 
Eastern European countries, the increase in GFCF could be as large as 1.9 pp, from 
3.8% to 5.7% of GDP.
7  Europe’s moment: Repair and prepare for the next generation (europa.eu).
As part of public investment, capital transfers are set to rise. Capital transfers include 
recapitalisations and incentive schemes for investments in the private sector. National 
governments tend to require co-financing for investment incentives by the private 
sector, enabling RRF funds to generate investment in excess of the support provided. A 
preliminary analysis of member states’ Recovery and Resilience Plans (RRPs) suggests 
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Fig. 6 EU Public GFCF, % GDP.
































































that RRF-financed capital transfers are set to be largest relative to GDP in Southern 
Europe (Table 1). Most of these capital transfers are investment incentives. As a result, 
capital transfers are projected to increase, close to the levels hit in the aftermath of the 
Global Financial Crisis and the subsequent European sovereign debt crisis (Figure 7). 
In those years, the increase was mainly linked to the public acquisition of domestic 
ailing banks (the lion’s share of the increase was in fact due to Ireland and Germany 
in 2010, and to Greece, Spain, Cyprus, and Portugal in 2012–14). Just as public GFCF, 
capital transfers are set to rise over the next couple of years to 1.6% of GDP in 2022. On 
average over 2021–23, capital transfers are expected to be 1.4% of GDP, around €60 bn 
per year more than the 2016–19 average. 
Table 1 RRF-Funded Public Investments and Expenditures (% of 2020 GDP)







EU 1.9 1.2 0.1 1.0
North and 
West
0.4 0.4 0.0 0.2
East 5.4 2.0 0.9
South 3.9 2.6 0.8 2.9
Source of data: EIB preliminary evaluation of EU member states’ RRPs as of end of June 2021.
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Fig. 7 EU Capital Transfers, % GDP.
Source of data: EU member states’ Stability and Convergence Plans (April 2021) and authors’ 
calculations.
A large share of RRF spending will be directed towards climate mitigation and 
digitalisation. RRPs generally describe investment projects in much detail and place 
them into the context of European and national policy. Three aspects stand out. The 
first is the priority of spending on climate mitigation and digitalisation. Member states 
plan to exceed the Commission’s targets: 41% of spending will help mitigate climate 






























































Fig. 8 Actual Climate and Digital-Related Share of Funds.
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Western European countries allocate a large share of their RRF funds to climate 
mitigation (Luxemburg, Denmark, Belgium, Finland, and France are at or above 50% 
of the resources). Southern countries, hit more severely by the pandemic, allocate 
somewhat more to other areas. 
Support for R&D will also be larger than in the past. Public R&D spending is set to 
increase, particularly in Southern and Eastern European countries. As a share of GDP, 
total resources from RRP allocated to public R&D are particularly large in Southern 
Europe (0.4% of GDP in total over six years). On an annual basis, this is about a sixth 
of Southern Europe’s public R&D spending in 2019 (Table 2). 
Table 2 Public and Private R&D Spending (% of 2020 GDP)
Region RRF spending 



















EU 0.1 0.7 0.1 1.5
North and 
West
0.0 0.9 0.2 1.9
East 0.2 0.5 0.1 0.8
South 0.4 0.5 0.1 0.8
Source of data: Eurostat; EIB preliminary evaluation of EU member states’ RRPs as of end of 
June 2021.
Capital transfers to promote private-sector R&D are relatively less important in 
Southern and Eastern European countries, and more important in the North and West. 
Capital transfers can generate a larger amount of investment by requiring the private 
sector to co-finance some of the investments. In the Recovery Plans, these capital 
transfers typically target green technologies (research related to green hydrogen 
being a clear example with explicit allocations in Italy, France, and Finland), strategic 
sectors (aeronautic sector), or the innovative capacity of SMEs. The types of subsidies 
vary across countries and programmes: they include tax allowances (for example, in 
Denmark for R&D), procurement by public-private partnerships (Ireland, France), 
and setting up investment funds that aim to co-finance investments in certain areas, 
such as tourism (Cyprus, Greece, Belgium, and Italy).
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1.3 The Implementation of Public Investment Plans Determines 
Their Success
To be successful, large public investment programmes need to be properly 
operationalised, monitored, and evaluated. A commitment to spending is not sufficient. 
Plans need to be well-designed. They need to identify barriers to investment and 
market failures to justify the public intervention. They then need to be operationalised 
by defining concrete projects that should be financed and that would not have been 
realised without public support. 
Despite differences in design, the European Fund for Strategic Investments 
(EFSI) provides some lessons. Just like the RRF, EFSI has been set up in the wake 
of a crisis to tackle its consequences. EFSI’s objective was to stimulate investment in 
the aftermath of the 2008–09 financial crisis. Similar to the RRF, EFSI targets a range 
of areas: infrastructure, environment, human capital, and improving SMEs’ access 
to finance. Both programmes require that the supported projects address market 
failures and that they could not have been carried out under existing EU programmes 
(“additionality”). In contrast to the RRF, however, EFSI did not offer grants but 
shares project risks with its beneficiaries. EFSI funds are used to provide loans, loan 
guarantees, credit enhancements, and equity-type products, including investments 
into private investment funds. Its institutional deployment is also different: while the 
RRF enables the European Commission to provide grants and loans directly to member 
states, EFSI uses a loss-sharing agreement between the European Commission and the 
EIB to allow the EIB Group to support riskier projects and borrowers. EFSI closed for 
new projects in 2020. 
EFSI offers lessons about the importance of investment advisory, private co-financing, 
additionality of investments, and transparency. First, barriers to investment do not only 
stem from access to finance. The capacity to identify concrete projects and implement 
them is equally important. For EFSI, the EIB not only provided loans but also advisory 
services. The European Investment Advisory Hub offered technical assistance, support 
and training for preparation, management, monitoring, evaluation, audit, and control 
of projects, and a platform for cooperation with partner institutions. Similar services 
should be made available when implementing RRF funds.
Second, public sector investment should be catalytic. Member states could amplify 
the impact of RRF funds by involving the private sector and national and supranational 
development banks in the funding of the projects. As of the end of 2020, EFSI supported 
732 investments in infrastructure and innovation, totalling €69.6 bn, and 816 operations 
to improve access to finance for SMEs,8 totalling €33.0 bn. The combined size of these 
operations was far smaller than those envisaged by the RRF. However, because 
EFSI support also attracted funds from other investors, including from the private 
8  Here, firms with fewer than 500 employees.
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sector, these operations mobilised considerably more investment. The EIB estimates 
that EFSI mobilised over €545.3 bn of investment. To facilitate the co-financing of 
private investors, the European Investment Project Portal was set up, allowing project 
promoters to advertise their projects and investors to search for opportunities. Even 
though much of the support from the RRF comes in the form of grants without any 
co-financing requirements, member states can choose to require their RRF-supported 
projects to be co-financed. Indeed, many plan to do so, in particular when providing 
investment subsidies to the private sector.
Third, given the large size and short deadlines of RRF funds, particular care needs 
to be taken to ensure that RRF funds generate additional investments rather than 
replace existing financing sources. Experience from EFSI suggests that the larger the 
supply of funds relative to the amount of projects waiting to be financed, the greater the 
risk that public funding only replaces other funding instead of generating additional 
investment. For the part of EFSI targeted at improving access to financing for SMEs, 
ECA (2019) found no evidence of replacement of other funds: according to interviews 
with experts, SMEs’ demand for funds substantially exceeded supply. The EIB’s own 
evaluation finds that EFSI operations provided financial and non-financial benefits 
which the market could not have provided, or not to the same extent, nor within the 
same time frame. ECA (2019) argued that about two thirds of EFSI-financed projects 
might not have been realised without EFSI support. 
Whether all RRF support leads to additional investment remains to be seen. RRF-
funded projects need to be additional to projects that take money from other EU 
sources. There is no corresponding requirement for projects without EU funding. 
In many countries, RRF funds may not be large relative to investment gaps but 
they are large relative to what the private and public sectors normally invest. In 
addition, implementation deadlines are relatively short, providing member states 
with an incentive to tag projects for RRF funding that were ready to be implemented 
anyway. Member states themselves, however, expect RRF funds to lead to additional 
investments. Based on forecasts of investments that some member states provided in 
their Stability and Convergence Programmes, capital spending funded by the RRF 
is about as large as the difference in average investment from 2021–24 to 2016–19 
(Figure 9).9
9  e.g., Belgium, France, and Italy. 
Fourth, transparency, at a minimum, helps the perception of the investment 
programme and does not lead to significantly higher costs. While the key benefit of 
transparency is to help ensure that financial support is used for its intended purpose, 
it can also help the public perception of the investment programme. In response 
to criticisms by the European Parliament and Civil Society Organisations, EFSI’s 
transparency was strengthened. The EIB published the rationale for decisions over EFSI 
funding and a scoreboard used by the EIB to assess EFSI operations while protecting 
commercially sensitive operations. As a result, the perception of EFSI improved. 
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Fig. 9 RRF-Funded Capital Spending, % GDP.
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Finally, investment plans should also be complemented by structural reforms. Public 
investments offset investment gaps that arise because market failures or investment 
barriers thwart private investment. Structural reforms can eliminate some investment 
barriers and raise GDP substantially. This was recognised in 2014 when structural 
reform recommendations complemented the creation of EFSI. It remains very relevant 
today. Consider the example of Italy, which plans RRF-funded investments of almost 
12% of 2020 GDP over the next six years. A staff working document by the European 
Commission estimated that these investments will lift Italy’s GDP permanently.10 By 
2040, Italian GDP could still be 1.1% higher relative to the case in which the investments 
were not implemented. Implementing structural reforms, even if these only halved the 
distance to the best performers, are thought to be able to raise GDP by 17% by 2040.
1.4 Will This Time Be Different?
Governments have learnt their lesson about the effects of precipitated fiscal 
consolidations. Many EU governments addressed the economic downturn in 2008–09 
with fiscal stimulus programmes. These programmes were, however, quickly reversed 
in 2010–11 as some governments were forced by markets to reduce borrowing and 
hence expenditure. Others, despite lack of market pressure, decided that it was 
prudent to consolidate budgets. Ten years later, things look different. Government 
expenditures rose substantially in 2020 to address the health crisis and its economic 
fallout. Investment increased in lockstep. Moreover, governments plan to increase 
investment even further in the next three years.
10  European Commission (2021).
The Great Reset30 
Current conditions are exceptionally benign with very low borrowing rates and 
little market pressure due to the ECB government-bonds buying programmes. Despite 
high indebtedness of some EU member states (Figure 10), borrowing rates remain low, 
also owing to large-scale government bond-buying programmes of the ECB. In his 
presidential address to the American Economic Association in 2019, Olivier Blanchard 
(Blanchard 2019) argues that when nominal growth of GDP exceeds the nominal 
interest rate, governments can afford moderate deficits and yet keep stable or even 
decreasing debt to GDP ratios.11 Moreover, he argues that, at least in the US, nominal 
growth is more often than not higher than the nominal interest rate.
The ongoing recovery creates a window of opportunity in which governments 
can act by investing. With borrowing rates close to zero and the continuing economic 
upswing, governments can focus on implementing structural policies and sustaining 
higher expenditures to address long-term issues like digitalisation, climate change, 
and social cohesion. 
Governments should also understand that the current benign conditions might 
change quickly. Blanchard made very clear in his lecture that he was calling for a 
“richer discussion” on the topic rather than to return policymaking to the thinking of 
the 1960s, when the mainstream IS-LM model demonstrated that expansionary fiscal 
policy is essentially free, while ignoring the government budget constraint. Rather, 
policymakers should take the current situation as a lucky confluence of favourable 
conditions, which may deteriorate suddenly at any point in the future. Thus, 
policymakers should take advantage and address the pressing longer-term challenges 
to their countries, but remain mindful that fiscal stimulus has not become perpetually 
free. 
An early return to the provisions of the Stability and Growth Pact in 2023 carries 
risks for public investment.12 Government expenditure rose sharply in 2020 and 
revenues declined, resulting in large increases in government debt in the EU (Figure 
10). The size of the debt increase was higher for countries with higher pre-pandemic 
debt and sharper declines in economic activity in 2020. While European policymakers 
remain committed to supportive policies to strengthen the recovery, the decision 
to reintegrate the EU fiscal rules in 2023 could require large fiscal consolidations in 
some countries, creating risks for public investment. If fiscal rules were reimposed 
without any changes, highly indebted countries may once again opt for cutting public 
investment to make ends meet. 
Policymakers face a difficult trade-off between letting the economy recover for 
longer by postponing fiscal consolidation and the risk that their borrowing costs rise 
11  This claim is seen as controversial by many. See, for instance, the dedicated section in the AEA Papers 
and Proceedings: https://www.aeaweb.org/issues/592. Blanchard himself said that this proposition 
was to stimulate debate rather than to assert fact.
12  See the European Commission’s Economic Governance Review for a discussion of how governance 
frameworks can support economic growth and sustainable government finances. 
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before they have countered the increase in debt-to-GDP ratios. Currently, even highly 
indebted countries are able to borrow and roll over debts due to large-scale bond 
buying programmes of the ECB. This, however, cannot be taken for granted if inflation 
picks up significantly, for instance. After all, current debt levels and increases largely 
exceed those in the period of the European sovereign debt crisis that precipitated the 
large fiscal corrections in Southern Europe. That said, the RRF constitutes the first 
European example of a common, joint fiscal policy action that it is based on risk-sharing 
and on the issuance of a common debt. The RRF explicitly increases EU cohesion and 
solidarity. This precedent may make it less likely that financial markets will succeed 
in testing the strength of member states’ commitment to the currency union than in 
2011–12. 
Fig. 10 Change in General Government Debt and Debt Levels in 2019, % GDP.
Source of data: EC Macroeconomic Database (AMECO), and authors’ calculations.
Note: The size of the bubbles reflects the size of the decline of GDP in 2020.
1.5 Conclusion
Following the COVID-19 crisis, the new mantra is to “rebuild better”. A strong 
commitment to supporting investment has emerged and been reflected, inter alia, 
in the EU’s Recovery and Resilience Facility. This is welcome news, as Europe had 
only just started to recover from a twenty-five-year low in public investment intensity. 
Investment gaps are large, in particular in the context of the structural changes required 
to put the economy on an environmentally more sustainable path.
Is this time different? The current fiscal programmes appear to avoid the cut to public 
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are, for the moment, exceptionally benign, creating a window of opportunity in which 
governments can act by investing and gradually putting their debts onto sustainable 
paths. These conditions might worsen quickly, however. Hence the urgent need to 
make best use of the funds to strengthen economic growth. In order to be successful, 
public investment programmes need to be properly operationalised, monitored, and 
evaluated, and should be should be complemented by structural reforms boosting 
private investment. 
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2. From Fiscal Consolidation to 
the Plan de relance:  
Investment Trends in France
Mathieu Plane and Francesco Saraceno
Introduction
This chapter traces the trends of public investment and public capital in France from 
the 1970s. Compared to other OECD countries, both the level of public capital and 
the quality of infrastructures in France are high. But the trend over at least the last 
ten years is not favourable. Gross public investment has been on a declining trend for 
years, and net public investment has shown an even greater drop, becoming negative. 
The depreciation of public capital today is not compensated by new investment. The 
net worth of public administrations is still positive but has suffered a significant fall 
and reached a worrying low point. Indeed, since 2005 public debt has grown faster 
than public capital. The first part of the chapter will summarise and actualise the 
analysis of Plane and Saraceno (2020) on the dynamics of the public capital stock in 
France. The second part will initially look at the French response to the COVID-19 
crisis and then describe the €100 bn Plan de relance (Plan de relance) that was presented 
in September 2020.
2.1 Trends in Public Investment before the Pandemic
How did public capital in France evolve from the late 1970s? What are its main 
characteristics and how is it measured? Which public institutions hold this capital? 
How did investment flows and depreciation shape it? What is the net position of public 
administrations today? This section will address these questions. 
What is referred to as public capital covers a wide variety of assets, such as land, 
residential buildings, ports, dams, roads, but also intellectual property rights. It is 
necessary to break down the “wealth of the state” into these different components to 
understand its dynamics considering, as we will show below, that price (most notably 
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land prices) and volume effects may play a significant role in explaining the evolution 
of the different components, and of aggregate figures.
The data we use are from the INSEE national accounts, which are public; our analysis 
covers the period 1978–2020 for the decomposition of net wealth and 1949–2020 for 
investment. INSEE reports the consolidated level (general government, GG) and its 
components, distinguishing between the central government (CG), local governments 
(LG), social security administrations (SSA), and other government agencies (OGA).
Public investment in France has seen contrasting trends in recent decades. While it 
was rather dynamic until the late 2000s, at the turn of 2010 the fiscal stance changed, and 
a substantial part of fiscal consolidation was achieved by reducing capital expenditure. 
Indeed, the reduction of public investment has contributed to almost a third of fiscal 
consolidation even though investment only represented 6% of public expenditure. The 
share of public investment on GDP, which had largely been above 4% since the 1960s 
(Figure 1), fell below that level in 2011 and, during the period 2015–18, reached its 
lowest level since 1952. Spurred on by the new rules of local communities’ management 
and the effect of the electoral cycle linked to municipal elections, the investment rate 
has improved in 2019–2020 but has not, however, returned to its average level of the 
2000s. In 2020, due to health restrictions, public investment contracted by 4.4% but 
held up rather well in the face of the decline in GDP (-7.9%). Nevertheless, the drop in 
investment fatally impacted the stock of public capital.
Fig. 1 General Government Investment Rate (as a % of GDP).
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In 2020, the consolidated public sector had a positive net wealth in spite of the negative 
impact of the COVID-19 crisis (Table 1). Total assets held represented 172% of GDP, of 
which 103% was for non-financial assets. Financial liabilities totalled 164% of GDP. The 
net worth in 2020 was therefore 8.2% of GDP, around €2800 per capita.
Table 1 Decomposition of General Government Net Wealth
As a % of GDP In euros per 
head
1978 2007 2020 2020
Non-financial assets 60.8 90.4 102.8 35210
Financial assets 27.6 52.6 69.0 23620
Financial liabilities 33.7 84.9 163.5 56020
Net worth 54.7 58.1 8.2 2810
Source of data: INSEE and authors’ calculations.
While positive, the consolidated net wealth is at its lowest level since 1978. Indeed, 
after reaching a record level in 2007 (58% of GDP), it has lost fifty points of GDP in 
the space of thirteen years. The reasons for this sharp drop are to be found on the net 
financial liabilities (debt) side that increased substantially while non-financial assets 
increased slightly.
This net worth is unevenly distributed among different levels of government. Indeed, 
it is very positive for local administrations (70% of GDP in 2020), very negative for the 
state (-80% of GDP in 2020), and slightly positive for social security administrations 
and other government agencies (8% and 10% respectively). Broadly speaking, the 
central government―which runs recurrent public deficits―has accumulated public 
debt; low-debt local governments hold non-financial assets, be it land, buildings, or 
civil engineering works. With the economic and financial crisis, from 2008 on, the 
central government net worth deteriorated considerably, as public deficits and debt 
increased. On the other hand, the net worth of local governments remained high and 
relatively stable over the same period due to a stable value of non-financial assets and 
of their debt.
In 2020, non-financial assets (NFAs) of the general government represented 60% 
of total assets and accounted for 103% of GDP. These figures can be further divided 
into fixed capital (produced NFAs), which is the result of past public investments, and 
land (non-produced NFAs).
Fixed assets account for 55% of GDP, mostly civil engineering works and non-
residential buildings (47% of GDP), with 8% being public housing, machinery and 
equipment, weapon systems, and intellectual property rights. Non-produced NFAs 
represent 47% of GDP, most of which (98%) constitutes land owned by the general 
government. Unlike fixed assets, non-produced NFAs do not depreciate, and their 
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Fig. 2 Evolution of General Government Net Wealth as a % of GDP.






















evolution depends mainly on land prices. These prices have been the main cause of 
change since the 1970s (details on the decomposition by type of assets and by level of 
government can be found in Plane and Saraceno 2020).
Fixed capital is given by calculating the past accumulation of realised investments 
net of depreciation. Between the end of the 1970s and 2020, the value of fixed assets 
held by the general government ranged from 47% to 55% of GDP, showing significantly 
lower volatility than the value of non-produced NFAs. This is because fixed assets 
experience much smaller price changes than land.
Since 1978―but also since 2007―it has been the non-residential buildings, and to 
a lesser extent the intellectual property rights, which have seen the larger increase of 
their share in fixed assets.
The analysis of gross investment needs to be complemented by the net flow of 
fixed assets (net investment), to assess the dynamics of the capital stock (abstracting 
from the effects of revaluation of the existing stock). Thus, if gross investment is 
greater (lower) than the depreciation of capital (consumption of fixed capital, CFC, in 
national accounts’ nomenclature), then net investment increases (decreases) and the 
stock of capital increases (decreases). Unlike fixed assets, non-produced NFAs (land) 
and inventories may experience changes in value but are not subject to consumption of 
fixed capital. CFC only applies to fixed assets.
Over the period from the late 1970s to the first half of the 1990s, general government 
net investment was strong, averaging more than 1% of GDP per year (Figure 3). It even 
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experienced a strong boom over the period 1987–92, averaging above 1.4% of GDP per 
year. From 1993 to 1998 however, general government net investment declined sharply, 
reaching 0.5% of GDP in 1998, a decrease of 1% of GDP in the space of six years. Like in 
other European countries, this is mostly due to the effort to meet the Maastricht criteria 
in the run-up to adopting the euro: the cyclically adjusted deficit for France decreased 
from 4.6% of GDP in 1993 to 1.8% in 1998. Past this phase, net investment recovered, 
then fluctuated between 0.7 and 0.9% of GDP over the 2000–10 period, without ever 
returning to the level observed during the 1980s and the first half of the 1990s. But 
it is mainly from 2011, following the Global Financial Crisis, that net investment has 
experienced a break. Since then, it has been at its the lowest level since the late 1970s, 
when the wealth accounts were introduced.
Fig. 3 Net General Government Investment by Component as a % of GDP.
Source of data: Insee. Figure created by the authors.
Thus, during the period 2014–18, France has spent about 0.7% of GDP (about €17 bn 
by year in constant 2020 euros) less on net investment than it did during the period 
2000–10, and 1.4% (approximately €34 bn by year in constant 2020 euros) less than 
during the period 1990–92.
While the central government contributed positively, albeit weakly, to net investment 
until the early years of the 2000s, since 2005 central government net investment has 
moved into negative territory. It is, in fact, local governments which have historically 
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the one hand, with the Global Financial Crisis that reduced own resources levied by 
local governments, and, on the other hand, with the reduction of endowments to local 
governments that followed fiscal consolidation―net investment by local governments 
has collapsed from 0.8% of GDP in 2007 to 0% in 2016. Since then, it has recovered 
slightly, to a level that barely offsets the destruction of capital by the central government 
and by social security administrations.
The picture that emerges from the analysis of stocks and flows is rather consistent 
and gives two main messages: the first is that public investment and the stock of capital 
have been largely affected by the macroeconomic cycle. In the two significant phases of 
fiscal consolidation―the run-up to adopting the euro in the 1990s and the aftermath 
of the sovereign debt crisis―investment was strongly reduced. Especially in the latter 
case, net investment turned negative of zero for all levels of government, thus reducing 
the stock of capital that, before the pandemic, was at an all-time low. The second 
message, that emerges in particular from the analysis of stocks, is that in spite of these 
trends in investment, the capital stock in France is still significant (and larger than in 
other countries, as can be seen by looking at the other chapters of this outlook). One 
might ask then if the effort of consolidation, and the disproportionate burden that it 
has laid on public investment, at least led to more sustainable public finances.
If we compare the evolution over the last twenty years of non-financial assets’ 
net flows in relation to the primary net financial flow (financial assets―financial 
liabilities―interest expenses), which we consider here as a proxy of the net worth, 
two sub-periods emerge clearly. The first, which runs from 1996 to 2008, is a period in 
which the additional public net financial debt (excluding interest expense) was more 
than offset by the net accumulation of non-financial assets, leading to a positive net 
value on this period, which means that the general government stock of wealth has 
increased in value over this period, even abstracting from price effects. The second 
period, which runs from 2009 to 2020, shows a new pattern in which the net debt 
increase is no longer offset by an increase in public non-financial capital, generating 
a sharp deterioration in government net worth. The economic and financial and 
economic crisis has led to a sharp increase in public debt. Fiscal consolidation started 
being implemented in 2011: while on one hand it has partly reduced new financial 
commitments, on the other hand this has been more than offset by a reduction in 
the net accumulation of non-financial assets. This is further proof of the fact that the 
burden of fiscal consolidation was disproportionately laid on the shoulders of public 
investment. The sharp reduction in net worth therefore casts doubt on the effectiveness 
of fiscal consolidation in strengthening the public finances outlook for France.
2.2 Public Investment during the Pandemic 
A recovery in public investment began in the two years before the COVID-19 crisis, with 
an increase of nearly 14% between the end of 2017 and the end of 2019. This movement 
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was linked to the electoral cycle of municipal elections and the government’s desire to 
preserve investment within the framework of the targeted budget contract with local 
communities. While a partial reversal in public investment was expected after the 
municipal elections, the drop observed in the first half of 2020 is out of proportion to 
that observed in previous electoral cycles (Figure 4).
Indeed, the COVID-19 crisis led to a drop of 11% in public investment during 
the first half of 2020 compared to the second half of 2019 (with a fall to 16% during 
the second quarter of 2020). By way of comparison, the three strongest half-yearly 
decreases observed for the previous seventy years were between 5% and 6%. The fall 
in public investment during the first half of 2020 was therefore twice as strong as the 
most severe reversals since 1950.
Fig. 4 General Government Investment―Constant Prices, in Billion Euros.
Source of data: Insee and authors’ calculations.
The reason for the drop can be traced to the virtual halt of the economy. The first 
lockdown, from 17 March to 11 May 2020, was characterised by very strong health 
restrictions and a historic drop in GDP of more than 30% during the period. The 
restrictive measures of that lockdown impacted most sectors of the economy, 
including construction, with the almost total shutdown of most construction sites. The 
construction sector lost more than 60% of its added value in April 2020 (compared to 
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However, from the third quarter of 2020, public investment returned close to its 
pre-COVID level despite two other lockdowns (in November-December 2020 and 
March-April 2021). This is because the two subsequent lockdowns were less restrictive: 
activities related to construction were no longer stopped, and non-teleworking activities 
were, in general, less restricted. In addition, the government voted in September 2020 
for a €100 bn Plan de relance, which includes a section on public infrastructure, with 
particular emphasis on the thermal renovation of public buildings and increased 
planned investment from the start of the year 2021 (see Section 3.4).
Overall, public investment contracted by 4.4% in 2020. This is a relatively modest 
drop, especially when compared to the fall in the level of activity, the highest on 
record. It is not the most important contraction in recent times; in 2014 and 2015, public 
investment fell more than 4%, despite positive growth rates, because of fiscal austerity 
and the reduction of local governments’ endowments. The pandemic overall had a 
lesser negative impact on public investment than fiscal consolidation. The resilience of 
public investment in 2020 has helped to slow down the fall in activity and contributes 
to the ongoing and future recovery of the French economy. However, taking into 
account the depreciation of public productive capital, net investment only increased to 
0.2% of GDP in 2020. It is 0.2 points % of GDP less than in 2019. The investment gap to 
be filled, stemming from the drastic drop of the first semester, is of almost €5 bn. 
2.3 The Plan de Relance of September 2020
There are several reasons that lead us to believe that, as of today, the multiplier of 
public investment for France would be quite significant, in the upper range of estimates 
(Creel et al. 2011; Le Garrec and Touzé 2020). First, the French government finances 
its ten-year debt at a historically low nominal rate (around 0.2% in June 2021), which 
means that the real rate is almost zero and is becoming negative with the desirable 
return of an inflation rate close to 2%. Second, in spite of recent spikes in inflation, 
the medium-term forecast for inflation remains subdued, so that interest rates will 
remain low for quite some time; this will limit crowding out of private investment (see 
Chapter 7 of this volume). Finally, the output gap and (more importantly) the slack 
in the labour market leads us to believe that, in the short run, the multiplier will also 
be quite large. 
It is in this context that the French government unveiled, in September 2020, the 
contents of the Plan de relance worth €100 bn over two years, part of which (€40 bn) is 
financed with funds from the Recovery and Resilience Facility, the flagship item of the 
Next Generation EU programme. Like all other major EU countries (except for Italy), 
France made the choice of only using the grants of the Recovery Facility. Of the €100 
bn, around €36.7 bn will be dedicated to public investment (see Table 2).
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Table 2 The Investment Component of the Plan de relance (in Billion Euros)
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The Plan de relance is focused on three components, each weighing a third of the total: 
an “ecological transaction” component, for around a third of the plan (€30 bn); a 
“competitiveness” component (€34 bn), aimed at supporting businesses (especially 
small and medium enterprises) with aid and tax cuts; and a “cohesion” section (€36 
bn), for the most part dedicated to supporting local communities. If we look at the 
public investment components of the plan (the €36.7 bn detailed in Table 2), ecological 
transition has the lion’s share, with €18 bn (50% of total investment), followed by 
cohesion (€15.1 bn or 40% of public investment). Only 10% of the public investment 
component of the plan will go to competitiveness.
If we look into the details of the ecological transition component, €4.5 bn will be 
allocated to the thermal renovation of public buildings, and to the energy renovation 
and major rehabilitation of social housing. Investment in transport (daily mobility, 
rail networks, and other transport infrastructure) will absorb €6.5 bn. With regard 
to competitiveness, the public investment effort will be concentrated on the digital 
upgrading of the central and local governments, in particular the digitisation of public 
services (€1.5 bn) and support for heritage renovations in the domain of culture. With 
regard to the cohesion component, public investment will mainly be allocated to health 
(€6 bn), support for investment by local authorities (up to €5.2 bn), and the Plan de 
relance of the Banque des Territoires (construction of social housing and land for small 
businesses), for €3 bn.
Like for other countries, the challenge for France is the deployment of the Plan de 
relance according to the timeline presented to the Commission. The disbursement of 
funding will be conditional to the attainment of milestones and results detailed in 
the plan. The second issue is a territorialisation of the Plan de relance, especially for its 
investment component. We saw that local authorities account for a large part of public 
investment. Capacity building and coordination among local governments and the 
central government will be central to the success of the plan.
On top of the €6 bn devoted in 2020 to measures to promote youth employment, 
green technologies, and infrastructure, the Plan de relance should, based on our 
estimates,1 mobilise €34 bn in 2021 (1.4% of GDP) and €28 bn in 2022 (1.1% of GDP). 
A reasonable assessment of the impact of these expenditures requires a detailed and 
disaggregated analyisis, as sectoral and functional multipliers may be quite different 
(for details, see Ducoudre et al. 2020). A significant percentage of the Plan de relance 
rolled out in 2021 (38%) focused on non-targeted support for businesses, in particular 
through a cut in production taxes. In a time of high uncertainty, these measures will 
not be particularly effective in revitalising investment in the short-term and will have 
a low multiplier the first year (estimated at 0.3). While the Plan de relance is betting on 
1 Our evaluation is focused only on the Plan de relance and doesn’t consider the emergency measures 
for 2020–21 which represent 7.2% of GDP. The main objectives of these short-term measures are 
to maintain revenues of households and firms, limit job destruction, and fund emergency health 
expenditures.
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public investment, only 30% of the plan for 2021 is used to fund public investment. 
Even though the public investment multipliers are high (close to one), the slow speed 
of project implementation explains the expected modest improvement in growth in 
2021 induced by public investment. In 2022, the share of the Plan de relance earmarked 
for public investment is expected to increase to 39%.
In contrast, job retention schemes, measures to promote employment and strengthen 
equity capital, sector-based subsidies, and assistance for the poorest households are 
supporting employees’ income and the financial position of companies coping with the 
long-term impact of the health restrictions and changes in consumer behaviour. These 
measures, which represent 43% of the plan for 2021, will yield a strong multiplier 
effect in the short term (Figure 5). The Plan de relance is projected to boost GDP by 1.3% 
in 2021 (after an impact of 0.3% of GDP in 2020), which corresponds to a multiplier of 
0.9. In 2022, the Plan de relance measures are expected to amount to €28 bn euros (1.1% 
of GDP) and to have an impact on growth of 0.8% of GDP. The fiscal multiplier in 2022 
(0.7) would be slightly below that of 2021, mainly because of the increasing share of 
non-targeted measures (39%); in contrast, the weight of targeted measures declines 
sharply between 2021 and 2022 (from 43% to 20%). In total, the Plan de relance would 
result in a cumulative gain in economic activity of 2.4% of GDP over the period 2020–
22, for a cumulative fiscal impulse of 2.8% of GDP, which corresponds to a multiplier 
Fig. 5 Impact of the Plan de relance on French GDP and Breakdown by Three Categories of Measures, 
% of GDP.
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of 0.85. Over the same period, the public investment component would boost GDP by 
0.7%, representing 30% of the total impact of the Plan de relance. 
On 11 July 2021, President Macron announced a new investment plan to follow the 
€100 bn Plan de relance and “build the France of 2030”. While the 2020 stimulus plan 
was composed of very disparate measures, the new one would only target investment 
for strategic sectors, such as hydrogen, semiconductors, or electric batteries. The 
resources devoted to these future investments in the 2020s will be unveiled on the 
occasion of the budget project for 2022, presented in the fall of 2021. The plan will 
hopefully significantly increase public investment, and eventually strengthen the 
potential growth rate of the French economy.
2.4 Conclusion
In the run-up to the COVID-19 crisis, France followed the trend of all the European 
countries, who in the past decade have seen public investment decrease quite 
substantially and capital stock deplete. It is true that, thanks to the sustained investment 
dynamics of previous decades, France ranks highly in both the quantity of public 
capital and the quality of its infrastructures; but in terms of flows, it is today near an 
all-time low. The reversal started at the time of the Global Financial Crisis of 2008. 
Despite the rhetoric of the time, national account data show that it was not countered 
with a public investment push: the sharp increase of debt between 2007 and 2017 
did not correspond to an accumulation of public capital. On the contrary, investment 
paid the heaviest toll in the subsequent consolidation phase, when both expenditure 
reduction by the central government and cuts to transfers to local administrations (the 
largest owner of non-financial assets) resulted in a significant loss of public capital. 
Thus, in the space of a decade, the French general government saw its net investment 
drop to very low levels, and its net worth decrease by fifty points of GDP, to an all-time 
low in 2018. An even greater source of concern is that the previous increase of the net 
worth, in the 2000s, is mostly attributed to a price effect of non-produced non-financial 
assets (land and real estate; see Plane and Saraceno 2020, for details).
In 2018 and 2019, thanks—amongst other things—to the electoral cycle associated 
with the municipal elections, public investments seemed to recover slightly. But with 
the pandemic and the harsh lockdown of spring 2020, it dropped brutally in the second 
quarter of the year. Despite the subsequent rebound, its overall level for 2020 marks 
yet another drop. 
The European Commission, led by Ursula von der Leyen, that took office in late 
2019 has put public investment, most notably in ecological transition and digitalisation, 
at the centre of its agenda. These priorities were carried into the massive effort for the 
recovery that the Commission has launched with the Next Generation EU programme, 
more specifically with the Recovery and Resilience Facility. France has decided to 
embed the Facility grants financing in its Plan de relance that, over two years, will devote 
2. From Fiscal Consolidation to the Plan de relance: Investment Trends in France  45
€100 bn to recovery (of which €36.7 bn will go to public investment), so that the effects 
of the pandemic will definitively be left behind. The Plan de relance allocates the funds 
along the guidelines given by the Commission, with particular emphasis (compared 
to other countries) on the green component.
This effort is quite considerable, but it is certainly not going to be enough for the 
task of completing the modernisation and the greening of the French economy.There 
will certainly be the need for further long-term investment plans. This is why, past 
the pandemic, the emphasis will go back to national fiscal policies. Most of the essays 
contained in the previous volume of the European Public Investment Outlook (Cerniglia 
and Saraceno 2020), including our chapter on France, called for a preferential 
treatment for investment (a “golden rule”). The consultation process on the reform 
of the Stability Pact, slowed down by the pandemic, is now in its final stages, and the 
Commission will formulate a reform proposal in the coming months. A golden rule, 
even if limited to some categories of spending such as digitalisation and ecological 
transition, would be particularly important for a large economy like France, in which 
domestic demand and sustained investment (both public and private) are necessary 
to ensure long-term growth. 
The explosion of public debt during the pandemic might nevertheless force us to 
be cautious of the capacity to carry on the necessary public investment efforts. In other 
words, it is legitimate to ask whether the fiscal space exists for the massive investment 
in key sectors such as ecological transition. Global public debt has reached a level that 
is unprecedented, exceeding the peak reached during World War II (IMF 2021). This 
is not the case for France’s public debt, which could nevertheless reach a high level 
of 116% of GDP in 2021, according to the most recent figures, i.e., eighteen points 
of GDP more than in 2019, and nearly sixty points more than in 2007. Nevertheless, 
this unprecedented rise of public debt emerges in a context of historically low levels 
of interest rates (Ragot 2021), that are at or close to zero for maturities of up to ten 
years. It should be remembered that the French State raised, at the beginning of 2021, 
a record amount of seven billion fifty-year at a fixed rate of 0.59%, attracting in the 
process orders for seventy-five billion. The peculiarity of this period, therefore, is that 
despite historically high debt levels, interest payments for France have never been so 
low in the past forty years. Since 2007, the effective cost of debt has been decreasing 
because of falling effective interest rates. This tendency towards subdued interest rates 
is likely to persist, in a situation of structural excess savings. This, in turn, will keep 
central bank policy rates close to the current zero or negative rates over the medium 
run.
The widespread increase of public debt is, of course, the unintentional result of the 
2008 and COVID-19 crisis. But it is also the result of a political choice, made possible 
in an environment of low interest rates, in order to stabilise aggregate demand and 
avoid a sharp rise in unemployment. The near-zero interest rates on long maturities 
offers France a real opportunity to invest in projects with high economic, social, and 
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environmental returns and to enhance its potential growth. This long-term investment 
policy, with returns larger than costs, would be a wise economic choice. Markets and 
the ECB are handing to France the opportunity to strengthen its economy and improve 
competitiveness, as well as the wellbeing and standard of living of its population, 
while at the same time improving sustainability, thanks to better long-term growth 
prospects. It would be a shame to let this opportunity slip. The new investment plan 
to “build the France of 2030”, presented in October by President Macron, goes in this 
direction, and this is a good thing for the French economy.
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3. Public Investment in Germany:  
Much More Needs to Be Done
Katja Rietzler and Andrew Watt
Introduction
The analysis of the German situation in last year’s issue of the European Public 
Investment Outlook described public investment and the public capital stock since 
the German reunification. It contrasted the development of German infrastructure 
with economic and population growth, and showed that public investment had been 
insufficient for more than a decade. The country needed massive public investment 
in a number of fields to modernise its infrastructure as well as ensure that Germany 
meets its own climate policy goals (Dullien et al. 2020c). This year’s chapter looks at 
the most recent developments. It begins with an overall analysis of public investment 
across policy fields and the activities of different levels of government. The next section 
focuses on the massive stimulus package, which the German government launched in 
summer 2020―the so-called “Konjunktur- und Zukunftspaket” (stimulus and future 
package). We analyse the investment content of the package and the progress of its 
implementation. The third section focuses on the German Recovery and Resilience 
Plan (Deutscher Aufbau und Resilienzplan, DARP) as part of the EU’s NextGeneration 
programme, noting the very substantial overlap with the domestic stimulus plan. The 
fourth section presents recent simulations by the Macroeconomic Policy Institute 
(IMK) with the National Institute`s Global Economic Model (NIGEM), which show 
that under the current financial conditions a substantial credit-financed public 
investment initiative is compatible with a reduction of the debt-to-GDP ratio (Dullien 
et al. 2021). The concluding section sums up the resulting policy recommendations.
3.1 Public Construction Investment Softened in the Pandemic, 
Equipment Massively Increased 
Since the early 2000s, Germany has recorded a substantial investment backlog, which 
has become more and more prominent in the economic policy debate in the wake of a 
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report by the DIW Berlin in 2013 (Bach et al. 2013). As already shown in the previous 
European Public Investment Outlook (Dullien et al. 2020c), net public investment was 
negative during much of the last two decades. Stimulus packages following the financial 
crisis of 2008–09 caused a temporary increase in public investment. However, when 
they were phased out in 2012, real gross fixed capital formation of the government 
sector in Germany was only slightly above the level of the year 2000. 
A sustained upward trend started only in 2015 (Figure 1).1 It was driven by two main 
factors: firstly, Germany’s population rose sharply due to the migration of hundreds 
of thousands of refugees, creating an urgent need for additional infrastructure; 
secondly, the fiscal situation improved rapidly with the strong recovery after the 
Global Financial Crisis. From 2014 onwards, both the federal government and the 
states (taken together) recorded rising fiscal surpluses, which made it easier to finance 
new investment projects. The increase was particularly pronounced in construction as 
well as machinery and equipment,2 whereas other investment3 had already been on a 
steady upward trend since the 1990s. 
Fig. 1 Quarterly Real Gross Fixed Capital Formation of the Government Sector (in Billion Euros, 
Prices from 2015).
Source of data: Destatis, Quarterly National Accounts, seasonally adjusted, 1991 Q1 until 2021 Q1. 
The public investment backlog is most pronounced in construction, where net 
investment has been negative since 2003. In 2015 the negative public construction 
investment trend was reversed, but depreciation still exceeded new construction 
1  Data as of early August 2021.
2  Since the introduction of the ESA 2010 in 2014, public investment in machinery and equipment 
includes military spending on weapons.
3  Other investment consists mostly of investment in research and development. 
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investment in 2020. Insufficient infrastructure investment is largely a problem of the 
local government level, which is responsible―amongst other things―for schools, 
childcare facilities, and municipal roads, and accounts for about 60% of construction 
investment. Local government investment increased steeply after 2017, in parallel to 
rising investment grants both from the states and from federal programmes. However, 
after years of stagnating investment, the municipalities face serious bottlenecks. They 
have insufficient staff in their planning departments after years of job cuts and are 
confronted with capacity constraints in a booming construction industry (Scheller et al. 
2021). Nevertheless, municipal investment, 85% of which is construction investment, 
rose by 33.3% in real terms (Figure 2). The national data conceal considerable regional 
disparities.
Developments since the first quarter of 2020 have been dominated by the COVID-
19 pandemic and other one-off factors. Government construction investment declined 
two quarters in a row last summer, and is now slightly below the pre-crisis level 
and slightly below the level of twenty years earlier. In the second quarter of 2020, 
investment in machinery and equipment surged and declined again in subsequent 
quarters. According to Destatis, this temporary increase was due to a large defence 
project as well as regional spending on the railways. Overall, public gross fixed capital 
formation has lost some momentum in recent quarters. 
Fig. 2 Annual Real Gross Capital Formation of Government Subsectors (in Billion Euros, Reference 
Year 2015).
Source of data: Destatis, Annual National Accounts, price adjustment by IMK using weighted 
deflators for government subsectors. Investment of social security is not presented, as it is negligible.
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3.2 Investment Projects under the Stimulus and Future Investment 
Package: Limited Scope and Slow Progress 
On 3 June 2020, the German government published its “stimulus and future package”. 
Its focus was on stabilising incomes and consumption, as well as businesses, in the 
COVID-19 crisis. Key elements were a temporary lowering of the VAT rate in the 
second half of 2020, a reduction of the renewable energy levy in 2021, and generous 
subsidies to support businesses adversely affected by the anti-COVID measures. In 
addition to the usual criteria of being timely, targeted, and temporary (Elmendorf and 
Furman 2008), the package also aimed to be transformative. This is why it is split 
into two parts: a stimulus package (“Konjunkturpaket”) and the future package 
(“Zukunftspaket”), a medium-term programme consisting largely of investment in 
key areas such as decarbonisation and climate-friendly mobility, digitalisation and the 
modernisation of the health sector. The total volume of quantified measures in both 
packages adds up to €171.6 bn, of which roughly €130 bn was supposed be effective in 
2020–21 (BMF 2020; Dullien et al. 2020a).
As several measures were not quantified― e.g., the extension of the short-time 
work scheme beyond 2020―and subsidies to business as well as spending to contain 
the pandemic have repeatedly been upgraded, the overall volume of the package 
could be even higher. The measures of the Zukunftspaket amount to €57.9 bn, of which 
€43.9 bn is either direct public investment or investment grants.4 At the same time, 
the stimulus package includes investment totalling €13.9 bn. Overall investment in the 
stimulus and future investment package thus amounts to €57.8 bn, or roughly one 
third of the total quantified amount (Table 1). 
At first sight, this looks impressive. However, in some cases, the planned 
implementation stretches beyond 2025, translating into an annual allocation in the 
single-digit billions of euros. Total investment in the stimulus and future investment 
package thus covers only about 12% of the requirements identified by the IMK and 
IW Köln in their joint report, which was endorsed by both the German Trade Union 
Confederation and the Federation of German Industries (Bardt et al. 2019). The order 
of magnitude of the institutes’ estimate, a total of €457 bn over ten years, was classified 
as “not implausible” by the Board of Academic Advisors at the Federal Ministry of 
Economic Affairs and Energy (BMWi 2020).
Furthermore, not all of the investment is additional. €10 bn of the package refers to 
planned investments of the federal government that were to be brought forward. If one 
looks at the statistics of the past year, there has not been much additional investment. 
According to the national accounts, gross capital formation of the federal government 
at current prices increased by just €1.9 bn in 2020. 
4  The future investment package also includes measure such as additional staff in the health sector 
(€4 bn), humanitarian aid in the pandemic (€3 bn), or an equity increase for Deutsche Bahn (€5 bn), 
which mostly covers losses of the German rail company during the crisis.
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Moreover, implementation is lagging in some areas. An example is the national 
hydrogen strategy, the largest individual item of the future investment package, with a 
total scope of €7 bn.5 Of this amount, less than €0.6 bn is to be disbursed until the end 
of 2021. As the package was only launched in mid-2020, it was clear that not too much 
could be achieved that year, but, at less than €0.4 bn, the plan for 2021 is also quite 
unambitious, after being scaled down from €1.7 bn in the original draft budget. This 
is all the more problematic if one takes into account that the government’s hydrogen 
strategy is far too small in dimension, compared to what would be needed. A recent 
working paper by Tom Krebs of the University of Mannheim, one of Germany’s leading 
experts on investment, calls for a much more ambitious hydrogen strategy combining 
massive infrastructure investment (both in Germany and across Europe) and industrial 
policies. With an overall budget of €100 bn until 2030, it would be more than eight 
times the size of the current plans. More importantly, it envisages a much more active 
role of the government and substantial hydrogen production within Germany, which 
is seen as a prerequisite for sustaining Germany’s technological leadership position 
(Krebs 2021).
When assessing the impact of the stimulus measures on investment, it is insufficient 
to look only at direct investment expenditures in the packages, as some measures 
have a beneficial indirect effect. As the municipalities play a central role in German 
infrastructure investment, their financial situation is vital. Depending strongly on 
the highly cyclical trade tax (Gewerbesteuer), the municipalities would have had 
to cut spending, investment in particular, if the federal and state governments had 
not reimbursed the revenue losses of the trade tax fully in 2020.6 In addition, the 
federal government raised its reimbursements of municipalities’ expenditure on 
accommodation and heating for long-term unemployed people substantially and 
permanently. This enabled the municipalities to continue investing strongly, albeit at 
a slightly slower pace than in the two preceding years, most probably also because of 
restrictions in the pandemic. As revenue losses continue in 2021, with federal and state 
governments not planning to compensate the municipalities for their revenue losses 
again, it remains to be seen whether the municipalities can sustain their dynamic 
investment activity.
3.3 German Recovery and Resilience Plan: Substantial Overlap 
with Stimulus and Future Package 
In a major step forward for European integration, in late 2020, after fraught 
negotiations, the member states agreed to set up a Recovery and Resilience Facility 
5  With an additional €2 bn earmarked for international cooperation on hydrogen and €3 bn from 
European sources, the total hydrogen budget adds up to €12 bn (Krebs 2021). 
6  Federal and state governments each bore half of the trade tax revenue losses. The Federal Ministry of 
Finance reported the federal share as €6.1 bn (BMF 2021).
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(Watzka and Watt 2020). Under the scheme, the European Commission is empowered 
to borrow, on behalf of the EU, hundreds of billions of euros on financial markets. Up 
to €672.5 bn is to be made available to member states, roughly half as grants, and the 
other half as loans. The money is to be spent on agreed priorities. The mechanism, 
in a nutshell, is for member states to submit national plans which are approved first 
by the Commission, then the Council. Funds are then disbursed, providing member 
states achieve agreed milestones. Disbursement and programme expenditures are 
foreseen to run until 2026. The member states have committed to servicing these 
debts over the long term (until 2058) via the EU budget―if agreement can be 
reached by means of new “own resources”.
Germany submitted a first draft of its national plan at the end of 2020, and the 
final version―Deutscher Aufbau- und Resilienzplan (DARP)―on 27 April 2021. It 
runs to 1250 pages. Germany is seeking funding only under the grants pillar of the 
RRF: it is not applying for RRF loans, as the servicing costs of such loans are not lower 
than Germany can currently obtain on financial markets. The discussion here focuses 
on aspects that can be considered, in a broad sense, as public investment;7 planned 
reforms are not discussed.
3.3.1 Overview of the DARP
For Germany, the volume for grants available under the RRF is small. It is estimated 
to be €23.6 bn in 2018 prices and €25.6 bn in current prices; this is less than 0.8% 
of annual GDP (2020) and will be spread over a period of six years (2021–26). In 
macroeconomic terms, the RRF is of limited direct importance for Germany, much 
less than the domestic stimulus and recovery package. This reflects both the fact that 
the RRF is strongly redistributive in favour of low-income member states and those 
hardest hit by the pandemic (Watzka and Watt 2020) and also Germany’s decision to 
forgo the loans component. The country also benefits indirectly, however, via the boost 
the RRF gives to its close trading partners.
The German government puts a value of just under €28 bn on the forty measures 
brought together in the DARP, for which it is seeking EU funding. These are divided 
into six priorities which are structured a little differently, but overall are congruent 
with the six policy areas set out in the RFF. They are:
1. Climate and energy
2. Digitalisation of the economy and infrastructure
3. Digitalisation of education
7  In its analysis of the DARP (DARP, p. 1110), the DIW classifies around 61% of spending as either public 
investment or an investment subsidy. But a substantial proportion of what is termed government 
consumption in the naitonal accounts (just under 21% of DARP spending) can be considered 
investment in a broader sense (e.g., salaries of additional educational or healthcare staff). 
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4. Strengthening social inclusion
5. Strengthening the health system, especially related to pandemics
6. Modern administration/removing investment barriers
An overview of the division of planned expenditures between these six priorities (and 
some of the most important subcategories) is given in Table 1―which also shows 
spending plans in the national “stimulus and future package”―and in Figure 3. 
Fig. 3 Contribution of Main DARP Sections to Total Expenditure, in %.
Source of data: DARP, p. 10.
EU rules stipulate that at least 37% of expenditure of the RRF should be on climate-
protection projects; 20% is to be devoted to digitalisation. According to the German 
government, more than 40% of DARP-spending is concentrated in the first priority, 
climate/energy. Regarding digitalisation, Germany has made this goal explicit in 
pillars two and three of the DARP, which total more than 25%. Because digitalisation 
has been “mainstreamed” across other thematic areas, Germany claims that as much 
as 50% of spending under the DARP will contribute to the digitalisation goal.
There is considerable scope for applying false labels―“greenwashing”―and 
double-counting in such claims. With this in mind, we take a closer look at the main 
proposed projects. To simplify the exposition, Chapters 2 and 3, and 5 and 6 are 
considered together. 
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Table 1 Comparison of German RRF and Domestic Stimulus Plan.
Source of data: German Reconstruction and Resilience Plan (Deutscher Aufbau und Resilienzplan, 
DARP), Written Statement of the German Council of Economic Experts on DARP, Table 7 of Annex, 
simplified and aggregated presentation of IMK, German Federal Government (2020).
Components of Resilience Plan Euro bn Measures of stimulus and future 
package ("Konjunktur- und 
Zukunftspaket") 
Euro bn 
3.3.2 Climate and Energy
The climate and energy pillar consists of three packages of measures: decarbonisation 
with a focus on renewable (green) hydrogen, efforts to promote climate-friendly 
mobility, and construction/housing. Representing 40.3% of the total, it is, by a 
considerable margin, the most important section of the DARP.
A total of €3.26 bn is allocated to decarbonisation. Notable is the cooperation with, 
in particular, France on developing electrolysis capacity to produce green hydrogen 
and distribute it to end-users. (By contrast, the DARP does not offer support for other 
mature renewable power sources such as wind and solar power.) But even with the 
addition of hydrogen-related research and innovation funding, only €2.2 bn is set aside 
to develop a technology that is still in its infancy. While the priority given to this area is 
appropriate, funding appears derisory (as already noted above for the national stimulus 
and future package). Similarly, the offer of carbon contracts for difference, in which the 
government subsidises firms undertaking long-term carbon-reducing investments that 
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are not currently profitable at present carbon prices, is a promising approach. Against 
the background of political barriers to an adequate carbon price and the lack of a border-
adjustment mechanism, it has a direct impact in carbon-intensive industries, and also 
substantial indirect effects, as it aids the breakthrough of new technologies. However, it 
is set up as a pilot scheme and has a budget of only a little over half a billion euros. For 
context: one study suggests that decarbonising part of the German steel industry alone 
(shifting the so-called primary route to hydrogen-based reduction) would require, in 
addition to a massive expansion of renewable energy supply, some €30 bn euros of 
investment by the steel companies themselves (Berger 2020). 
What is striking about the section on climate-friendly mobility is the almost complete 
focus on road transport. Only €227 m of the €5.4 bn envisaged to promote climate-
friendly mobility is dedicated to improving rail transport. And even that is focused 
narrowly on engine technology: there is no place for a more general expansion of the 
rail network or train services.8 Local public transport is included only via a subsidy 
program, albeit a sizable one (€1 bn), to purchase electric buses. Overwhelmingly, the 
aim of the policies in this section of the DARP is to promote the electrification of private 
motorised transport. Almost half (€2.5 bn) of the total is foreseen as an “innovation 
premium” of €9000 for new purchases of electrical vehicles (plug-in hybrids up to 
€6750). Not a single euro is foreseen to promote cycling—for instance, by improving 
inner-city cycling infrastructure or increasing the use of bikes for commuting. 
While it is a valid policy goal, for economic and social reasons, to manage the 
transition of the German car industry from internal combustion engines, the almost 
complete focus on it at the expense of other interests is regrettable. A study by the 
Forum Ökologische Marktwirtschaft (2021) notes that the DARP represents an 
improvement on the original version of the plan which, notably, contained more than 
€1 bn in subsidies to upgrade heavy goods vehicles to lower-emission diesel engines. 
This expensive subsidy to fossil-fuel road transport was removed, primarily because 
it was thought likely to be rejected due to the “do no significant (environmental) 
harm” injunction applying to all RRF-funded measures (DARP, p. 1071). While the 
promotion of electrical vehicles is an important element in achieving climate goals―
assuming a parallel move to decarbonise electricity generation9―the subsidisation of 
the acquisition of new vehicles and the expansion of the charging network primarily 
benefits upper-income households and firms providing company cars.
The section on climate-friendly construction/renovation is dominated by a €2.5 bn 
subsidy for renovation of buildings to reduce their energy use through insulation, and 
allow for the modernisation of heating systems, etc. This is to be used to expand an 
existing national scheme, permitting an estimated 40,000 additional housing units to 
benefit. 
8  But see also the section on digitalisation.
9  Plug-in hybrid vehicles are also eligible for support although their ecological impact is, to say the 
least, disputed.
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3.3.3 Digitalisation of the Economy and Infrastructure, and of Education
These two chapters of the DARP represent around €5.9 bn and €1.4 bn respectively, 
together more than a quarter of the DARP. German political discourse, accentuated 
by the experience during the pandemic, has been seized by the view that Germany 
lags behind its peers in terms of digitalisation. Germany is attempting via an IPCEI 
initiative10 to develop its (and Europe’s) potential in the areas of microelectronics 
(started in 2018) and, more recently, cloud infrastructure, to gain a foothold in these 
areas. 
The most striking feature of the digitalisation of the economy section, however, 
is the quantitative predominance―at almost €1.9 bn―of support for a very specific 
sector, the automobile industry, which as shown above is also a prime beneficiary of 
projects under the climate pillar. Policymakers justify this focus (DARP, p. 455) with 
reference to the huge challenges facing the sector to shift to electric vehicles and to cope 
with cost competition, particularly among part-supplying SMEs. It is difficult, though, 
to see why this is really support for “digitalisation” rather than sectoral investment 
support, focused on a strategically important sector. On the other hand, this part 
of the DARP does contain an investment in rail infrastructure (identified above as 
missing from the mobility section) in the form of digitalisation of rail signalling and 
communication systems (€500 m).
The experience of the pandemic, with pupils forced to learn at home for extended 
periods, and local authorities and even individual schools forced to seek individual 
workarounds, has certainly revealed the need for a “digital education offensive”. The 
programme is of very modest size, however. Alongside the purchase of equipment 
for teachers and investment in their skills development (€500 m), it contains elements 
whose priority is not immediately obvious, such as support for the educational 
institutions of the German army (€100 m). The largest single project (€630 m) is to set 
up a “meta-platform” to systematise and improve access to digital educational content. 
The focus on the “meta” level―and the associated nebulous description of what this 
measure can achieve in practice―reflects the fact that, in Germany, education is the 
prerogative of the federal states.
3.3.4 Social Inclusion
The foreseen measures are small in volume, with a strong focus on children and 
young people, an explicit goal of the EU-level RRF. The two quantitatively most 
important schemes are to improve childcare (€500 m) and ensure an adequate 
supply of apprenticeships/dual training courses, particularly for disadvantaged 
groups. A goal is to increase labour market participation, and indirectly also to 
contribute to undergirding the pension system, one of Germany’s country-specific 
10  Important Project of Common European Interest. 
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recommendations. In the case of childcare, the funds will enable investment needs 
that have become more acute due to the pandemic to be met. The apprenticeship 
promotion programme offers financial support to companies who, despite the impact 
of the pandemic, take on additional trainees (including, for example, those who have 
lost their trainee placement in another company as a result of the crisis). 
In short, these are sensible programmes that respond to real needs rendered more 
pressing by the pandemic; however, the quantitative dimensions are very limited.
3.3.5 Strengthening the Health System and Modernising 
Public Administration
It goes without saying that the COVID-19 pandemic threw down huge challenges to 
national health systems. Just over 16% of DARP is allocated for health-related measures. 
Specifically in the case of Germany, problems with inadequate digitalisation became 
apparent, leading to delays in processing tests and patchy reporting on the progress of 
the pandemic, and a lack of coordination between local health authorities. In view of 
this, more than €800 m is foreseen to be invested in this area. 
Germany―the home of BioNTech, whose vaccine (produced in cooperation 
with Pfizer) has been the mainstay of the European vaccination campaign―plans to 
invest an additional €750 m in COVID-vaccine research and development under the 
DARP. By a substantial margin the largest programme in this area, at €3 bn, it is a 
“future programme” for hospitals. The program is to be “frontloaded”, with spending 
concentrated in 2021; the corresponding legislation was already passed last year. Here, 
the main aim is to improve the digitalisation of hospitals. They will be able to claim 
financial support for the necessary physical and human-capital investment. This is 
arguably one programme where a specific need, occasioned by the recent crisis, has 
been identified, and a commensurately substantial sum set aside to address the issue; 
this programme alone represents around 10% of the entire DARP. 
The considerations detailed in the specific case of the public health system apply 
more generally to the German public administration; the problems of a reticent adoption 
of digital hardware and processes are the same. Similarly, therefore, a programme has 
been launched to address these problems through investment in physical and human 
capital. Here, too, the main element is a €3 bn support programme for investment in 
digitalisation, to make it user-friendly for citizens while dealing with the complexities 
of Germany’s three-layered federal administrative system. Additionally, two specific 
initiatives have been launched, whose aim is to enable citizens to identify themselves in 
online communication with the administration, while avoiding data-protection pitfalls 
and abuse by criminals, and permitting interoperability between different parts and 
levels of the administration; a first crucial step is to have a single identification number 
for each citizen.
As in other areas, this section of the DARP is doubtless focused on an important 
reform area, one also identified as part of the European Semester in the country-specific 
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recommendations. However, the specific contribution (and additionality) of the DARP 
is questionable. The legislative processes have been underway for many years in some 
cases. The corresponding investments are now being, to some extent, booked under 
the DARP, but they would have proceeded under purely national financing in the 
absence of the RFF. 
3.3.6 Overall Assessment
The DARP (p. 1103) contains a study undertaken by the DIW research institute, 
according to which long-run GDP is expected to be almost 2% higher than in the 
absence of the programme. The counterfactual here, though, is that the measures 
enumerated under the DARP are otherwise not implemented (full additionality). 
The overlap between the national stimulus and future programme and the DARP 
measures is very substantial, however. For Germany, the RRF has very largely not been 
perceived as an opportunity to take on additional tasks or increase the ambition of 
planned projects. Already planned projects, which would otherwise have been funded 
by domestic borrowing, are now to draw on RRF funding.
As regards prioritisation, in broad-brush terms the DARF is in accordance with 
the required focus on climate change and digitialisation. Indeed, the latter is like 
a red thread running through much of the programme. This is in accordance with 
recent country-specific recommendations issued to Germany by the EU, and reflects 
perceived weaknesses revealed by the pandemic. 
A more granular look, however, reveals some issues of concern. Striking is the 
focus, under the “green” and “digital” labels, on the automobile sector. While there are 
economic and social justifications supporting what is clearly a far-reaching adjustment 
in a strategically important sector, the neglect of other modes of transport stands out. 
Some measures, such as subsidisation of plug-in hybrid cars, are arguably inimical to 
environmental goals. An admittedly speculative interpretation is that this represents, 
in part, an attempt to show that “Europe” is supporting the German car industry 
against the background of criticism that EU-imposed fleet emission requirements have 
placed a heavy burden on German automobile production. In other areas (such as the 
hydrogen economy and support for industrial decarbonisation) envisaged measures 
are appropriate, but the scale of funding is very limited.
3.4 Substantially Higher Credit-Financed Public Investment 
Does Not Threaten Debt Sustainability
Some insight into the likely effects of additional public investment, whether under the 
purely domestic budget or as part of the German recovery plan, can be gained from a 
recent simulation of a credit-financed investment programme conducted by the IMK 
(Dullien et al. 2021).
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Based on conservative estimates of unmet infrastructural needs (Bardt et al. 2019), 
the authors simulate a public investment programme totaling €460 bn (in 2019 prices, 
equal to around 13% of 2019 GDP) over ten years. At the end of the period, the public 
capital stock is about 25% higher than without the programme. The simulation is 
conducted using the macroeconomic model NiGEM. The investment is credit-financed. 
No monetary policy reaction is assumed during the first two years. The simulation 
runs for thirty years.
The simulations use three different assumptions. The first is with the standard 
version of NiGEM: here, the public and private capital stocks act as substitutes. The 
larger public capital stock depresses the marginal productivity of the entire capital 
stock. As this is neither theoretically not empirically plausible, two illustrative 
alternative simulations were undertaken. In a technological-improvement scenario, 
the rate of technical progress is assumed to be boosted by the higher public investment 
(for instance, due to the provision of a better broadband network). Secondly, in a more 
far-reaching intervention, the output-elasticity of the public capital stock is set at 0.3, 
in line with empirical evidence in the literature. 
In the basic scenario, in which the short-run fiscal multiplier is only around 0.8%, 
substantially below most estimates in the current low-interest-rate environment, 
GDP is around 1.7% higher at the end of the programme compared to baseline. In 
the longer run, the multiplier is higher―around 2%, in line with much of the recent 
literature―and the GDP effect is substantial at 3–4%. Private investment is crowded 
in, the total capital stock is some 4% above baseline, and potential output is about 3% 
higher. The additional credit-financed investment means that initially the debt-to-GDP 
ratio is some 10 pp higher than without a programme. But this one-off cost is matched 
by permanently higher potential output. Because of this, the debt-to-GDP ratio is the 
same as without the programme at the end of the thirty-year simulation period. Even 
with low multipliers, the impact is positive: output is higher while the debt-to-GDP 
ratio is the same as without the investment offensive.
The positive impacts on output and potential growth are substantially higher in the 
two alternative simulations. Accordingly, the period after which the programme is self-
financing (in the sense of a debt-to-GDP ratio no higher than baseline) is substantially 
shorter. While there is clearly considerable uncertainty about the real-world size of 
the multiplier, which in practice would depend, not least, on exactly which sorts of 
public investment received additional impetus, the two alternative simulations are 
considered more plausible and the quantitative effects given above are likely at the 
bottom of the plausible range.
The implications of this simulation are clear. Germany has substantial scope 
to increase credit-financed public investment with positive economic impacts and 
no longer-run negative effects on debt-to-GDP ratios. This could be done purely 
domestically or, if the financial terms become favourable, by taking up the loans 
available under the RFF.
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3.5 What Germany Needs after the COVID-19 Crisis: Reform of 
Fiscal Rules and Stabilisation of Investment at a High Level 
In parallel to the European Union’s upgrade of its climate goals, the German government 
also raised its ambitions, aiming to reach climate neutrality by 2045. On top of already 
considerable investment needs, this requires even more capital spending much earlier. 
The investment projects of the stimulus and future package cover only a fraction of 
Germany’s massive investment requirements. The Recovery and Resilience Plan is 
even smaller in size and overlaps substantially with the national stimulus and future 
investment package; it therefore provides only limited additional investment. This is 
not a problem in itself: it is right that the EU RRF has a strongly redistributive function 
and supports states hit hardest by the COVID-19 crisis. Germany has the means to do 
much more on its own.
From early on in the COVID-19 crisis, both the European fiscal rules and the German 
debt brake were suspended, which allowed both federal and state governments to 
incur substantial additional debt to fight the crisis. While nobody knows when the 
pandemic will finally be over, the debate about fiscal consolidation after the crisis 
is already in full swing and was a key issue in the autumn general election. There 
is a high probability that there will be neither substantial reforms of the debt brake 
nor tax increases to finance the massive additional investment requirements. Current 
discussions of financing options focus on a variety of measures ranging from making 
use of public companies to cutting ecologically harmful subsidies. This are unlikely to 
be enough, however.
Germany and the whole of the EU needs a sustained investment strategy. In Germany, 
public investment, which has recently been determined much more by the availability 
of current revenues than an assessment of longer-run needs, must be stabilised at a 
satisfactory level in the medium- to long-term. This is particularly important for the 
municipalities, which play a vital role for infrastructure investment. They will only 
employ the additional staff needed to implement investment projects if they receive 
sufficient funds on a permanent basis instead of having to rely on successive small-
scale federal programmes. This would also provide the planning certainty that the 
construction industry needs to increase its capacities. As the municipalities receive 
substantial investment grants from the states, they are also affected indirectly by the 
debt brake, which prevents federal states taking on any new debt in normal times. 
The federal level has slightly more fiscal space, being allowed to incur structural debt 
of 0.35% of GDP per year. This is only about a quarter of the additional requirements. 
Furthermore, the current cyclical adjustment method tends to underestimate cyclical 
effects and thus has a procyclical bias (Heimberger 2020; Heimberger and Truger 
2020). 
At EU level, the current economic governance review should be used to modernise 
the fiscal rules. A viable option would be an expenditure rule combined with a 
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“golden rule” for investment as proposed by Dullien et al. (2020b). At the same time, 
the debt limit of 60% of GDP should be defined more flexibly, taking account of the 
macroeconomic environment (especially negative real interest rates). This would also 
be a good opportunity to reform the German debt brake, which in many respects is not 
fully consistent with the European rules (Dullien et al. 2021, pp. 18–19).
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4. Relaunching Public Investment 
in Italy
Giovanni Barbieri and Floriana Cerniglia
Introduction
The official outbreak of COVID-19 in Italy in March 2020 dealt a considerable blow 
to the national economy. Out of all the EU countries, Italy has suffered the most from 
the pandemic, and has experienced the worst contraction of its GDP since WWII. 
The economy has been further stressed by a reduction in consumption and a drop 
in tax revenues; furthermore, the health crisis has put the national healthcare system 
under severe strain. All of this has and will continue to contribute in the future to the 
redefinition of its budgetary policy. 
However, 2020 was also a turning point for public investments in Italy, thanks to 
the widespread conviction that a robust socioeconomic structure, capable of resisting 
exogenous shocks such as those caused by the COVID-19 pandemic, can be obtained 
only by a thorough and consistent policy of tangible and intangible public investments. 
There are encouraging signs pointing in this direction. The new Italian government has 
not only planned an increase in public capital investments, but it has also committed 
to redefining the regulatory framework in many areas. These general policy objectives 
are strongly thought to be capable of jump-starting public investments in Italy, and 
overcoming the slow, cumbersome, and ineffective processes that have systemically 
affected Italy for more than two decades. At the European level, the COVID-19 
pandemic has highlighted the limits of a rigorous conception of budgetary policy 
based solely on complying with the Stability and Growth Pact rules and with fiscal 
“austerity” rules. This is the foundation on which Next Generation EU (NGEU) has 
been developed and adopted. It is a programme which aims to relaunch the European 
economy through a massive plan of public investments in sectors that are considered 
strategic both for the survival of the economies of EU member countries and for the 
EU as a whole. 
This chapter will provide an update of the data on public investments in Italy, 
which was presented and discussed in a previous work (Cerniglia and Rossi 2020). We 
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More disaggregated data will be used to update the trends assessed in the previous 
work (Cerniglia and Rossi 2020). In this section, we will use the Conti Pubblici 
Territoriali dataset (hereafter CPT) released by the Italian Agency for Territorial 
Cohesion. We present data on capital expenditure by the Italian Public Administration 
(PA) and by the Enlarged Public Administration (Enlarged PA). The PA includes the 
central government as well as local and regional governments. EPA includes the PA and 
national and local public companies and utilities.2 The data cover 2017–18. The CPT 
data enable us to obtain a clear-cut picture of the share of capital expenditure in North-
Central Italy and in the “Mezzogiorno”. Public capital expenditure consists of three 
components: 1) public investments (expenditure for infrastructure, machinery, and 
equipment) 2) money transfers, for example to private companies, public institutions, 
etc.; 3) shareholding and the provision of loans. The following tables and figures refer 
to capital expenditure without shareholding and loans.
2  Further details on this data source can be found in Cerniglia and Rossi (2020).
will also address the measures taken by the Italian government to tackle the economic 
fallout caused by the pandemic, and consider the impact of NGEU funding on public 
investments in Italy in the coming years. 
4.1 Public Investments in Italy 
Public investments, which had declined from 3.7% to 2.1% from 2009 to 2018, gained 
new momentum in 2019 and 2020. In 2019, they went up to 2.3% of GDP. The increase in 
2019 was in large part attributable to the measures adopted by previous governments 
that made it possible to overcome both the limits imposed by the Internal Stability 
Pact at different levels of government (regions and municipalities) and the freeze on 
spending surpluses. These two circumstances allowed the sublevels of government to 
release funds, thereby increasing their share of capital expenditure for infrastructure 
investments by an additional 20%.
In 2020, notwithstanding the slowdown due to the pandemic in the first half of the 
year, public investments increased from €41.4 bn to €44.2 bn. Due to a contraction in 
GDP, the investments-to-GDP ratio climbed to 2.7% (OCPI, 2021).1
The state intends to continue its steady flow of public investments over the coming 
years, also with the help of the NGEU funds. The target for public investments in 2021 
is €55.6 bn (3.2% of GDP). The DEF 2021 forecasts an increase to €62.9 bn by 2024 
(3.2% of GDP). This level is higher than the average pre-pandemic level (3% for the 
period 1995 to 2009) and previous forecasts (NADEF 2019), as shown in Figure 1.
1  If the public investment-to-GDP ratio is calculated assuming that the nominal GDP growth in 2020 is 
equal to that of 2019 (i.e., excluding the effects of the crisis), Italy’s ratio would still have grown from 
2.3% to 2.4%. This is a remarkable performance, even if it is not possible to assess to what extent the 
increase in expenditure is due to a rise in the price of investments, rather than to an actual increase in 
the volume of investments.
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Fig. 1 Programmed Public Investments.
Source of data: OCPI (2021) on NADEF 2019, NADEF 2020, and DEF 2021 data.
The capital expenditure in Italy of the Enlarged PA in 2018 amounted to €67.4 bn, 
a +2.7% increase from the previous year. In terms of macro areas, the figure can be 
broken down into €46.1 bn for the north-central area and €21.3 bn for the south, as 
shown in Figure 2. 
Fig. 2 Capital Expenditure (billion euros at Constant 2015 Prices).
Source of data: CPT (2020).
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Looking at the per capita data, we see an increase in capital expenditure in both macro 
areas. In the north-central area there was an increase from €16,263 per capita in 2017 
to €16,612 in 2018, with a real variation of +2.1%, while in the south it went from 
€12,403 per capita to €12.706 (+2.4%). Notice that the increase in capital expenditure 
follows an increase in GDP in both macro areas. In the “Mezzogiorno”, the capital-
expenditure-to-GDP ratio was +5.4% in 2017 and +5.6% in 2018, as shown in Figure 3.
Fig. 3 Capital Expenditure (% GDP).
Source of data: CPT (2020).
Figure 4 provides a snapshot of only public investments.
Fig. 4 Investments. 
Source of data: CPT (2020).
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In 2018, there was a +5% increase in investments in the Enlarged PA, bringing per 
capita expenditure back to €768. The largest increase in spending occurred in the 
energy sector (Eni, Enel).
In the “Mezzogiorno”, on the other hand, per capita investment expenditure 
remained stagnant at €583. This is mainly due to a decrease in investments by Anas, 
Poste Italiane, and local public utilities. 
In the following graphs we now consider only the PA. 
Fig. 5 Capital Expenditure by Macro Area.
Source of data: CPT (2020).
Note that at the territorial level (CPT 2020), the “Mezzogiorno” saw an increase of 23% 
in central government expenditure, but not much growth in expenditure by regional 
and local governments. The north-central area, on the other hand, registered an 
increase in expenditure by the central government (+11%) as well as by the regional 
and other sublevels of government (+14%).
Figure 6 shows the expenditure trend when considering only investments. In the 
north-central area in 2018, there was an +8.8% increase in investments compared to 
the previous year, mainly due to positive actions by regional and local governments. 
The “Mezzogiorno” stabilised, after its economic collapse in 2017, but with lower 
levels of investments by national and local public companies and utilities (CPT 2019). 
Last, Figure 7 shows the variations in investments and transfers for 2017 and 2018 
across the macro areas and levels of government. 
The increase in expenditure by the central government in the “Mezzogiorno” 
was limited for investment (+4.4%), but significant for transfers to households and 
businesses (+29.7%). 
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Fig. 6 Capital Expenditure for Investments by Macro Area (Net of Financial Items).
Source of data: CPT (2020).
Fig. 7 Variations in Expenditure in 2017 and 2018 for Investments and Transfers in the Main PA 
Compartments by Macro Area (Calculations Based on Constant 2015 Prices).
Source of data: CPT (2020).
In the north-central area, the positive trend of the central government’s expenditure 
in investment and transfers was inverse to that of the south: investment expenditure 
grew by +29% while transfers increased by +5%. When considering the sublevels 
of government, there was considerable stability in both investment and transfer 
expenditures in the south (+1.3% and -0.3%, respectively), while the north-central 
area saw a contraction in investment expenditure (-8.4%) and limited growth in 
transfers (+2.1%).
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Municipal expenditure was positive, though limited, in the south for both 
investment and transfers (+1.9% and +4.4%, respectively). In the north-central area 
the trend was positive for investment (+26.4%), but negative for transfers (-14.9%). 
Expenditure by province increased for the “Mezzogiorno” in terms of investment 
(+5.7%), but decreased for transfers (-10.6%). In the north-central area, the trend was 
positive for both items, but it was considerably more significant for transfers (+30.3%) 
than for investment (+6.6%).
4.2 The National Recovery and Resilience Plan: Financial 
Resources for Public Investment3
In 2020, the Italian gross domestic product (GDP) decreased by -8.9% in real terms 
compared to 2019. Final consumption decreased by -7.8% and gross fixed capital 
formation by -9.1%. At the same time, the deficit-to-GDP ratio was -9.5% compared to 
-1.6% in 2019 (DEF 2021).4 The general government debt-to-GDP ratio rose to 155.6%, 
growing by 20.8 points compared to 2019 (134.8%) (ISTAT 2021a).
The deterioration in tax revenues contributed to the worsening of the Public 
Administration’s net borrowing indicators. In 2020, tax revenues decreased by €25,183 
bn compared to 2019 (-5.3%). The change was also determined by legislative measures5 
implemented to defer tax and social security contributions for businesses, the fine arts, 
and other professional activities. In order to address the economic damage caused 
by the pandemic, in 2020 the Italian government adopted fiscal stimulus measures 
amounting to approximately €130 bn through a series of decrees.6 The “relaunch” 
decree, the largest economic measure in Italy’s recent history, is a set of measures worth 
a total of €55 bn in net borrowing, primarily aimed at alleviating the strain caused by 
the lockdown measures on the Italian healthcare system, and the affected productive 
sectors and workers who, as a consequence, lost their jobs. All these measures led to an 
increase in 2020 in the general government deficit of approximately €108.1 bn (-6.5%/
GDP). The deficit is expected to increase by €31.4 bn in 2021 (-1.8%/GDP), €35.3 bn in 
2022 (-1.9%/GDP), €41.4 bn in 2023 (-2.2%/GDP), and €41.3 bn in 2024 (-2.1%/GDP).7 
3  Most of the data in this section are taken from “Il Piano Nazionale Di Ripresa E Resilienza―schede 
di lettura n.06 and n.219”, and were compiled by the Servizio Studi di Camera e Senato, 27 May 2021 
http://documenti.camera.it/leg18/dossier/pdf/DFP28.pdf. 
4  The DEF (“documento di economia e finanza”) is the government’s medium term budgetary 
framework and is presented to parliament every April. It is a substantial document that describes 
the government’s financial objectives and the pertaining reforms in compliance with the constraints 
of the Stability and Growth Pact. The Nadef (nota di aggiornamento al DEF) is an update of the DEF 
in relation to the new data and information on trends within the macroeconomic and public finance 
framework; this update is presented to parliament every September.
5  Legislative Decree DL8 April 2020, n.23.
6  Cura Italia (D.L. n.18 /2020), Liquidity (D.L. n.23/2020), Relaunch (D.L. n.34/2020), August (D.L. 
n.104/2020), Ristori (D.L. n.137/2020), Ristori-bis (D.L. n.149/2020), Ristori-ter (D.L. n.154/2020), 
Ristori-quater (D.L. n.157/2020).
7  Among the largest expenditures are those provisions benefiting businesses (€56.1 bn in 2020), 
institutions providing ordinary and exceptional wage subsidies, COVID-19 subsidies, ordinary and 
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As for GDP growth, the government forecast (DEF 2021) is of a substantially flat trend 
for the first half of 2021, followed by a robust rebound in Q3, and a continued notably 
positive shift in the latter part of the year. At the time of writing, both the Bank of Italy 
(2021) and the European Commission (2021) had estimated an annual growth rate of 
approximately 5% for GDP in 2021.8 A return to pre-crisis levels of economic activity 
is expected to occur in the last quarter of 2022, according to the DEF (2021). As for 
the rate of unemployment, in 2018 it was 10.6%, in 2019 it was 10%, and in 2020 it was 
9.2%.9 
The EU has put in place substantial stimulus measures to counteract the economic 
crises caused by the pandemic. Italy presented its National Recovery and Resilience 
Plan (PNRR) to Brussels at the end of April 2021. It is an ambitious plan, 266 pages 
long. Italy is among the main beneficiaries of the NGEU, i.e., of more than €200 bn. 
It is also the second country, after Spain, which will benefit from the highest share 
of grants, a circumstance that could prove favourable for implementing short-term 
investments and stimulating economic recovery. 
The Italian PNRR has six main missions, which follow the six-pillar structure defined 
by Regulation 2021/241 of the European Parliament and the European Council.10 The 
six missions are: 1. Digitisation, innovation, competitiveness, culture and tourism; 2. 
Green revolution and ecological transition; 3. Infrastructure for sustainable mobility; 
4. Education and research; 5. Social inclusion and cohesion; 6. Health. These missions 
are in turn further broken down into sixteen components covering a variety of fields of 
action.11 The six missions and sixteen components translate into 133 different types of 
investment and 49 economic-institutional sectoral reforms worth a total of €235.12 bn, 
of which €191 bn is financed by the Recovery and Resilience Facility (RRF), €13 bn by 
REACT-EU for 2021–23, and a further €30.6 bn by the Complementary Fund12 through 
emergency solidarity funds, and the NASPI and DIS-COLL unemployment subsidies. A one-off 
benefit totalling €9.2 bn in 2020 has also been established for self-employed workers, employees in 
the tourism sector, agricultural workers meeting specific requirements, VAT-registered professionals, 
workers enrolled in the entertainment pension fund, and domestic workers.
8  The real GDP growth rates were +0.9% in 2018, +0.3% in 2019, and -8.9% in 2020 (Source: Ameco). 
9  As this work goes to print, employment in Italy has not yet returned to pre-pandemic (February 
2020) levels. There are still at least 260,000 more people unemployed, the rates of employment and 
unemployment remain lower than before, and the rate of inactivity has increased by +0.7. A territorial 
analysis has highlighted a similar employment trend in the two macro areas for the fourth quarters 
of 2019 and 2020: an overall decrease by -2% in the “Mezzogiorno” and -1.9 in the north-central area. 
Women and young workers have been impacted the worst: female employment has decreased more 
in the “Mezzogiorno” (-3.0%) than the north-central area (-2.4%). The same is true for young workers 
under 35: -6.9% in the “Mezzogiorno” vs -4.4% in the north-central area. See https://www.istat.it/it/
files//2021/09/CS_Occupati-e-disoccupati_LUGLIO_2021.pdf and Svimez/Enbic 2021. 
10  https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A32021R0241. 
11  The sixteen components are listed in Table 1. For example, the first mission has three components 
indicated as M1C1, M1C2, and M1C3. 
12  The Complementary Fund, established by D.L. No. 59 on 6 May 2021, is an instrument provided by the 
PNRR with a total endowment of €30.6 bn for the period from 2021 to 2026. The Italian government 
has expressed its willingness to set up this fund to finance specific actions that complement and 
supplement the PNRR. These spending commitments comply with the provisions in EU Regulation 
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the budget changes approved by the Italian Council of Ministers on 22 April 2021. 
These capital expenditure commitments have been allocated for the period 2021–26 by 
D.L. no. 59 of 6 May 2021. On 22 June 2021, the Italian PNRR was officially approved 
by the European Commission, which described it as the most substantial, innovative, 
and courageous European transition and recovery plan.
Figure 8 below shows the subdivision of the RRF’s funding (€191 bn) for the 
six missions, and Table 1 shows the complete and detailed breakdown of PNRR 
expenditure by source of financing. 
Fig. 8 RRF’s Allocation of Resources by Mission.
Source of data: Italian PNRR plan.
2021/241: https://www.gazzettaufficiale.it/atto/serie_generale/caricaDettaglioAtto/originario?atto.
dataPubblicazioneGazzetta=2021-05-07&atto.codiceRedazionale=21G00070&elenco30giorni=true.
The PNRR stipulates that at least 37% of its resources must be allocated to green 
transition and 20% to digital transition across missions. The component of the PNRR 
which, in absolute terms, has received the largest share of resources is “Digitisation, 
innovation, and competitiveness in the production system”, with an allocation of 
€30.57 bn (M1C2). 
As already stated, the plan foresees 133 different types of investment and 49 
economic-institutional sectoral reforms (public administration, the justice system, 
streamlining rules and procedures, public procurement, the tax system, and 
strengthening social protection schemes).
Italy must now address both the consequences of the pandemic and its long-
standing system frailties. In fact, the potential for real growth over the next years will 
not only depend on the considerable resources available, but also on the significant 
reforms foreseen by the PNRR. The government expects the transversal reforms to 
provide the required structural innovations for improving fairness, efficiency, and 
competitiveness, and consequently to boost the general state of the economy. 
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Table 1 PNRR Expenditure by Source of Financing (in billion euros) 
Source of data: Authors’ own elaboration on PNRR data.
M1: Digitisation, innovation, 
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M4: Education and research 
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Mission 4 Total 
M5: Social Inclusion and 
cohesion 
–
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In short, the resources and reforms are necessary for unclogging three bottlenecks 
that have plagued Italy for decades. The PNRR has thoroughly identified them and 
stated that the cross-sector reforms aim to bridge the generational, territorial, and 
gender divides. These objectives are somewhat intertwined given that the employment 
issue for women and the youth in Southern Italy is decidedly worse. In fact, Daniele 
Franco, Minister of Economy and Finance, when presenting the Plan on 28 April 2021, 
clearly stated that: “only if we close the gender, generational and regional gaps can we 
obtain robust and sustainable growth in the medium term”. 
Unemployment among young people in Italy is quite high.13 Furthermore, the 
employment gender gap in Italy, which was already pronounced before the pandemic, 
has now worsened further. Prior to the pandemic, one out of two women in Italy did 
not work. The employment rate was much worse in the south (33.2%) than in the 
north-central area (60.4%). In 2019, the male employment rate was 68%, while the 
female rate was 50.1%. The pandemic has affected economic sectors where higher 
rates of females are employed (food and beverage, tourism, etc.). In 2020, the rate of 
unemployment dropped to 49% for women and 67.2% for men.14 The PNRR tackles the 
gender gap issue by dedicating resources to social infrastructure (building more child 
daycare facilities, increasing full-time school classes, etc.), and incentives for women-
owned businesses and more women entering STEM fields.15 
The final, or fourth part, of the PNRR provides an assessment of the macroeconomic 
impact of the measures included in the Plan. As can be seen from Table 2, when 
considering the best possible scenario, in 2026 (thanks to the effect of the investment 
multiplier), Italy’s GDP should increase by 3.6 pp with respect to the baseline scenario.
Table 2 GDP Impact of the PNRR: Different Investment Efficiency Hypotheses (% 
Deviation with Respect to the Baseline Scenario) 
2021 2022 2023 2024 2025 2026
GDP―Best 
scenario
0,5 1,2 1,9 2,4 3,1 3,6
GDP―Medium 
scenario
0,5 1,1 1,6 2,0 2,4 2,7
GDP―Baseline 
scenario
0,5 0,9 1,4 1,5 1,7 1,8
Source of data: PNRR Table 4.3, p. 249.
13  Italy has the third worst level of youth unemployment in Europe, with high peaks especially in the 
south. In 2019, the two regions worst off were Sicily and Campania—both had a youth unemployment 
rate of 53.6%. 
14  While the initial impact of the pandemic was decidedly harsher on women, it now seems that, as in 
other advanced economies, it is more balanced. There have been some signs of positive and more 
balanced changes in female labour force participation in Q1 of 2021.
15  From the outset of the pandemic, the gender gap issue was immediately addressed by Elena Bonetti, 
Minister for Families and Equal Opportunities; see: “Women for a New Renaissance” (2020) and 
“The National Strategy for Gender Equality” (2021): http://www.pariopportunita.gov.it/news/
pari-opportunita-bonetti-presentata-la-strategia-nazionale-per-la-parita-di-genere-2021-2026/. 
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4.3 Conclusion 
The year 2020 marked a turning point in terms of infrastructure investment in Italy. 
Foremost, notwithstanding the pandemic, investment has not decreased thanks to 
measures adopted during the previous two years. Furthermore, the conviction (in 
Italy and Europe) that investment is needed for promoting growth and as a tool for 
maintaining the essential resilience needed to face other fundamental challenges (the 
environment, for example) has been strengthened as a consequence of the pandemic. 
Therefore, the growing investment trend set in motion in the first months of 2020, 
before the COVID-19 outbreak, was also the result of measures taken since 2018. 
From a qualitative and quantitative stance, 2020 marked a break from the previous 
“austerity-led” decade. The national programming agenda went from a policy 
approach focused on current spending and the compression of capital expenditure 
to a strategy based on growth-oriented infrastructure investment, geared toward the 
newly established objectives of energy and digital transition. The pandemic, with its 
recessionary effects on the economic system, stimulated this trend, and led to the 
current PNRR where investment is explicitly oriented towards a green and digital 
transition.
The PNRR also contains a seminal strategy for “restoring” the Italian economy and 
a specific focus on economic convergence and territorial cohesion for the south and 
the rest of the country. As already stated, inverting the tendency toward increasing the 
north-south divide is one of the primary objectives of the PNRR: the gap has existed 
since 1861, when Italy became a nation state, but it has gotten worse in recent years, 
especially since the economic and financial crisis of 2008–09.16 The average per capita 
investment in infrastructure in the “Mezzogiorno” over the past decade was around 
€780, which is 17% less than the €940 per capita average in the north-central area.17 The 
absence of impactful growth-oriented policies has thrust this part of the country down 
the path of economic stagnation and constant deindustrialisation. It is no coincidence 
that Southern Italy is one of the most economically depressed areas in the European 
Union (Senato della Repubblica 2018). Even before the outbreak of the pandemic in 
2019, the Conte II government, aware of the problem, formulated an ad hoc plan aimed 
16  For further details on the north-south divide, see the data provided by Svimez (http://lnx.svimez.
info/svimez/), a research centre established in 1946 for the purpose of studying the economy of the 
“Mezzogiorno”. It publishes annual reports and other studies on the north-south divide.
17  See a recent study by the Bank of Italy (Bucci et al. 2021) based on CPT 2020 data. This study is also a 
seminal analysis of the infrastructure endowment by region: from infrastructure for transport (road 
and rail) to infrastructure for telecommunications, from the quality and types of services provided 
for water and energy to essential public services like healthcare and waste management. Reducing the 
north-south infrastructure gap was one of the declared objectives of delegation law n.42 in 2009 on 
fiscal federalism. It is an objective that exists only on paper, since nothing has been done in all these 
years to bridge the infrastructure gaps, albeit this is partially due to budget cuts and a lack of explicit 
measures and data on the infrastructural gaps. The PNRR could finally be the means through which 
to enact a specific strategy. 
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at countering and addressing the critical issues afflicting the south.18 The sustained 
effort to redirect Italy’s economic trajectory, characterised by low growth and increasing 
inequalities, is particularly evident in the PNRR’s allocation of funds for the south. In 
fact, around 40% of the PNRR’s resources (approximately €82 bn) will go to the eight 
regions that make up the “Mezzogiorno”. According to the PNRR, this funding is 
pivotal to the south’s economic development—in fact, its share of GDP is forecasted to 
increase to 23.4% in 2026. This is a significant objective given that, currently, the south 
accounts for 34% of the overall population, but it contributes to only 22% of Italy’s 
GDP. Moreover, in addition to the funds allocated by the PNRR, another €58 bn will 
be provided by the Development and Cohesion Fund (DCF), €54 bn by the 2021–27 
Structural Funds, €8.4 bn by React-EU, and another €9.4 bn by the planned investment 
in the Salerno-Reggio Calabria railway line. Despite the flow of funds, there are also 
many risks that the convergence objectives will not be achieved. To begin with, the Plan 
lacks a precise breakdown of investment by territory for each mission and component.19 
In addition, there are no clear criteria for allocating the resources, which creates the 
tangible risk that funds could be diverted, including for the south, to projects and 
networks that already exist and need to be completed, rather than to areas in which 
investment (especially social investment) needs to be created from scratch in order to 
generate the inclusion and development necessary for lasting and generative growth. 
It is also important to note a further risk that many of the resources will be allocated 
through incentive mechanisms for firms; however, the existing firms who are in a 
position to benefit from them prevail in the richest regions of the country. Another risk 
is the fact that many of the resources will be allocated through public procurement. It 
is not unreasonable to hypothesise that in the weaker areas, like the “Mezzogiorno”, 
the local administrations will not be sufficiently equipped for these projects and could 
remain outside the allocation of the resources mechanism. The PNRR’s impact on the 
“Mezzogiorno” will depend on its implementation. On this, the Minister for the South, 
Mara Carfagna, has stated on numerous occasions that every effort will be made to 
guarantee that Southern Italy receives at least 40% of the PNRR’s resources.20
18  The plan, drawn up by Giuseppe Provenzano, Minister for the south, is called PianoSud2030 (Plan 
for the South 2030); it envisages a strategic investment programme of €21 bn over a three-year period, 
from 2021 to 2023, through national budgetary funds and the recovery of the last round of financing 
from the Development and Cohesion Fund and the European Structural Funds. The Plan also 
counts on new funds from the EU Programming for 2021–27 of approximately €123 bn for Southern 
Italy through the same instruments. The mission of PianoSud2030 has been partially absorbed by 
the National Recovery and Resilience Plan. https://www.governo.it/sites/new.governo.it/files/
PianoSUD2030.pdf. 
19  A precise and binding allocation of resources at the territorial level for the “Mezzogiorno” exists only 
in 33 of the 133 different types of investment and in 5 from the Complementary Fund. According 
to certain estimates, it amounts to approximately €23 bn, a bit more than one fourth of the overall 
resources (€82 bn) allocated for the “Mezzogiorno”. See Crf Viesti (2021a; 2021b).
20  In July 2021, an article was hinged to the “simplification” decree (D.L of 31 May 2021, no. 77) 
guaranteeing Southern Italy 40% of the total funds to be allocated through the PNRR.
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In a nutshell, the actual implementation of the PNRR will depend on the governance 
mechanism and on the decision-making process that a multilevel government, as is the 
case for Italy, must undertake in defining public policies through consultation and 
coordination between the State, regions, and municipalities. Part 3 of the PNRR is 
dedicated to implementation and monitoring, and refers to a series of dispositions that 
must be adopted on governance. As we write this chapter, some of the measures have 
just been approved or are in the process of being defined.
The “simplification” decree (D.L. of 31 May 2021 no. 77, adopted into law in July 
2021) first of all contains a series of measures that should simplify the planning 
phase, allocation of resources, implementation of projects, and definition of the Plan’s 
governance. More specifically, a steering committee acting as a “control room” has 
been established, chaired by the President of the Italian Council of Ministers, in which 
the relevant ministers and undersecretaries participate depending on the issues being 
discussed. It is essentially a variable-geometry mechanism. Others can be invited 
to join the meetings, such as the President of the Conference of Regions and/or of 
the Municipalities. Even more important is the provision whereby the President of 
the Council is substituted in the case of delays or non-compliance by other organs 
or institutions of the public administration. The decree also includes simplification 
measures that affect some of the sectors covered by the National Reform Programme 
(including ecological transition, public works, and digitalisation), in order to facilitate 
their complete implementation.
To conclude, for Italy, the main challenge will be to utilise PNRR funds effectively 
and break free from a past characterised by poor performance in managing public 
infrastructural investment. Italy, as one of the main beneficiaries of the NGEU, has 
an important role in ensuring its success. If the resources provided effectively boost 
investment and promote convergence and growth in Italy, the NGEU will have been a 
success and it will have provided a significant contribution to European integration.
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5. Public Investment in Poland
Adam Czerniak and Sebastian Płóciennik
Introduction
Nearly three decades of constant and relatively high economic growth has made it 
possible for Poland to initiate a catch-up with the most developed European economies. 
In 2000, GDP per capita amounted to less than €6500, representing only 29% of the 
average. Two decades later, in 2019, it reached €12,700, 48% of the average (Eurostat 
2021a).
To continue this positive trend, Poland must fulfil several requirements―from a 
stable demographic situation, higher-level innovation, and efficient infrastructure to 
a better supply of public goods, like healthcare. One can hardly imagine a success in 
these areas without the government being ready to participate as a generous investor. 
The purpose of this study is to analyse prospects for increasing the scale of public 
investment in Poland after the pandemic. It will indicate the most promising areas of 
the state’s activity and the priorities of the current government in investment. Further, 
it will offer an overview of the conditions required for rising public investment, 
including growth prospects and macroeconomic environments, as well as fiscal 
capacities, labour market features, and effectiveness of governance. A special place 
will be devoted to a new opportunity for a significant increase in public investment, 
which is Next Generation EU (NGEU)―the European Union’s programme aimed at 
combatting the long-term effects of the pandemic and the economic crisis.
The first part of the text is devoted to a short look at Poland’s experience in the field 
of public investment, both in terms of past policies and in more recent quantitative 
developments. The second part of the text focuses on the conditions required for a 
boost in public investment. The third part covers the analysis of the National Recovery 
Plan (Krajowy Plan Odbudowy, KPO)―the Polish vision of how the funds offered 
under the NGEU should be utilised in the national economy.
5.1 Historical Background
The topic of public investment in Poland is not free from political associations and 
ideological debates. Historical experiences play a significant role here. 
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On the one hand, there is a strong collective memory of the role of the government’s 
economic activity in recreating Polish statehood after the First World War. The challenge 
of sewing together the regions previously divided by borders required investment in 
transport infrastructure, of which the highlight was the seaport in Gdynia. Further 
achievements included the Central Industrial District (COP) in the south-east of the 
country, which aimed to create the economic backbone of the Second Republic (Grata 
2019). The outbreak of the Second World War wiped out this promising effort.
The period after 1945―with the command economy and the communist state―
is also a background for today’s discussions on public investment, albeit mostly in a 
negative sense. One of the crucial experiences of this time was the attempt to accelerate 
the growth of state investment financed by foreign loans in the 1970s. This did not lead 
to the expected increase in productivity, but rather a huge foreign debt, which also 
contributed to the collapse of the economy (Komornicka 2020). A both overwhelming 
and ineffective state, the domination of a “dirty” heavy industry and low-quality 
public infrastructure of the communist era largely explains the support that Poles gave 
in the late 1980s to the shock transformation aimed at a rapid shift to a free market.
5.2 Turning Points
In the 1990s, the Polish economy entered a period of disinflation and budget 
constraints―conditions which are hardly favourable to public investment. The 
priorities of the post-communist transformation were the restructuring of the general 
governance sector and the acceleration of privatisation processes in areas previously 
treated as the sole domain of the state. The situation began to change in the second half 
of the 1990s, when economic growth significantly accelerated. Moreover, a far-reaching 
administrative reform was carried out and increased the role of local, self-government 
authorities in the economy. Across the last decades, the enlarged voivodeships and 
relatively autonomous districts and communes have undertaken around half of 
public investment (Figure 1). The reform was undoubtedly a turning point for public 
investment in post-communist Poland.
The next breakthrough came with the accession to the European Union in 2004. 
Poland gained access to huge community funds. This allowed for a systematic increase 
in the level of public investment, which was especially visible in the first Multiannual 
Financial Framework (6% in 2011―see Figure 2). The funds, combined with the means 
of central and local government, were allocated, e.g. to the development of previously 
neglected transport infrastructure. The inflow of capital through this channel has 
massively contributed to GDP growth and improved the competitiveness of Polish 
business. However, some experts have criticised the allocation key as being oriented 
too much towards the demand side in less developed regions, instead of boosting the 
growth potential of Poland (Gorzelak 2014). 
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Fig. 1 Gross Fixed Capital Formation: Central Government and Local Government Expenditures as 
% of GDP, 1995–2020.
Source of data: Eurostat.
Fig. 2 Gross Fixed Capital Formation: General Government Expenditure in Poland and the European 
Union (27 Member States) as % of GDP, 1995–2020.
Source of data: Eurostat.
The third important moment for the public investment sphere in Poland was the financial 
and economic crisis, which began in 2008 and weakened the neoliberal bias dominating 
after 1989. Political elites began to the see the state’s activity—more regulations, and 
involvement in the fight against the crisis—as a necessary precondition for a stable 
economic order. Thus, the government of the Civic Platform decided at that time in 
favour of a large fiscal stimulus. As part of this, large public projects emerged, like 
express inter-regional roads and the liquid-gas terminal in Świnoujście on the Baltic Sea. 
Afterwards, the crisis discussion about the rise of public investment continued. In the 
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background stood the question of how to escape from the “dependent market economy” 
(Nölke and Vliegenthart 2009) to a more innovation-friendly system.
This line of thinking became mainstream when the United Right (Zjednoczona 
Prawica) came to power in 2015. One of the main goals of the new government was 
to accelerate the modernisation of the economy through large centrally-led projects. 
The Strategy for Responsible Development (Strategia na Rzecz Odpowiedzialnego 
Rozwoju, SOR; KPRM 2017), designed by the then-Minister of Finance Mateusz 
Morawiecki, has become the flagship declarative document. The government’s plans 
included spectacular ideas that had not been seen since the 1970s: for the construction 
of a state-owned electric car factory (Izera), the dredging of the Vistula Spit—which 
is to allow the development of the port of Elbląg—and the construction of the Central 
Airport (CPK), a transport hub located near Warsaw.
The last important turning point for the sphere of public investment in Poland was 
the outbreak of the pandemic and the economic crisis in 2020. It strengthened the 
belief that in the face of an external shock and a massive fiscal expansion is necessary. 
The government did not hesitate to boost deficit spending to 7% of GDP in 2020 
(according to Eurostat)―mainly in the form of protective programmes for enterprises 
and employees. However, the government also declared new public investment plans. 
Their determinants, size, and content will be presented below. 
5.3 Determinants for Public Investment Increases
5.3.1 Investment Needs
Poland is still one of the poorest countries in the European Union. Despite rapid 
economic growth and substantial real convergence over the last quarter of a century, in 
2020, GDP per capita in Poland was equal to €13,640―the fourth lowest level among 
the twenty-seven EU member states, and only 46% of the EU27 average. Many factors 
contributed to this outcome, of which path dependence (i.e., a very low starting 
point at the beginning of the transformation period) is most likely the dominant one. 
Putting aside the discussion on the past, it is best to focus on future possibilities and 
investment needs, since achieving high capital intensity and the capacity to innovate 
is the only way to sustain the process of real convergence in times of an ageing society. 
This, however, seems to be a problem for Poland, as the total investment rate has been 
decreasing steadily in recent years (MFiPR 2020), reaching an all-time low of 16.7% of 
GDP in 2020 (see Figure 3). Such a process happened despite the government goal to 
increase the total investment rate (private and public combined) above 20% of GDP, as 
explicitly expressed in the Strategy for Responsible Growth in 2017.
The decrease in propensity to invest was mostly seen among private entrepreneurs, 
who hoarded a record amount of savings and restrained from engaging in long-term 
and large-scale investment activity. Moreover, their willingness to invest in R&D 
endeavours aimed at increasing their future efficiency was also relatively low-standing, 
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Fig. 3 Gross Fixed Capital Formation in Poland and the European Union as % of GDP, 2009–2020.
Source of data: Eurostat.
at 0.83% of GDP in 2019 as compared to 1.46% on average in the EU27. However, no 
consensus has emerged on the reasons for this outcome. Some economists point out 
the relatively high margins and low labour costs of Polish companies, which decrease 
the incentives to invest in more efficient and capital-intensive technologies. Others 
focus on rising business uncertainty after the Global Financial Crisis, amplified by the 
increasing labour shortages in Poland―which are connected to low labour activity, 
low retirement age, and an ageing society—discouraging entrepreneurs from large-
scale investment in increasing output capacity. Another group of experts focuses 
more on aspects of the political economy after the change of government in 2015. 
They argue that a more redistributive model of social policy—along with higher 
uncertainty relating to fiscal burdens and the deterioration of the rule of law―deemed 
high investment activity as too risky for entrepreneurs, who must be prepared for an 
unexpected increase in the tax wedge, nationalisation attempts, and higher demand 
volatility. Some analyses also indicate that a lower investment rate is a natural side 
effect of the economic transformation, away from capital-intensive heavy industry 
towards a service-oriented economy dominated by small and medium enterprises. 
In our opinion, the truth lies somewhere in the middle, as each factor exhibits its 
impact on different groups of entrepreneurs, leading to a substantial decline in private 
investment activity that calls for urgent government action. Without action, there is a 
serious threat that the convergence process in Poland will come to a halt, as economic 
growth led solely by consumption will eventually generate excessive inflation and 
push Poland in the direction of economic turmoil.
The most urgent public investment needs are clearly pointed out in recently-
published government documents―Strategy for Responsible Growth in 2017, Poland’s 
Energy Policy adopted in 2021, the forthcoming healthcare strategy for 2021–27, and 
almost all of the National Recovery Plan and the Polish Deal (Polski Ład), drafted and 
presented by the governing party PIS (Law and Justice) in mid-May of 2021. After 
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studying these documents, a clear-cut picture emerges. The most important issues that 
need to be addressed are the transformation of the energy sector, digitilisation of the 
economy, society and public administration, housing affordability, improvement of 
the quality and availability of the healthcare system, and modernisation of transport 
infrastructure, both through building new motorways and investing in railways. 
Solving these issues requires a coherent plan with multi-source financing, as the joint 
costs of all these ventures can be estimated at a mind-blowing amount of over one 
trillion PLN―to be spent over this decade. If these plans succeed and the government 
can satisfy its financing needs at a low interest, then the fulfilment of this changeover 
strategy will bring long-term benefits to the economy and society. However, there are 
plenty of pitfalls that need to be avoided in the process, especially connected to large-
scale government projects, such as the plan to build a central airport hub in the crop 
fields of Central Poland.
5.3.2 Macroeconomic and Institutional Environment
The pandemic disrupted a long period of fast economic growth in Poland. The 
recessions triggered by lockdowns caused GDP to decline by 2.7% in 2020―relatively 
little compared to most EU countries. The mild course of the crisis is owed to the 
structure of the economy, of which key sectors are industrial branches and business-
oriented services. The most vulnerable branches, like tourism, play a lesser role than 
in the southern EU member states. 
The outlook for the post-pandemic rebound is very positive. According to the Spring 
Forecast of the European Commission, GDP growth is expected to accelerate to 4% in 
2021 and 5.4% in 2022. High levels of savings, consumer confidence, and the expected 
rise of investment in the private sector create a solid base for recovery. An additional 
factor driving growth will be external demand, boosted by the also rebounding euro 
area economy (European Commission 2021a, p. 110).
Under these circumstances, inflation―already high before the pandemic―may 
pose a difficult challenge. In 2020, the HICP index increased by 3.7%. The European 
Commission predicted in the Spring Forecast that the indicator will reach 3.5% in 2021 
and start falling slowly to 2.9% in 2022―more than twice what it is in the euro area 
(European Commission 2021a). There is a lively debate in Poland on how much this 
development is caused by temporary and external factors, and when the central bank 
should react by exiting from its ultra-expansionary monetary policy. Concerns about 
overheating the economy are on the rise and it may provoke questions if additional 
boosts in spending within the area of public investment make the problem worse.
The next determinant is the fiscal situation. The pandemic forced the Polish 
government to increase public spending. As a result, in 2020, the general government 
deficit amounted to 7% of GDP. In 2021, the situation should improve due to an 
increase in tax revenues and lower expenditure on “shields” for enterprises. In 2022, 
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the indicator should already have dropped below 3%. Despite a clear deterioration of 
the fiscal situation, Poland still meets the public debt criterion. In 2020, the debt level 
increased to 57.5%, but by 2022 it should drop to 55%. There is not so much spending 
space left to reach the warning thresholds written in the law, which foresees austere 
measures against further rise of debt. In the context of higher public investment, there 
is a lively debate about a possible revision of the legal framework for the fiscal policy 
in Poland towards more permissive rules. 
The labour market situation also constitutes a potential limit for the boost of public 
investment. Poland has spectacularly low unemployment levels— with a level of 3.2% 
in 2020, it belongs to best performing countries in the EU. Even considering the near 
completion of aid programmes launched during the pandemic, unemployment levels 
should not, according to the European Commission, exceed 3.5% in the next two years. 
However, a potential emerging problem may be a deficit in workforce and the fast rise of 
wages, which could further boost the already high inflation levels. Political constraints 
on immigration, as well as a quickly deteriorating demographic situation (with an 
expected two-million drop in population by 2040; Eurostat 2021b), combined with 
the low retirement age, will not make the situation easier. Under these circumstances, 
public investment plans may face the problem of quickly rising labour costs or even a 
lack of sufficient workforce to achieve its goals.
Finally, the factor which should be taken into account when increasing public 
investment is the effectiveness of the administration in preparing projects, organising 
tenders, and controlling the spending of funds. A good point of reference for the 
assessment of this criteria is the ability to absorb EU funds. Luckily, Poland does 
not look substandard in comparison with other member states. According to the 
Multiannual Financial Framework 2007–16, it performed slightly better than the EU 
average, and the rate of absorption was higher than in neighbouring countries (the 
Czech Republic, Hungary, Slovakia, and Germany; Darvas 2020). 
5.4 The National Recovery Plan 
5.4.1 General Information
The National Recovery Plan (Krajowy Plan Odbudowy―KPO) is the Polish agenda 
for disbursing EU funds from the Recovery and Resilience Facility (RFF). Poland’s 
allocation from the RFF is €34.6 bn, out of which €23.9 bn comes in the form of subsidies 
and €10.8 bn in the form of loans granted within the RFF to Poland. This translates into 
ca. 156 bn PLN of funds (6.7% of GDP per year from 2020) that should be disbursed 
until 2026. According to the KPO, the majority will be used to increase public investment 
(87.1 bn PLN) and the rest to stimulate private gross fixed capital formation (68.9 bn 
PLN). As shown in Figure 4, the government wants to start injecting the EU funds 
into the Polish economy as early as 2021, and expects the expenses to peak between 
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2023–25. In our opinion, this process will be delayed, as at the time of writing (August 
2021), the KPO has not yet been accepted by the European Commission, minimising 
the probability that money will reach the real economy before early 2022.
Table 1 National Recovery Plan Funds by Purpose and Expected Year of Disbursement, 
2020–26, in bn PLN.




0.0 1.9 12.9 20.7 19.3 20.9 11.4 87.1
Private 
investment
0.7 2.3 9.8 14.6 14.7 13.4 13.4 68.9
TOTAL 0.7 4.2 22.7 35.3 34 34.3 24.8 156
Source of data: Ministry of Finance, 2021.
The start date of the disbursement of EU funds is additionally uncertain due to 
several inconsistencies between the KPO and the European Commission’s policy 
agenda, including the European Semester. There are also some doubts whether the 
disbursement of the funds properly addresses the requirement to spend at least 
37% of the funds on Green New Deal projects and at least 20% on acceleration of the 
digitilisation process. 
These incoherencies can be traced back to the eclectic mode of preparation. The 
Polish government began to write the KPO in July 2020 (Klub Jagielloński 2021). In 
theory, the process was coordinated by the Ministry of Funds and Regional Policy, 
which is responsible for spending EU funds in Poland, but in practice it became a 
process of multilateral struggles between various ministries to get the biggest chunk 
of the funds, with the Minister of Economic Development being in the leader’s seat. 
Eventually, the Prime Minister’s Chancellery took over the coordination of the process 
and decided case-by-case which projects to include in the KPO.
This process transformed the KPO into a collection of bottom-drawer legislatives, 
i.e., various ideas from ministries, state agencies, state-owned companies, and local 
governments that had been put aside due to lack of funding. Many of them were of 
poor quality or based on unrealistic assumptions. It was only at the final stage that 
they were combined into larger sets of initiatives, but still requiring better coherence 
and a stronger link to the RFF agenda.
Eventually, in the autumn of 2020, the Prime Minister’s Chancellery arranged the 
KPO agenda into a plan matrix and, after a period of internal consultations, it will 
open the discussion to social partners and the general public at the end of February 
2021. After some minor amendments, the National Recovery Plan was approved by 
parliament in May 2021. The final version of the KPO consists of five main parts (or 
components): (A) resilience and economic competitiveness (B) green energy and 
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lower energy consumption (C) digital transformation (D) efficiency, availability, and 
quality of the healthcare system, and (E) green and smart mobility.
5.4.2 Five Components of the National Recovery Plan
Resilience and economic competitiveness (€4.7 bn)
This is the most general part of the plan. It consists of policies from various institutional 
areas (e.g., the labour market, housing, and social protection) that should help the 
economy to recover from the pandemic. The first element of this component (A1) 
consists of measures that are aimed at reducing the impact of COVID-19 and the 
effects of the crisis on enterprises to the amount of more than €2 bn. Companies are 
the major direct beneficiaries of this element, but some public investment is also 
planned, including money for preparing land for greenfield investment and financing 
for the acceleration of spatial planning. In the second element (A2), activities for the 
development of the national innovation system are grouped. Although most of the 
€500 m earmarked for this purpose is to go to companies, there are also public projects 
here, such as the construction of a museum of architecture and design in Krakow. The 
third element (A3) is aimed at improving education and the lifelong learning system 
to match the skills of employees with what is needed within the economy. This part 
also covers a plan to spend €500 m on the creation of 120 industry vocational skills 
and career guidance centres, so as to promote education and training in general. The 
last element (A4) contains an increase in the structural adjustment, efficiency, and 
crisis resilience of the labour market. An important goal is to increase the professional 
activity of women, part of which involves investment in nurseries and daycare centres, 
especially outside large urban areas (€400 m). Significant amounts are also earmarked 
for improving the operation of employment offices and e-administration. In the loan 
part, €150 m will be earmarked for increasing the use of satellite data—for instance, 
for monitoring weather risks. The government also plans reforms to strengthen the 
stability and transparency of public finances, reduce the regulatory burden, and 
increase the role of public consultation in law-making.
Green energy and reduction of energy consumption (€14.5 bn)
This KPO component coincides with the EU’s long-term financial perspective and the 
Just Transition Fund, which is aimed at helping communities affected by coal mining 
closures. The overall goal in this area is to transform key sectors of the economy to a 
low-carbon model, while maintaining competitiveness and energy security. The plan 
consists of three elements. The first (B1), worth €3.2 bn, is the improvement of energy 
efficiency. Much attention has been paid to supporting the transition to a less energy-
intensive mix of heat generation in residential buildings. As far as the sphere of public 
investment is concerned, the most important thing is the thermal modernisation of 
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schools envisaged in the plan. The second part (B2) focuses on increasing the use of 
renewable energy sources. A considerable amount of funds has been allocated to the 
development of transmission networks, development of hydrogen technologies, and 
intelligent infrastructure increasing energy consumption efficiency. By the end of 2024, 
an installation terminal for the construction of offshore wind farms is to be built and 
launched, and by 2026, offshore farms with a capacity of 2.6 GW and electrolysers 
to produce green hydrogen with a capacity of 400 MW will be completed. The last 
element (B3) includes activities aimed at adapting the Polish economy to climate 
change and limiting environmental devastation. It is planned, amongst other things, 
that degraded and post-industrial areas will be revitalised, including the cleaning of 
the bottom of the Baltic Sea. Additional funds will be allocated to facilitate the creation 
of “green” cities, e.g., those with limited traffic. Loans will be used to finance―in 
addition to offshore wind energy farms―green urban transformation, including 
“green multifamily housing”. The government is planning to establish a Green Urban 
Transformation Fund co-managed by local governments. The loan component also 
includes support for sustainable water management in rural areas.
Digital transformation (€4.9 bn)
Poland will allocate 20.9% of the funds to digital transformation―only 0.9 pp more 
than the minimum set by the European Commission. That is, in our opinion, an 
important deficiency of the plan, as there are significant deficits in the field of digital 
competence in society and in the computerisation of state institutions in Poland. The 
first element of this component (C1) is aimed at improving access to high-speed 
internet (>30 Mb/s), with a goal of increasing the proportion of households that have 
such access from around 65% to more than 80% in 2026. In this element, state support 
for private investment activity is planned, especially in regions with lower population 
density. For example, the loan component will help to finance the construction of 
5G networks by telecommunication companies. In turn, element C2 focuses on the 
development of digital services, also within public administration and between 
businesses, society, and the state. For example, the introduction of dozens of new 
e-services (e.g., e-invoicing and the digitalisation of construction permits) by public 
institutions is a planned development, as well as the creation of new communication 
platforms. Significant funds are to be spent on expanding the digital infrastructure of 
schools and improving teachers’ competence, which should result in an increase in the 
overall level of digital skills in society. The last part of this component (C3) is devoted 
to investment in increasing digital security.
Efficiency, accessibility, and quality of the healthcare system (€4.5 bn)
This component is compliant with the Polish Deal—the government’s newly published 
economic and social policy programmet―that also prioritises the improvement of 
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healthcare services. The basis for reforms and investment in both documents is the 
Polish healthcare strategy for 2021–27. The EU funds will be used to expand the public 
healthcare infrastructure, especially in oncology, psychiatry, and geriatric care, and to 
digitise healthcare and provide financial support for the education of medical students. 
The government also wants to finance the development of medical research and the 
pharmaceutical industry―for example, by creating a research centre for epidemic 
safety in Poland. The loan component will be used to facilitate the development of the 
pharmaceutical sector, primarily the production of active substances―manufacturers 
will be able to apply for €300 m in loans. Initially, the government wanted to finance 
the purchase of COVID-19 vaccines (€1.4 bn) using RRF funds, but they were forced 
by the European Commission to drop this idea. 
Green and smart mobility (€7.3 bn)
In this component, the government plans, amongst other things, to promote a low-
carbon economy in private companies and zero-emission public transport—in part, 
due to the approaching Fit for 55―and aims to cover the costs of the sector with 
ETS. There is, for example, over €1 bn’s worth of funds available for the purchase 
of EV buses and an additional €200 m for the purchase of new trams. Over half of 
the funds will be used to develop the Polish network of railway transport, including 
the modernisation of railway lines, purchases of new passenger rolling stock, and the 
construction of intermodal terminals. The government has also pledged to rewrite the 
e-mobility roadmap and increase the competitiveness of railways by reducing fees for 
access to infrastructure (charged by the railway network company PKP PLK). Almost 
all the expenses in this part of the plan will be procured by local governments.
5.4.3 Macroeconomic Impact of the National Recovery Plan
The disbursement of the funds according to the National Recovery Plan will have 
both direct and indirect effects on the economy. In the short term, it will stimulate 
aggregate demand and, through multiplier effects, increase employment, GDP, and 
tax income, speeding up the economic recovery. On the other hand, the programme 
might also lead to an increase in inflation, as companies are having supply-side 
problems with satisfying the fast-increasing demand, which provides incentives 
to increase prices in the wake of full capacity utilisation. In the long term, the 
disbursement of EU funds can stimulate the growth of the potential output by 
increasing the amount of working-age population in good health as well as boosting 
total factor productivity, thanks to higher energy efficiency, lower bureaucratic 
burden, and better labour skills. 
According to baseline economic simulations of the Ministry of Finance, as presented 
to the European Commission in the regular update of the Convergence Programme 
(Ministry of Finance 2021), in the short term the implementation of the KPO will 
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increase the real GDP level by 1.2% in 2024, compared to the baseline scenario without 
additional spending.
In the first three years of using the funds, the real economic growth rate will 
increase by an average of 0.56 pp compared to the baseline scenario. In 2027, the GDP 
level will be 1.3% higher than in the baseline scenario presented in the plan. The 
implementation of the KPO will also have a positive impact on the labour market. It is 
estimated that, after two years, 0.3% more jobs will be created, and after five years of 
using the funds in line with the KPO project, the number of jobs created will increase 
by 0.4% compared to the baseline scenario (see Table 2).
Table 2 Macroeconomic Impact of the National Recovery Plan
2024 2027 2042
difference to the no-policy change 
scenario
GDP +1.2% +1.3% +1.9%
Employment +0.3% +0.4% +1.3%
General government balance +0.3% +0.3% +0.9%
Source of data: Authors’ own assumptions based on Ministry of Finance 2021 calculations.
The long-term effects (i.e., twenty years after the beginning of the programme) of 
using funds from the RFF are related mainly to reforms and investment in   green 
transformation, digital transformation, and the healthcare system. Moreover, as the 
RFF will be distributed across the European Union, it will translate into the greater 
economic growth of Poland’s main trade partners (on average, +0.9 in the EU27, 
according to the European Commission; European Commission 2020), boosting the 
external demand for goods produced in Poland. The Ministry of Finance estimates 
that introducing the KPO will yield a 1.9% higher GDP over the long term than in the 
baseline scenario. Of these, 1.3 pp will be the result of high labour supply and better 
matching of workers’ skills (translating into lower natural unemployment rate), and 
the remaining 0.6 pp will result from the accumulation of productive capital.
In the long term, the main factors supporting Poland’s economic growth under the 
influence of KPO, apart from the increase in productivity, will be favourable changes 
in the population resulting from the improvement of the efficiency, availability, and 
quality of the healthcare system, and the increase in labour market activity. According 
to the Ministry of Finance’s forecast, the population in 2042 will increase by 303,000 
inhabitants, and the economic activity rate will increase by 0.9 pp compared to the 
baseline scenario. As a result, along with the increasing qualifications of employees 
and the demand for labour, employment is expected to increase by 1.3% compared to 
the baseline scenario in the horizon of twenty years.
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According to the European Commission, the disbursement of grants from the RRF 
will have a neutral impact on the public deficit path of EU member states (European 
Commission 2021b). In the case of debt, grant flows may have a temporary negative 
impact due to the mismatch in cash expenditure and receipts over time. In line with 
these assumptions, the Ministry of Finance expects that, despite some minor short-
term negative effects, the KPO will increase the general government balance due to 
higher tax incomes and lower expenditure needs from domestic funds. In total, the 
public deficit will be reduced by 0.3 pp in the short term and 0.9 pp in the long term, 
providing additional fiscal space to stimulate the economy in times of a slowdown, 
making Poland more resilient to negative external shocks.
5.5 Conclusion
The long-term investment plans of the Polish government are ambitious. If they are 
accomplished, both society and the economy will benefit, as real convergence will 
be sustained, the adaptation to the new climate policy will be faster, and private 
investment outlays will flourish, being made more attractive by high infrastructure 
quality, low transaction costs, and a skilled labour force. However, there are many 
pitfalls that need to be avoided―there is the risk of overheating the economy in the 
case of demand growing too quickly, the risk of engaging in investment projects that 
are deemed to fail (as it is constantly the case with motorway construction contracts 
in Poland), and finally there is the risk of over-politicising the investment process, 
which in our opinion might be the biggest risk, taking into account the polarisation of 
the Polish political scene and the partisan cycle it induces (i.e. consecutive periods of 
radical policy U-turns).
Moreover, there are also some intrinsic risks stemming from the weaknesses of the 
current programmes, especially the National Recovery Plan. Its text exhibits a lack of 
significant measures to increase the economic activity of the elderly and the disabled, 
and it leaves us with doubts regarding the achievability of the goals in society’s “digital” 
activation. For example, providing wider access to education does not always translate 
into the improvement of skills, if proper incentives and nudges are not provided 
simultaneously. In turn, long-term effects of the KPO are strongly dependent on the 
way in which the available money will be spent. As the disbursement of EU budget 
funds shows, the selection of qualified projects―as well as tender design―can largely 
affect the quality and adequacy of public investment outlays. There is also a political 
risk the KPO is exposed to. In the event of an escalation of disputes with the European 
Commission over the rule of law, access to funds may be suspended―which would 
mean immeasurable economic damage.
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6. Trends and Patterns in 
Public Investment in Spain:  
An Update
José Villaverde and Adolfo Maza
Introduction
After a good deal of both theoretical and empirical analysis on the issue, it is pretty 
obvious that there is a general consensus about the positive effects of public investment 
on the economy (for a recent survey, see Bom and Ligthart 2014). GDP, employment, 
and private investment trends are closely related to that of public investment, although 
the value of the corresponding multipliers is still a matter of certain debate. As is 
well known, it depends on a number of factors such as, for instance, the level of 
development and the stage of the economic cycle (for an analysis on influential factors, 
see, e.g., Gechert 2015). This direct and positive link between public investment and, 
amongst other things, the three aforementioned macrovariables, becomes particularly 
important in times of economic crisis, such as during the Great Recession of 2008 and 
the current COVID-19 pandemic. 
In this update of our previous paper (Villaverde and Maza 2020), we pay attention 
to the key characteristics related to the evolution of public investment in Spain between 
2000 and 2020. Specifically, although we have to admit the data is very scant and the 
period still too short, in Section 6.1 we focus our attention on the new economic crisis 
unleashed by the pandemic and, more precisely, try to shed some light on its effects on 
public investment. In the next part of the paper, Section 6.2, we make a brief reference 
to what Next Generation EU funds may imply for public investment in the country. 
Finally, in Section 6.3, we present the main conclusions from our research.
6.1. Public Investment in Spain: 2000–20
When evaluating the relevance and evolution of anything (be this a plant, an animal, 
an idea or an economic variable), the judgement critically depends on what or who we 
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are comparing with. As for economic variables in the case of Spain, it seems natural 
to start, very briefly, by comparing them with those of Spain’s main partners and 
competitors, namely the EU countries.
According to its GDP, Spain is (after Germany, France, and Italy) the fourth largest 
economy in the EU, fifth before Brexit took place. In terms of public investment 
specifically, it is also the fourth European economy, and although its evolution from 
2000 onwards has followed a similar path to that of the average of the EU, there is 
no doubt that it has also experienced much larger fluctuations. This is indeed true 
for each one of the three main subperiods we can split the period of 2000–19 into 
and, to a certain extent, for the year 2020. During the expansion period 2000–08, 
Spain registered, in 2015 constant prices, one of the highest increases in public 
investment among the EU countries, a rate (about 6% per year) much higher than 
that of both the EU and Eurozone averages (2.7%). The Global Financial Crisis that 
hit the EU, and the whole world, in 2008 and successive years had a very negative 
impact on Spanish public investment. More precisely, with a fall of around 12% per 
year between 2008 (€46.2 bn) and 2014 (€22.6 bn), Spain was, by far, the country that 
suffered the deepest decline among the big four. Not only this, but it also experienced 
a much larger drop than the EU and Eurozone (the annual drop was 3.2 and 2.1%, 
respectively). In 2014, however, the economic situation in Spain began to improve at 
a greater speed than in the EU; this is most probably the reason why Spanish public 
investment between 2014 and 2019 not only returned to positive rates of growth (see 
further below), but also its growth rate was, on average, much higher than that of the 
EU. Although quite understandable, the pro-cyclical performance of Spanish public 
investment is counterproductive in terms of stability, as this variable is supposed to 
play, at least in cases of severe recessions, an anti-cyclical role to limit the pressures 
from the economic cycle. Fortunately, and as stressed later on, this seems to be the 
case in the year 2020, when the health, social, and economic crisis hit the country 
most acutely.
The aforementioned pro-cyclical role of public investment is depicted in Figure 1. 
As can be seen, public investment (measured in bn euros, 2015) exhibited a relatively 
steady upward path from 2000 to 2009, declined sharply from then to 2014, and has 
remained relatively stable afterwards. There are, however, two relevant exceptions to 
this pro-cyclical path. The first one refers to 2009: although this is a year of clear, huge 
recession in Spain, public investment grew even more rapidly than in previous years, 
most likely as a government’s attempt to reduce the depth of the crisis that erupted in 
2008. The second exception refers precisely to 2020, the year of the COVID-19 outbreak, 
in which the Spanish government also tried to soften the effects of the pandemic on 
both GDP and employment. As depicted in the green line of Figure 1, the public-to-
total (P/T) ratio grew very sharply, much more than in any other year of our sample 
period, both in 2009 and 2020.
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Fig. 1 Public Investment.
Source of data: AMECO database. Figure created by the authors.
Note: Public investment is given in 2015 € bn. The ratio P/T is measured (in pp) on the 
right-hand axis.
Be that as it may, the pro-cyclical role of public investment in Spain can be seen even 
more clearly in Figure 2, in which the period under consideration has been split into 
expansion and contraction subperiods. Concerning the expansion ones and in line 
with previous comments, it is observed that public investment grew at a very high rate 
(6% per year) between 2000 and 2008 and, once again, although at a much lower one 
(1.5% on an annual basis), between 2014 and 2019. As for the contraction subperiods, 
it is shown that, despite the significant growth in 2009 noted above, public investment 
experienced a severe decline during the 2008–14 subperiod, with an average yearly rate 
of -11.5%. The revival of public investment in 2020, with an increase of 9.5%, effectively 
illustrates, and confirms, the second exception to the pro-cyclical tendency mentioned 
in the previous paragraph.
To conclude with the public investment evolution, we think another additional trait 
needs to be highlighted: expressed in 2015 constant euros, public investment in Spain 
declined over the 2000–20 period at an average annual rate of -0.3% (Figure 2), a fact 



















An indirect but complementary, as well as quite significant, way of analysing the 
evolution of public investment is by paying attention to the investment effort made 
by the government. Measured through the ratio “public investment/GDP (in pp)”, 
Figure 3, apart from confirming what was previously reported, shows that Spain made 
a great investment effort during the first boom subperiod 2000–08 (4.3% per year) 
and the first year of the Great Recession, 2009 (5.3%). Afterwards, and due to the 
guidelines issued from Brussels regarding the consolidation of public finances, the 
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Fig. 2 Public Investment: Growth Rate (%).
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investment effort dropped very sharply until 2014, and then remained more or less 
stable at a level of just over 2%. Fortunately, in 2020, and because of the more relaxed 
and anti-cyclical policy stance emanating from Brussels, the investment effort grew 
once more, but to a meagre 2.6%; in any case, it is evident that it falls far short of what 
is needed, since its level in 2020 is around 50% lower than the average between 2000 
and 2009.
Fig. 3 Public Investment Effort: Public Investment over GDP (%).
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Up to now, we have referred to public investment without considering the level of 
government that acts as the effective investor. This might not be relevant for a country 
with a highly centralised way of governing, but it is important for a country, such as 
Spain, with a very decentralised one (for an analysis of fiscal policy across levels of 
government, see OECD 2010). In this respect, Figure 4―in which, for the sake of clarity, 
we once again split the whole period into expansion and contraction subperiods―
shows the shares corresponding to the three tiers (central, state or regional, and local) 
of government, plus the social security share. Three features need to be highlighted: 
first, that the state governments are the main public investors in Spain; second, that 
their share in total public investment increased over time; and third, that this share has 
peaked up precisely in 2020, reaching a value of 45%. On average, more than 42% of 
public investment in Spain comes from state governments, around 31% from the central 
government, and 26% from local governments; as expected, the share corresponding 
to social security has been almost negligible (less than 1%).
Fig. 4 Distribution of Public Investment by Government Level (%).
Source of data: EUROSTAT database, along with an extension for the year 2020 based on IGAE data 
(IGAE stands for ‘Intervención General de la Administración del Estado’). Figure created by the 
authors.
Finally, it is important to note that just as relevant as the level and evolution of public 
investment is its composition, the areas in which public funds are being invested. 
According to Table 1―which only covers the period 2000–19, because there is no official, 
reliable data about 2020―it is obvious that, making use of the so-called Classification 
of the Functions of Government (COFOG), the share devoted to “economic affairs” 
(which includes subheadings such as general economic, business, and labour affairs; 
agriculture, forestry, fishing, and hunting; fuel and energy; mining, manufacturing, 
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to economic affairs) is always the most relevant, with figures accounting for more than 
40% of the total. As can be seen by looking at the three subperiods, and in what may 
be considered as a government attempt to play, to a certain extent, an anti-cyclical role, 
the amount of investment in “economic affairs” reached its maximum share during 
the huge economic contraction that took place between 2009 and 2014. As for the 
rest of assets, it is worth mentioning that the second position in the ranking always 
corresponds, and with increasing values, to the “general public services” (including 
subheadings such as executive and legislative bodies; financial, fiscal, and foreign 
affairs; foreign economic aid; general services; basic research; R&D related to general 
public services; public debt operations; and general intergovernmental transfers). The 
third position is occupied by either “health”, also with increasing values, or “housing 
and community amenities”, in this case with decreasing ones. Although, as mentioned 
before, there is no information about what happened in 2020 from this perspective, it is 
very likely that, due to the efforts made to overcome the severity of the COVID-19 crisis, 
the share devoted to investment in health had reached a new peak. Even being higher, 
this new peak will not probably be much higher than the previous one, considering 
that most of the spending in this area was current and not capital spending. 
Table 1 Distribution of Public Investment by Type of Asset (%)
2000–08 2009–14 2015–19 2000–19
General public services 11.00 12.58 16.59 12.54
Defence 7.00 5.32 8.26 6.69
Public order and safety 3.09 2.86 3.07 3.01
Economic affairs 41.52 45.27 40.71 42.59
Environmental protection 5.67 4.75 4.56 5.17
Housing and community 
amenities 9.82 6.93 4.65 7.94
Health 6.67 8.21 9.82 7.75
Recreation, culture, and 
religion 6.92 6.26 4.97 6.35
Education 6.50 6.09 6.34 6.34
Social protection 1.79 1.73 1.01 1.63
Source of data: EUROSTAT database following COFOG. Figure created by the authors.
6.2. Next Generation EU: Some Insights from Spain
As is well known, due to the severe economic crisis caused by the COVID-19 pandemic, 
the EU institutions (the European Commission, the European Parliament, and the 
European Council) launched a recovery plan, branded Next Generation EU (NGEU). 
This plan, which breaks with the rules of no common debt issuance (de la Porte and 
6. Trends and Patterns in Public Investment in Spain: An Update  99
Jensen 2021), aims to stimulate the economic recovery of the EU member countries 
by laying the foundations for a modern and more sustainable Europe, agreed on a 
European recovery fund of up to €750,000 m (in 2018 constant prices). Spain, the EU 
country hardest hit in economic terms, is expected to receive, over the period 2021–
26, up to €140,000 m, about half of them in direct transfers and the other half in soft 
credits. However, at the time of writing, and due to the uncertainty and the difficulty 
of setting actions for a longer period, the current Spanish recovery plan—the so-called 
“RTRP”, which stands for Recovery, Transformation, and Resilience Plan (see Spanish 
Government Agenda 2030)—revolves around the reforms and investment to take place 
between 2021 and 2023 only. 
Regarding public investment, it is important to note that, as pointed out in the 
RTRP, without the support of direct transfers from the European funds, it would be 
practically nil because of a context of limited fiscal space and a great need for current 
spending on health and education. In a trend scenario, it would mean, in practice, 
assuming a continued deterioration of the capital stock, as can be seen in Figure 5, since 
the tendency line (referred to as “no-policy change”) is below the “replacement” line. 
There is no doubt this situation would have a negative effect on long-term growth and, 
consequently, on social and territorial cohesion (since many of these public investments 
are territorialised). However, the investment foreseen in the RTRP (represented by 
the “plan” line in Figure 5), with its additive nature, will make it possible to reach 
an investment effort of around even 4% of GDP some years and always appreciably 
higher than the “no-policy change” scenario; this will not only imply closing the gap 
with the EU average, but also allow net investment to be positive for the first time since 
2011.
Fig. 5 Investment Recovery: Gross Public Investment (% GDP).
Source of data: Valencian Institute of Economic Research (IVIE) dataset and AMECO dataset. The 
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As shown in Table 2, the nearly €70,000 m of investment from direct transfers will 
be mainly devoted to two large areas, in line with the EU climate and digitalisation 
agendas: green transition and digital transformation. Human capital formation and 
R&D are two other important areas in which a large amount of the European funds 
will be invested. The main aim of this investment is to boost productivity and, in so 
doing, to increase the potential growth rate of the economy. In short, its purpose is to 
make the Spanish economy more modern, more resilient, and more competitive.
More specifically, in the classification by investment levers (again, see Table 2), the 
lever related to the modernisation and digitalisation of industry stands out (23.1% 
of total investment), which includes the development of the Spain 2030 Industrial 
Policy, strategies to enhance small and medium-sized enterprises, the plan for the 
modernisation and competitiveness of the tourism sector, and the promotion of 
digital connectivity and 5G. Another very important target of the funds will be the 
development of a rural and urban agenda that will, among other things, modernise 
agriculture and promote territorial cohesion (20.7%). It includes, amongst other things, 
an action plan for sustainable mobility in urban and metropolitan environments, 
housing rehabilitation and urban regeneration, and the environmental and digital 
transformation of agriculture and fisheries. The third investment lever we want to 
highlight is that devoted to the development of resilient infrastructures and ecosystems 
(15%). Given the structural impact that infrastructures can have on the economy and 
on society, the aim is to develop nature-based solutions and strengthen their capacity 
to adapt to climates―and, thus, their resilience. To this end, investment will focus on 
the conservation and restoration of ecosystems and biodiversity, the preservation of 
the coastal zone and water resources, and, again, progress in terms of sustainable, safe, 
and connected mobility.
Table 2 Investment Allocation
Lever Policies Amount (%)




II. Resilient infrastructures and ecosystems 10.400 M€
(15.0%)
III. A fair and inclusive energy transition 6.385 M€
(9.2%)
IV. An administration for the 21st century 4.315 M€
(6.2%)
V. Modernisation and digitalisation of industry and SMEs, 
entrepreneurship and business environment, recovery and 
transformation of tourism and other strategic sectors
16.075 M€
(23.1%)
VI. Promotion of science and innovation and strengthening of the 
capabilities of the National Health System
4.949 M€
(7.1%)
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Lever Policies Amount (%)
VII. Education and knowledge, lifelong learning, and capacity building 7.317 M€
(10.5%)
VIII. The new care economy and employment policies 4.855 M€
(7.0%)
IX. Promotion of the culture and sports industry 825 M€
(1.2%)
X. Modernisation of the tax system for inclusive and sustainable growth -
Total 69.528 M€
Source of data: The table is an adaptation created by authors of a figure published in Spanish 
Government, Agenda 2030 (2021).
According to the RTRP, it is foreseen that this new stream of public investment will 
give, on average, an approximate boost to the GDP of 2 pp per year, something that, 
hopefully, will allow Spain to return to its pre-COVID-19 GDP growth trend by, 
approximately, the end of 2022 (GDP forecast can be seen in Figure 6). As for the 
labour market, it is expected that, in aggregate terms, the employment generated by 
the RTRP could exceed 800,000 jobs at the end of the plan´s execution period. Not only 
this, but they will be quality jobs which, in principle, should increase the productivity 
of the Spanish economy, one of its well-known weaknesses. Finally, and in a similar 
vein, although admittedly a little more difficult to assess, it is also foreseeable that the 
investment from the RTRP will affect Spanish foreign trade positively. More precisely, 
a 0.2 pp increase in the long-term growth rate of exports is expected.
Fig. 6 Macroeconomic Impact (GDP Forecast 2015 = 100).
Source of data: National Statistical Institute of Spain, Ministry of Economic Affairs and Digital 
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6.3. Conclusion
The aim of this chapter, apart from summarising the main findings of a previous 
one (Villaverde and Maza 2020), was twofold. First, to present new evidence on the 
evolution of public investment since 2000 and, above all (and despite the fact that 
in this case the evidence is necessarily partial due to the scarcity of data), to present 
evidence from during the COVID-19 pandemic. Second, to briefly discuss the key 
points of the content of the Spanish recovery plan, the RTRP. By doing so, the paper 
has reached some interesting conclusions.
First, and contrary to what is expected, public investment in Spain has mainly played 
a pro-cyclical role in the new century. There were just two exceptions to this general 
trend: the years 2009 and 2020, precisely when the two recent economic recessions 
were at their strongest.
Second, the investment effort made by the public authorities in Spain has been very 
volatile and, on average, lower than that of the EU. After the outbreak of the pandemic, 
nevertheless, it has increased markedly and is expected to continue in the same vein.
Third, state (regional) governments have not only carried out most of the public 
investment in the country, but also their share of total public investment has grown 
over time, even after the outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic. In any case, the largest 
increase in public investment in 2020 corresponded to the central government.
Fourth, the economic affairs category of the Classification of the Functions of 
Government (mainly infrastructure) is the one that received the lion’s share of Spanish 
public investment―on average, more than 40% of the total. Although we are unable 
to give precise figures due to the paucity of data, it seems clear that we can point to 
the existence of a strong increase, yet to be quantified, in health investment during the 
current COVID-19 crisis.
Fifth, between 2021 and 2023, in the context of the NGEU plan and as a way to 
promote economic recovery, Spain will receive an amount close to €70,000 m in the 
form of direct transfers. According to the RTRP, this will bring net public investment 
back into positive figures for the first time since 2011. 
Sixth, this additional public investment spending will hopefully give an important 
boost to the Spanish economy, namely to GDP (an additional increase of 2% per year) 
and employment (about 800,000 new jobs by 2024). 
Although very promising, we consider that the positive expectations for the future of 
the Spanish economy linked to the European funds are a bit too optimistic and, therefore, 
have to be tempered. This opinion is based, on the one hand, on the foreseeable delays in 
the implementation of the NGEU plan and, therefore, in the effective delivery of funds 
to Spain and, on the other, on the fact that the investment projects that will benefit from 
these funds are not yet sufficiently detailed. In any case, there is no doubt that the arrival 
of the EU funds (the sooner the better) will give a big push to the economy, helping it, as 
mentioned before, to become more modern (productive), resilient, and competitive. This 
is an opportunity that Spain cannot afford to miss.
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7. Crowding In-Out of 
Public Investment1
Luigi Durand, Raphael Espinoza, William Gbohoui, and 
Mouhamadou Sy
Introduction
Public investment stands apart as a fiscal instrument to boost growth. Not only can it 
boost economic activity in the short term, it can also increase the productive potential 
of the economy by raising the capital stock and thus productivity. This is particularly 
important for countries that seek to support economies through crises but that, at 
the same time, need to boost long-term growth and thus, protect fiscal space (IMF 
2020). This is the situation many advanced economies face as they seek to kickstart 
their economies, after having shut them down in order to prevent the propagation 
of COVID-19. In Europe, the EU Recovery Fund is a €750 bn plan, financed at the 
EU-level, that has a strong focus on public investment.
This modern view of the effect of public investment owes a lot to Keynes. Prior to 
the publication of The General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money in 1936, the 
conventional wisdom was that an increase in public investment would lead to an 
equivalent decrease in private investment, so that the level of aggregate output would 
be unchanged. This concept of “crowding out” was challenged by Keynes: when 
prices are rigid in the short run, aggregate demand determines the level of output, 
and markets adjust via quantities rather than prices. Under this model, there is room 
for governments to support economic activity by increasing public investment. This 
argument is summarised by the concept of the “fiscal multiplier”:2 “when there is 
1  The views expressed in this chapter are those of the authors and do not necessarily represent the 
views of the Central Bank of Chile or its Board members, the IMF, the IMF Executive Board or IMF 
management. 
2  Even if the concept of multiplier is associated with Keynes, it was first was developed first by Kahn 
(1931). However, Kahn’s focus was on the “employment multiplier”: by how much does aggregate 
employment increase when public investment increase? See Kahn (1931) and Snowdon and Vane 
(2005).
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an increment of aggregate investment, income will increase by an amount which is k 
times the increment in investment” (Keynes 1936, p. 115).
The public “investment multiplier” can thus be defined as the ratio between the 
variation in output and the variation in public investment. In The General Theory, the 
main determinant of the multiplier is the marginal propensity to consume (MPC);3 
that is, how much of their extra euros of disposable income households spend on 
consumption. When the MPC is close to unity, small changes in investment lead to 
large increases in economic activity because spending (and thus employment and 
workers’ incomes) reacts strongly to income. However, if the MPC is close to zero, the 
multiplier is low. Keynes thought that the MPC would fall between these two bounds 
but be closer to unity, which would imply a large public investment multiplier. 
Arguments that run counter to this Keynesian view also have a long tradition, 
and include: the “Treasury view” of crowding out, according to which government 
borrowing to finance fiscal expansion would lead to a full crowding out of private 
investment,4 which is why deficits should be reduced to boost confidence (this view 
is echoed in the current debate on expansionary fiscal consolidation; see Alesina et 
al. 2019); the “Monetarist view” of Friedman (1957), according to which consumers 
respond only to changes in permanent income, and thus the impact of an unexpected 
temporary increase in income is going to be small; and the “Classical view”, according 
to which an expansionary fiscal policy cannot boost aggregate demand, because 
private agents have rational expectations and increase their savings in anticipation of 
a rise in future taxes (the “Ricardian equivalence”; see Ricardo 1820, and Barro 1974). 
However, the Keynesian view has been mostly supported by the data, as this chapter 
will show. Section 2 of the chapter gives a few examples of the existing literature and 
reports the results of a meta-analysis of Gechert and Rannenberg (2018). Section 3 will 
present some of the conditions that can lead to strong crowding in. Section 4 provides 
information on EU structural funds and the EU Recovery Fund, and discusses, in light 
of the recent literature, whether the EU Recovery Fund is likely to crowd in private 
investment and private activity in the sectors most hit by the COVID-19 crisis.
7.1 Modern Estimations of the Fiscal Multiplier
The empirical literature of the effect of fiscal policy on growth has bloomed since 
the 2008 Global Financial Crisis (GFC). The renewed interest is due to the fact that 
many governments launched recovery plans to boost their economies during the 
GFC. Responses to the COVID-19 pandemic are benefiting from this experience (IMF 
2020). Recent empirical estimations (summarised in the meta-analysis of Gechert and 
3  MPC = 1-1/k
4  Ralph G. Hawtrey (1925), then a senior official at the Treasury, harshly repopularised the Treasury 
view: ‘’The public works are merely a piece of ritual, convenient to people who want to be able to say 
that they are doing something, but otherwise irrelevant’’.
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Rannenberg (2018); see Figure 1) find that the fiscal multiplier is relatively high for 
public investment, possibly because public investment has the potential to crowd in 
private investment and support long-term productivity growth. For instance, Abiad 
et al. (2016) use investment forecast errors produced by the IMF to identify the effect 
of government investment, and find that increasing public investment by 1% of GDP 
increases GDP by about 0.4 in the short term and by 1.4 in the medium term (i.e., a 
short-run multiplier of 0.4 and a medium-run multiplier of 1.4). 
Fig. 1 Reported Fiscal Multipliers.
Source of data: Gechert and Rannenberg (2018). 
Note: n denotes the number of papers.
Eden and Kraay (2014) estimated the causal effect of public investment on private 
investment by using the variation in loan disbursements from official creditors in 
thirty-nine low-income countries. They found that one additional dollar of public 
investment leads to an increase in private investment by about two dollars. Some 
estimations based on subnational data also found large fiscal multipliers for public 
investment. Leduc and Wilson (2012) use US state-level funding for highways and 
estimate a multiplier of public infrastructure of about 1.7. Coelho (2019) finds that EU 
structural funds have a multiplier of around 1.7. 
7.2 Conditions under Which Crowding In Is More Likely 
The above summary hides several factors that can affect the extent of crowding-in. 
Keynes had anticipated some of them: (i) in an open economy, part of the benefits 
of investment will accrue to foreign economies, lessening the effect of the multiplier 
on domestic economic activity; (ii) following a fiscal expansion, the increase in 
“confidence” could increase the preference for liquidity and thus decrease the MPC; 
















The Great Reset110 
lead to an increase in inflation; and (iv) the central bank may respond by tightening 
monetary policy, which would reduce private investment. 
Recent research has emphasised the role of business cycles and monetary conditions. 
A fiscal stimulus may be less effective during expansions, because at full capacity, the 
short-term effects of an increase in public investment on output are limited, leading to 
crowding out of private investment and private demand, and higher prices. Moreover, 
in times of recession, the proportion of credit-constrained households and firms 
which can adjust spending in response to a change in disposable income is higher. 
Most of the literature finds that fiscal multipliers are larger during recessions, when 
there is economic slack, than during expansions (Gechert and Rannenberg 2018; 
Baum et al. 2012; Auerbach and Gorodnichenko 2013). Auerbach and Gorodnichenko 
(2013) reported a fiscal multiplier of up to 3.5 during downturns and a statistically 
insignificant multiplier during upturns, in a sample of OECD countries over the period 
from 1985 to 2010.
Public investment multipliers also tend to be larger when monetary conditions are 
accommodative (Erceg and Lindé 2014; Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Rebelo 2011; 
Coenen et al. 2012). In particular, multipliers are larger when interest rates do not 
increase in response to the fiscal expansion (for instance, because the economy would 
need negative interest rates that are much below the feasible policy interest rate, which 
is, in practice, close to zero). The literature on the effect of temporary government 
purchases suggests that accommodative monetary conditions increase the size of 
fiscal multipliers by a factor of two to three. Relatedly, multipliers tend to be larger 
in countries that follow a fixed exchange rate regime (which includes members of a 
currency union), because monetary policy does not offset the fiscal policy shock, thus 
remaining more accommodative. Empirical estimates find that countries that follow a 
fixed exchange rate regime have long-run fiscal multipliers that are larger by a third 
(Born et al. 2013; Ilzetzki et al. 2013; Karras 2011).
In periods of high macroeconomic uncertainty, public investment can also crowd 
in private investment if it affects private sector confidence. This is important at the 
current juncture, as the medium-term economic outlook crucially hinges on the race 
between a mutating virus and the deployment of effective vaccines. Uncertainty has 
been found to reduce firm-level investment (see Guiso and Parigi 1999, or Bloom 2014, 
for a review), and some have suggested that high levels of uncertainty could also 
make firms and consumers less responsive to fiscal stimulus (Bloom et al. 2018; Alloza 
2018). At the same time, uncertainty could increase the fiscal multiplier if public 
investment shocks improve private agents’ expectations about the economic outlook, 
thereby generating a positive and stronger private response (Farmer 2010; Bachmann 
and Sims 2012). Indeed, Gbohoui (forthcoming) finds that public investment shocks 
boost private sector confidence during periods of high uncertainty, leading to large 
multipliers of up to 2.7 over two years, compared to a multiplier of 0.6 in a linear 
version of the model (Figure 2). The crowding in of private investment is also stronger 
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in periods of high uncertainty. Private investment increases by more than 10% over a 
period of two years, after an initial public investment increase of 1% of GDP. A possible 
reason behind this result is that public investment shocks signal future improvement 
in productivity, driving up the private sector’s expectations about future growth, 
which leads to higher private investment. During periods of low uncertainty, public 
investment shocks do not seem to have effects on the economy. These results extend 
to a panel of countries, the findings by Arčabić and Cover (2016) for the US, and Berg 
(2019) for Germany, that reported fiscal multipliers larger than two during periods of 
high uncertainty.
The composition of the investment package also matters for its effect on private 
investment, especially in the long run. For instance, crowding-in effects can be larger 
if the package prioritises sectors with large positive externalities (Arrow 1962; Romer 
1986) or if it fosters innovation (Moretti et al. 2019; Agenor et al. 2015). From a 
theoretical standpoint, the private sector’s response to increases in public investment 
should be larger when newly installed public capital complements private capital 
(Aschauer 1989). For example, Fernald (1999) found that US industries that are more 
vehicle intensive have a disproportionate increase in productivity after the construction 
of roads (see also Lanau 2017). In recent years, the literature also suggests that 
public spending on environmentally friendly investment is likely to crowd in more 
private investment. Batini et al. (2021), for instance, find an impact multiplier of 1.2 
for renewable energy investment and of 4.1 for nuclear energy investment, but the 
multiplier is only 0.65 for “brown” energy investment. 
The quality of public investment, which will depend on the institutional, legal, and 
regulatory frameworks, is also fundamental. Short-term multipliers are likely to be 
lower when resources are diverted—for instance, because of corruption—and public 
inefficiencies in project planning, allocation, and implementation can result in less 
productive public capital in the long term.5 Even though there is no fully satisfactory 
metric of public investment “quality”, several measures and indexes are commonly 
employed. Among these, the IMF Public Investment Management Assessment (PIMA) 
score summarises information on institutional designs drawn from all three stages of 
the investment cycle (planning, allocation, and implementation), while the IMF Public 
Investment Efficiency Indicator (PIE-X) estimates the relationship between the public 
capital stock and indicators of access to and the quality of infrastructure assets.6 The 
empirical literature has confirmed that fiscal multipliers are higher in countries with 
5  However, Berg et al. (2019) note that the relationship between fiscal multiplier and the efficiency of 
public investment is complicated in theory, because the marginal productivity of capital should be 
increasing in investment inefficiencies if one realises that inefficient investment results in less capital, 
and thus a higher marginal product of capital.
6  Other measures that can be used to quantify public investment quality measures include the 
International Country Risk Guide (ICRG) indexes, the World Economic Forum Global Competitiveness 
Report survey on the wastefulness of government spending, the IMF Tax Administration and 
Diagnostic Assessment Tool (TADAT), the Public Expenditure and Financial Accountability (PEFA), 
and the IMF Fiscal Transparency Code (FTI).
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strong public investment management (Abiad, Furceri, and Topalova 2016; Myamoto 
et al. 2020). 
In addition, recent research has noted that crowding in is unlikely to materialise if 
public or private balance sheets are weak. A higher level of public debt is associated 
with low or even negative fiscal multipliers in the long run, a result obtained at both the 
country level (Ilzetzki et al. 2013) and the subnational level (Huang et al. 2020). Using 
firm-level data across sixty-nine countries, Huang et al. (2018) documented a negative 
correlation between public debt and corporate investment. One possible explanation 
is that public debt increases the correlation between investment and cashflow for firms 
that are credit constrained. 
Finally, the effect of an increase in public investment on private investment also 
depends on the strength of corporate balance sheet. Espinoza, Gamboa-Arbelaez, and 
Sy (2020) show that financial constraints matter for the effect of public investment 
on corporate investment. In particular, the authors find that an increase of public 
investment by 1% is associated with an increase in net investment rate of private firms 
by 2.3% on average, but for firms that are not liquidity constrained, net investment 
increases by 6.7%. Similarly, high leverage can discourage firms to invest, because new 
investment financed by additional debt could induce future low cashflows (Myers 
1977), a theory confirmed by the data (Figure 3).
7.3 Lessons for the European Union 
7.3.1 Public Investment and EU-Financed Investment in 
the Post-COVID Recovery
The pivotal role of the European funds in directing and supporting economies and 
investment has recently gained the spotlight, with the finalisation, in 2020, of a 
Recovery Fund (Next Generation EU, NGEU) to both buffer the negative effects of 
the COVID-19 pandemic, and to promote a transition towards more sustainable and 
more efficient means of production, through the disbursement of loans and grants. 
Given the heterogeneity in the intensity of the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic 
across countries and regions, the current programme sits well within the Cohesion 
Policy objective of ensuring medium-term income convergence in the EU. The concern 
is that the pandemic had highly asymmetric regional effects (OECD 2020), which have 
depended on the degree of exposure to tradable sectors and global value chains, and 
the reliance on the tourism industry. Of particular relevance is the disruption suffered 
by the agri-food sector (European Parliament 2020a), which exemplifies the fragility 
of complex production networks in the face of a systemic shock. Importantly, the crisis 
is showing that peripheral (still-converging) regions are suffering more than others 
(European Commission 2020a). 
The NGEU offers an unprecedented mechanism to counteract a major crisis episode 
(through the Recovery and Resilience Facility, RFF), both in terms of resources and 
characteristics; for instance, the firepower of NGEU amounts to approximately €750 
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bn, committed over a period going from 2021 to 2024, which adds to the planned 2021–
27 EU budget, for a total sum of around €1.85 tn (approximately 13% of EU GDP). 
NGEU is financed by borrowing on capital markets, in stark contrast with the regular 
EU budget, which has historically been funded using the EU’s own resources. The 
European Commission projects the total economic impact generated by the RRF to be 
approximately 1.2% of 2019 EU real GDP, over the 2021–22 forecast horizon (European 
Commission 2021).
NGEU financing is primarily tilted towards public investment, which constitutes 
87% of the total allocated expenditure (D’Alfonso 2020). NGEU could thus push future 
private investment towards economic sectors that are likely to be essential to ensure 
resilience and prosperity, such as digital communication, transportation infrastructure, 
sustainable farming, and clean energy. In this sense, the current crisis offers an 
unprecedented opportunity for public policy to advance its footprint on fundamental 
challenges, such as climate change and the erosion of natural ecosystems, by steering 
the national investment away from a production system strongly unbalanced toward 
polluting and unsustainable activities (see European Energy Agency 2021).
NGEU adds to the funds that the EU traditionally employs to reduce disparities 
between development levels and to promote the catch-up of lagging regions. As of today, 
the EU relies on five major funds: the European Regional Development Fund (ERDF), 
the European Social Fund (ESF), the Cohesion Fund (CF), the European Agricultural 
Fund for Rural Development (EAFRD), and the European Maritime and Fisheries Fund 
(EMFF). Together, these funds currently make up over half of the EU funding budget, 
and they are commonly referred as the European Structural Investment (ESI) Funds. 
Importantly, these funds finance both public investment and private investment.
ESI Funds are allocated under different “banners”. The lion’s share of ESI payments 
is classified under three objectives: payments associated with the Convergence 
Objective (formerly known as Objective 1) are aimed at stimulating growth in lagging 
regions (and can only be allocated in regions with a GDP per capita below 75% of 
the EU average), while payments associated with the Regional Competitiveness and 
Employment Objective (formerly known as Objective 2) are allocated to regions 
in structural decline; finally, payments associated with the European Territorial 
Cooperation Objective (formerly known as Objective 3) are disbursed to support 
education and employment policies in regions not included under Objective 1. 
ESI Funds are integrated into an overarching cohesion policy, dating back to 1988. 
Since then, the EU has gone through five programming periods (Multiannual 
Financial Frameworks, MFF), that usually lasted seven years each. In the case of the 
last programme (2014–20), the total budget (including EU financing and national 
co-financing) equalled approximately €650 bn―around 4% of EU GDP―of which 
€450 bn was from the EU only.7 
7 European Commission (2021x) “European Structural and Investment Funds 2014-2020. 2020 
Summary report of the programme annual implementation reports covering implementation in 2014-
2019.” European Commission Strategic Reports.
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Figure 4 describes the evolution of ESI Funds’ (modelled) expenditures across all 
MFFs to date. The figure highlights the extension of payments beyond the end of each 
MFF, a feature which stems from a decommitment rule, which allows the recipients 
to spend the funds after each programme’s end date. Interestingly, the 2014–20 period 
shows a significant slowness in disbursements. Despite this trend, 94% of the budgeted 
European Structural and Investment Funds (ESIF) had been allocated by the end of 
June 2020, and 47% had already been spent, on average.8 Figure 5 summarises these 
dynamics, by showing the share of EU funds payments as a percentage of the planned 
amount, for all EU countries. The issue of slow spending of EU funds can be attributed 
to several factors, including low project approval rate and delays in execution in some 
countries, but also the decommitment rule itself; these patterns are relevant from a 
policymaker perspective, since they raise concerns on the effectiveness of ESI Funds 
to provide an effective short-term stabilisation tool against unexpected adverse 
macroeconomic shocks (see Carrion Alvarez 2020). 
Fig. 4 ESI Funds Modelled Expenditures. 
Source of data: Annual EU budget payments (EUR) made by programme period, available at https://
cohesiondata.ec.europa.eu/Other/Historic-EU-payments-regionalised-and-modelled/tc55-7ysv. 
Within the context of the ongoing pandemic, many regulations surrounding the use of 
EU funds have been amended to allow for more flexibility and to increase the speed of 
project implementation (European Parliament 2020b). Among the major amendments 
is the temporary suspension of the principle of additionality, which originally required 
ESI Funds not to replace the national or equivalent expenditure by a member state. 
While co-financing might prevent crowding out of private capital in normal times, 
this concern is unwarranted in a crisis, when private investment is depressed because 
of ongoing uncertainty. Thus, the NGEU framework does not include the need for 
co-financing. Other amendments to ESI Funds include the exemption from the need to 
comply with thematic concentration requirements and the possibility of receiving EU 
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support on expenditures related to operations fostering crisis-response capacity to the 
COVID-19 outbreak. 
Fig. 5 Historical ESI Funds Payments as a % of Planned Amounts. 
Source of data: Author’s calculations.
Note: Absorption rates for the 2007–13 MFF are from the Commission’s “SF 2007–2013 Funds Absorption 
Rate” dataset available at https://cohesiondata.ec.europa.eu/2007-2013-Finances/SF-2007-2013-
Funds-Absorption-Rate/kk86-ceun/data; the 2014–20 data is based on the Commission’s “Regional 
Policy 2014–2020 EU Payment Details by EU Countries” dataset available at https://cohesiondata.
ec.europa.eu/2014-2020-Finances/Regional-Policy-2014-2020-EU-Payment-Details-by-EU/
vs2b-dct3/data. 
7.3.2 The Crowding In Effects of EU Funds
Given the size and scope of the EU investment policy for growth and regional 
convergence, it is essential to quantify the impact of such programmes on growth 
and both private and total investment; indeed, a requirement for accessing the EU 
Recovery and Resilience funds has been that member states provide detailed plans that 
also include a description of how the EU funds will contribute to promoting the EU’s 
economic, social, and territorial cohesion and also mitigate the social and economic 
impact of the crisis (see European Commission 2020b).
A large literature has estimated the growth effects of EU funds at a regional level; 
for example, Hagen and Mohl (2010) estimated that a 1% increase of Objective 1 
payments  leads to a small but positive impact on the regional GDP per capita by 
approximately 0.5%. A more positive assessment was provided by Becker, Egger, and 
Von Ehrlich (2010), who found that for every euro spent on Objective 1 transfers, GDP 
increases by €1.20. A common denominator in both studies is that having access to 
Objective 1 status does not immediately lead to higher growth, and several years are 
needed to show significant effects. Coelho (2019) analysed the response of output 
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large regional output multipliers, averaging 1.7 on impact in the poorest regions, 
and with a cumulative effect reaching a value of 4 after three years (after adjusting 
for co-financing). Canova and Pappa (2021) offered a more nuanced approach by 
studying ERDF and ESF funds separately, and finding that, on average, in the case 
of ERDF (ESF), an increase corresponding to 1% of regional GVA, increased GVA 
cumulatively by 1 (5.1)%, employment growth by 0.9 (1.6)%, and investment growth 
by 1.3 (4.3)%, cumulatively over a three-year horizon. The authors also underscored 
how these average figures hide significant heterogeneities across time and space. 
In this respect, the literature also highlighted that these multipliers depend on 
the initial level of economic development. Becker, Egger, and Von Ehrlich (2013), 
for example, concluded that only in regions where there is sufficient human capital, 
and enough institutional quality, do transfer programmes increase growth (see also 
Breidenbach, Mitze, and Schmidt 2016, and Ederveen, De Groot, and Nahuis 2006). 
There are very few studies that move beyond regional multipliers to estimating 
national multipliers of EU funds. In Durand and Espinoza (2021), which uses national 
data to assess the crowding-in effect of ESI Funds,9 shocks to investment are computed 
using associated disbursements from all ESI Funds, following an identification strategy 
based on an instrumental variable approach first proposed by Kraay (2014), which 
exploits the time lags between commitments and disbursements of funds. The study 
also investigates country heterogeneity by looking at crowding-in effects in a selected 
group of CEE countries where the multiplier would be expected to be large given the 
fixed exchange rate regime and high quality of institutions.10 The results, presented in 
Figure 6, summarise the main findings for the EU. The figure shows that ESIF funds 
crowd in private investment, increase total investment and GDP (with a multiplier of 
around 1.2), but do not increase employment.11
In addition to analysing aggregate multipliers, Durand and Espinoza (2021) further 
highlight significant heterogeneities in estimated multipliers across economic sectors. 
Understanding the heterogeneous impact of EU funds is particularly pressing in the 
context of both the NGEU and the MFF. Figure 7 reports the responses of EU total 
investment following ESI Funds shocks, by highlighting only those economic sectors 
where either the contemporaneous or 1Y multipliers are found to be statistically 
significant (at the 10% level).
9  In Durand and Espinoza (2021) ESI disbursements are computed using data from the major funds 
throughout the sample years starting in 1989, depending on data availability. This is in contrast with 
much of the previous literature, which instead focuses only on specific funds.
10  This group is composed of Croatia, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Latvia, and Slovenia. Durand and 
Espinoza (2021) show that in this group of countries, multipliers on investments and total investments 
are relatively higher when compared to the EU-wide multipliers. 
11  Notice that all coefficients are subject to uncertainty, as illustrated by the bars surrounding the point 
estimates in Figure 6. In Durand and Espinoza (2021), the estimated multipliers also include the 
effects driven by co-financing, which is approximately equal to 40% on average. 
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Fig. 6 ESI Funds Multipliers in EU. 
Source of data: Durand and Espinoza (2021), and author’s calculations.
Note: EU-GDP refers to the EU-wide impact of a 1% increase in ESI Funds disbursements on GDP. 
Similar interpretations apply for the case of total investment (I) and private investment (pI). The 
coefficients are subject to uncertainty, as illustrated by the bars surrounding the point estimates.
Fig. 7 Total Investment ESI Funds Multipliers in EU across Economic Sectors.
Source of data: Durand and Espinoza (2021), and author’s calculations.
Note: The figure shows the EU-wide impact of a 1% GDP increase in ESI Funds disbursements on 
total investment across economic sectors (based on the NACE Rev. 2 classification); as an example, 
the figure suggests that a 1% GDP increase in ESI Funds contemporaneously increases investment 
in Water Supply by approximately 0.2% of GDP, after one year. The figure only includes the list of 
economic sectors which contain statistically significant multipliers. The sectors are ordered from 
left to right based on the degree of labour intensity (defined as sectoral employment/sectoral Gross 
Value Added). The coefficients are subject to uncertainty, as illustrated by the bars surrounding the 
point estimates.
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An interesting result is that, overall, the list of economic sectors includes many labour-
intensive activities such as agriculture, manufacturing, education, and health, which 
were all hit by the pandemic. 
The composition of the funding package itself is also likely to affect crowding in. 
This is particularly relevant, given that the EU resources are allocated toward a wide 
variety of economic sectors, with different potentials for crowding in; reassuringly, 
the NGEU funding programme is well aligned with the theoretical arguments that we 
reviewed in the previous sections, by focusing on financing activities with potentially 
large externalities for the rest of the economy, and those that can foster innovation. 
More precisely, the package supplements short-term support to crisis-stricken sectors, 
such as manufacturing and health, with longer-term packages, which are tilted towards 
research and innovation (via Horizon Europe), digital transition (Digital Europe 
Programme), transportation and energy efficiency (Connecting Europe Facility), and 
addressing market failures in investment (InvestEU). In parallel to these programmes, 
the EU will remain engaged in more traditional themes such as regional cohesion 
(also through REACT-EU), recovery and resilience, security and defence, border and 
migration, and an efficient European public administration (European Council 2020). 
The EU is also extensively engaged in climate actions, as exemplified by the 2030 
climate target and the 2050 climate neutrality goal, as part of the so-called European 
Green Deal. Concerning climate change, the EU recently established a rule that 
programmes and instruments should contribute to mainstream climate actions and 
to the achievement of an overall target of at least 30% of the total amount of the EU’s 
budget and of NGEU expenditures supporting climate objectives.12 In this respect, 
the EU also established a Just Transition Fund to address the social and economic 
consequences of the objective of reaching EU climate neutrality. By implementing 
these directives, the EU is on the right track towards achieving strong multipliers.13 
To better appreciate the importance of the composition of the stimulus package, it is 
useful to review what the existing empirical evidence suggests with respect to sectoral 
public investment shocks. Durand and Espinoza (2021) follow the Classification of the 
Functions of Government (COFOG) to study the impact of sectoral public investment 
on aggregate outcomes, including total investment, in the EU. Their analysis shows 
strong crowding-in effects across a broad range of sectors (in fact, out of ten COFOG 
categories, only the category “GF10: Social Protection” does not display significance 
at both horizons). Importantly, it also suggests that the upcoming NGEU and 2021–27 
MFF, with its focus on key themes such as environmental protection and health, is well 
positioned to give rise to strong multiplier effects. 
12  See questions and answers on the MFF and Next Generation EU, available at: https://ec.europa.eu/
commission/presscorner/detail/en/qanda_20_935. 
13  This argument is further backed by the results from an international survey of experts, including 
senior officials from finance ministries and central banks, who expressed the desirability of green 
projects in creating more jobs and delivering higher short-term returns, when compared to more 
traditional fiscal stimulus (see Hepburn et al. (2020)).
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7.4 Conclusion
The literature and the new results presented in this chapter lend support to the view that 
the 2021–27 European Multiannual Financial Framework and the recovery packages 
will be effective in boosting the post-pandemic economy. However, policymakers 
should remain aware of the long-term implications of public investment, as well as 
of the potential drawbacks of a governance framework which, given the historical 
levels of slow absorption, inevitably limits the timely availability of these resources to 
address unexpected shocks (Bruegel 2020). 
These two observations give rise to a tension between efficiency and speed; in 
particular, policymakers must recognise that increasing absorptions of EU funds 
should not come at the cost of lower consideration for the value of money being spent, 
as seems to have been the case in recent years (see European Court of Auditors 2018). 
Importantly, while speed might be crucial during a time of crisis, the magnitude of the 
EU funds (especially when giving rise to further debt, as is the case with the NGEU) 
will inevitably bring long-term implications, both in terms of fiscal sustainability and 
in terms of long-term economic growth and development, and resilience against future 
crises. Although it is possible to optimise that trade-off by financing first maintenance 
spending and smaller and simpler projects (IMF 2020), transformational projects will 
take more time to implement, and the portfolio of investments will thus have to be 
carefully balanced to take into consideration the timeliness of an investment stimulus.
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8. Investing in Health
Pierre-Yves Geoffard
Introduction
Broadly speaking, any healthcare intervention that improves patients’ health may be 
qualified as an investment. Good health, a major component of individual welfare, may 
also increase labour supply, especially during older age, as well as increasing labour 
productivity. In that sense, health is a key component of human capital. In the words 
of the European Commission (2014), “the Commission adopted the SWD “Investing 
in health” (as part of the Social Investment Package, SIP) which presents health as 
a value in itself and as a “growth-friendly” investment.” In line with this definition, 
the Commission recommended in 2014 “investing in three key areas: health systems 
sustainability, people’s health as a human capital, and reducing health inequalities.” 
However, such an approach raises many issues. Not every good or service that 
improves welfare may be qualified as an investment. Many healthcare treatments may 
alleviate pain, and improve or restore the autonomy of the patient treated, without 
increasing their future productivity. The value of healthcare cannot be reduced to the 
effect it may have on future production, and benefit/cost analysis now defines the 
benefit of healthcare as the gain it provides in terms of quality of life or longevity. We 
choose, in this chapter, to focus on a narrower definition of health investment: current 
expenditures that may improve the future production of health. Such a definition 
encompasses the prevention of diseases, human capital investment in healthcare and 
the long-term care labour force, and capital expenditure in healthcare. Put differently: 
“How much a country invests in new health facilities, the latest diagnostic and 
therapeutic equipment and information and communications technology (ICT) can 
have an important impact on the capacity of a health system to meet the health needs 
of the population and thus contribute to better outcomes” (OECD 2019).
When we talk about health and healthcare, some contextual elements are important 
to keep in mind. 
8.1 Health
After decades of constant improvement, the decrease of mortality in most European 
countries, especially the richest ones, has been slowing down in the recent period. 
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Indeed, in 2015, overall mortality even increased across Europe, due to a severe 
influenza outbreak which killed many elderly individuals. Overall, population 
ageing and increases in obesity and diabetes slow down the decreasing trend of 
mortality by stroke or heart disease. Chronic diseases not only increase mortality, 
but they also reduce quality of life, especially at older ages. Population ageing also 
raises important issues in terms of health and long-term care, as in many countries, 
gains in life expectancy are no longer associated with gains in life expectancy with 
good health. Moreover, in all countries, individual health is strongly associated with 
socioeconomic status: the richer and the better educated live longer, and in better 
health, than the poorest and the least educated. Last but not least, the COVID-19 
pandemic has induced, between March 2020 and June 2021, more than 735,000 
deaths in the European Union alone.
In short, there have been as many important progresses as there are challenges 
ahead. Medical innovation has been incredibly successful in discovering several 
vaccines against COVID-19 in a few months, but better treatments for acute cases are 
still needed. More generally, as chronic diseases are becoming more and more prevalent, 
and as more and more hospital treatments can now be administered in ambulatory 
care units, healthcare systems need to evolve from hospital-centered organisations to 
more decentralised ones, which raises important issues in terms of coordination of 
care. The increase in “behaviour-related” diseases―such as those induced by lack of 
physical activity, alcohol or other drug consumption, and unhealthy diets―require 
public health interventions, all the more so as these diseases and these behaviors reveal 
strong social inequalities. Other evolutions of healthcare also impact investment, both 
actual and needed. New medical treatments, especially gene therapies and recent 
advances in oncology, often come at a very high unit cost. Finally, the digitalisation 
of health and healthcare information creates new possibilities for improving patients’ 
follow-ups and healthcare coordination. 
8.1.1 Healthcare and Investment in Healthcare
Overall, in 2018 European Union countries spent 10% of their GDP on healthcare,1 
and this figure varies from 5.7% in Luxemburg to 11% in Germany, France, or Sweden. 
Hospital care accounted for 36% of healthcare expenditures, ambulatory care for 
25.5%, and drugs and medical devices represented 17.6%. Labour costs represent 
about three quarters of hospital and ambulatory care costs, and an even larger share 
of long-term care costs.
Investment in healthcare capital typically represents a small share of healthcare 
expenditures, highly variable across countries and time (Figure 1).
1  https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php?title=Healthcare_expenditure_
statistics.
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Fig. 1 Investment in Healthcare Capital as a Share of Current Health Expenditure, 2017 
(or Nearest Year).
Source of data: OECD 2021, Health at a Glance.
8.1.2 Recent Crises
The Global Financial Crisis of 2008 induced tension on public budgets, including 
healthcare financing, due to a decrease in revenues following a decrease in economic 
activity. Given the high share of labour costs in healthcare, and given that these costs 
are mostly fixed in the short run, the pressure on healthcare budgets led to a substantial 
drop in investment in some countries, especially Greece and the UK.
The COVID-19 pandemic induced high-excess mortality among the elderly. The 
large number of patients requiring intensive care for unusually long hospital stays 
put tremendous pressure on hospitals. In order to cope with an exceptionally large 
number of COVID patients, most hospitals postponed non-urgent care for other 
diseases, which increased treatment delays. The structure of healthcare expenditures 
changed, with a sharp decrease in ambulatory care, important changes in medical drug 
consumption, and (of course) increases in hospital care costs; given these rapid and 
contrasted evolutions, it is still too early to say how much total healthcare expenditure 
has increased by. However, the sharp drop in GDP, induced both by individual 
responses to the risk of infection and by policy interventions such as lockdowns and 
other restrictions on social and economic activity, led to a sharp decrease in healthcare 
financing revenues, which are highly sensitive to GDP. As for public budgets, healthcare 
financing experienced in 2020 a historical deficit, contributing to a strong increase in 
the “social debt”.
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Fig. 2 Trends in Healthcare Capital Expenditure.
Source of data: OECD Health Statistics 2019, OECD National Accounts.
8.2 Relevant Investment in Health and Healthcare
However, it may be worth reminding that investment decisions should be based on the 
balance between current costs and the prospect of future benefits, and not on currently 
available budgets. This section suggests some areas in which investing resources may 
improve healthcare systems in the future, including investment in preventing future 
diseases. These suggestions are highly subjective, and each of them would require a 
thorough benefit/cost analysis which would go way beyond the scope of this brief.
8.2.1 Human Capital
As stated above, healthcare principally involves labour. Training medical staff usually 
takes up to ten years or more, taking into account medical school, internships, 
residencies, and specialisation. In a context in which healthcare organisations, due to 
digitalisation, switch from hospital to ambulatory care, and in which there is growing 
importance of chronic and older-age diseases, investment has to be made now to train 
the physicians that we will need in ten years. In addition, medical doctors are not 
the only workers in the health sector. Population ageing, given the uncertainty about 
the health condition in which individuals will spend the last years of their life, will 
induce a strong increase in long-term care needs. Many countries, not only in Europe, 
already face difficulties in hiring well-trained professionals. As suggested by some2, 
2 OECD (2020) Who Cares? Attracting and Retaining Care Workers for the Elderly https://www.oecd.org/
health/who-cares-attracting-and-retaining-elderly-care-workers-92c0ef68-en.htm
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this challenge may be solved by selective immigration. However, high unemployment 
rates, especially among women, may also suggest that an increase in training capacities 
may contribute to solving this challenge. Indeed, if we fail to increase labour in long-
term care facilities, the elderly who suffer some loss of autonomy will be taken care 
of by their relatives—in practice, most of the time by their daughters or daughters in 
law, some of whom may have to reduce labour force participation in order to be able 
to devote sufficient time to their parents. Investing in training for long-term care jobs 
may therefore not only impact long-term care itself, but also female employment in 
many sectors.
8.2.2 Digital Transformations 
Information is central to healthcare production. An episode of care starts with a medical 
visit in which a physician has to transform some information (symptoms, biological 
tests, past medical history, etc.) into another form of information (diagnosis). Given 
the rapid expansion of medical knowledge, every physician has to spend a substantial 
and growing share of their time learning about new therapeutic opportunities. 
Information technologies can be of great help, by offering computer assistance to 
medical decision-making. In some areas (e.g., radiology), systems based on artificial 
intelligence, relying on the standardised analysis of thousands or more past cases, can 
produce a highly reliable diagnosis. It is hard to believe that such technologies will not 
provoke dramatic changes in medical care, and increase healthcare productivity. Such 
systems are still in their infancy, and will need important investment to generate their 
full potential.
What is true for medical decision-making is also true for surgery. Surgeons 
increasingly rely on robots, not as substitutes of their own practice, but as a complement 
to it. For instance, a high-speed connection may allow a surgeon to command a 
surgical robot at long distance. Additionally, a robot commanded by a surgeon can be 
more precise than the same surgeon’s hand in executing very precise surgical gestures. 
Again, such technologies will experience major improvements in the years to come, if 
they benefit now from relevant investment.
Electronic health records constitute another opportunity for improving healthcare. 
A typical healthcare episode, especially when it includes some hospital care, involves 
several physicians, and even more other healthcare professionals. Electronic health 
records may contribute to a better coordination of all. This is easier to say than to do, 
however, as many attempts to set up such systems on a large scale have failed in the 
past. Nevertheless, it is reasonable to believe that they will play an important role in 
improving healthcare, provided that relevant investment is undertaken.
Information and communication technologies also create the possibilities of 
improving surveillance and follow-up of chronic patients. For instance, a house may 
be equipped with sensors that detect the fall of a fragile patient and send an alarm, or 
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measure blood pressure or other elements, the evolution of which may indicate that 
some action is needed. Again, such technologies are in their infancy, but their potential 
is huge.
Yet another area in which the digitalisation of health and healthcare creates new 
opportunities is the value assessment of drugs and medical devices. The producer of a 
new drug has to prove, in order to bring the drug to the market, that it is safe, and that it 
improves patients’ health. This proof is usually produced in randomised clinical trials, 
which impose increasing development costs and delays. Whereas such procedures do 
increase safety and confidence in efficacy, these delays may be detrimental to patients 
who have to wait before being allowed to receive the treatment. Once the drug can be 
prescribed, it remains under strict surveillance, and eventual side effects, too rare to 
be observed in a clinical trial involving a few hundred or thousand carefully selected 
patients, can arise when the drug is prescribed in real life to much larger, and more 
heterogenous, groups of patients. Investing in health data systems that routinely 
collect information relevant to the evaluation of safety and efficacy of a drug may 
actually decrease substantially the relative costs of such “real life” experience vs ex ante 
(in an RCT) production of information. 
This issue is particularly relevant for treatments of rare diseases. A disease is 
qualified as “rare” when it concerns a small number of patients, i.e., when its prevalence 
is very low, lower than one case per 2000 individuals (actual thresholds vary, but this 
value is commonly used in Europe). There are many rare diseases, 70 to 80% being 
genetic diseases, so that the total number of patients suffering from a rare disease is 
estimated to be around 250,000 in Europe.3
Rare diseases raise important issues in terms of innovation (see Section 8.3. below), 
and also in terms of health technology evaluation. First, the small number of patients 
in a given country makes it almost impossible to set up a standard randomised 
clinical trial with sufficient statistical power. Second, especially for gene therapies, the 
potential benefit to patients may last for many years, ideally for life, but at the time 
the therapy is discovered there is a high uncertainty about its duration, and therefore 
its expected overall value. Third, the unit production cost of such therapies is very 
high, usually larger than €1 m for the first cases, and given the small prevalence, the 
possibility to amortise research costs is limited. These elements raise specific issues in 
terms of pricing, financial risk-sharing between healthcare financing institutions and 
producers, and patients having access to promising treatments, as there is usually no 
therapeutic alternative.
A European perspective could bring important benefits: registers of all 
European patients could be created and maintained, gathering clinical and patient 
satisfaction data in a standardised way, matched with existing healthcare data such 
as reimbursement or cost data routinely collected by health insurance organisations. 
Given that such processes are currently defined and operated at each country’s level, 
building a European platform will raise important technical, and political, issues. 
3  https://ec.europa.eu/health/non_communicable_diseases/rare_diseases_en.
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8.3 Hospital and Long-Term Care
Hospital care is a highly innovative industry. Surgeons can be assisted by surgical 
robots for many interventions, and sometimes such robots can be operated at long 
distance. Less invasive surgical procedures can treat patients who now need to stay 
hospitalised for a shorter period. Some surgical interventions can even be done in the 
outpatient section of the hospital patients can also be treated at home for illnesses 
that required full hospitalisation not long ago. Digitalisation offers opportunities to 
improve coordination of care by providing us with better circulation of information. A 
reasonable prediction is that fewer hospital beds will be needed in the future, but these 
beds may be occupied by patients receiving more intensive care.
Needless to say, all such innovations may lead to important changes in the role of 
hospitals within the healthcare system. Such transformations may require important 
investment. Identifying the relevant investments which are needed in Europe would 
go far beyond the scope of this brief, in part because the current state of hospitals 
varies a lot across, and within, European countries. Relevant innovations may be 
quite different across, say, northern Italy, Switzerland, and Scandinavian countries, or 
across southern Italy, Greece, or the United Kingdom. But what is quite clear is that no 
country will be prepared to face the challenges raised by the transformation of hospital 
care without important investment.
Population ageing has been associated with some medical progress, but the 
reduction in mortality at older ages is not necessarily associated with a gain in quality 
of life in the last years of life, especially for women. Given the sharp increase in the 
number of elderly people, especially in countries with a low fertility rate and very 
limited immigration flows, more long-term care homes will need to be built, equipped 
with medical facilities, and staffed with medical and paramedical personnel. This can 
be a highly profitable investment, since as stated above, the alternative is to rely on 
family or informal care to provide long-term care, which in most cases leads to relying 
on women, some of whom may have to withdraw, temporarily or permanently, from 
the labour force. 
8.4 Industry: Pharmaceuticals 
Along with the information technology industry, the pharmaceutical industry is the 
most intensive in research and development, and about 10% of firms’ revenue is devoted 
to it on average. It is a key player in a system which articulates fundamental research, 
usually undertaken in publicly-funded universities; start-ups which often originate 
from such universities; patent law which grants temporary monopolies to inventors; 
big pharmaceutical firms which may conduct their own R&D, invest in start-ups, and 
buy (and sell) patents; health authorities which assess the safety and efficacy of new 
treatments; healthcare financing institutions which reimburse treatments; and patients 
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who may benefit from new treatments. Research and development by private firms 
is often subsidised by governments, and innovative financing mechanisms, such as 
advanced market commitments (Kremer et al. 2020), also contribute to the evolution 
of cost- and risk-sharing between different bodies. 
Public funding of R&D in health technologies varies substantially across countries 
in Europe, and shows divergence between countries (Figure 3). Public investment in 
universities, by financing fundamental research in life sciences, also varies substantially. 
There is high potential in investing more in R&D, both at the fundamental stage of 
research and in supporting and incentivising private firms. 
Fig. 3 Public Investment in Healthcare R&D.
Source of data: OECD, Government Budget Allocations for R&D, https://stats.oecd.org/Index.
aspx?DataSetCode=GBARD_NABS2007.
Patent protection and drug pricing are also important drivers of innovation. The 
question seems, at first, not to be related to investment, but it is in fact closely linked. 
Patent protection and adequate pricing guarantee profits over ten or more years, and 
this perspective of profits stands as a strong incentive to innovate―and to put more 
effort into―therapeutical areas in which the number of patients is large and the 
negotiated price, at least partly based on therapeutic added value, is high. However, 
patents are also an artificial barrier to competition, which prevents other firms from 
producing a similar drug, and discourages process innovation to produce it at the 
lowest cost. An alternative to patents would be innovation prizes (Geoffard 2020), in 
which financing authorities commit to pay a high lump-sum payment to the inventor of 
a socially desirable drug to buy out its patent; this allows ex post competition, reduces 
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costs for health insurance, and requires an upfront investment which is a substitute to 
future profits paid during patent protection. 
As stated above, some recent innovations, and others in the pipeline, have a very 
high production cost. Some gene therapies may cost more than €1 m for a single 
treatment, which has to be tailored to each patient. However, when they concern 
only a very small number of patients each year, even such sky-rocketing prices do not 
threaten health insurance budgets. Investing in such innovations is important to attract 
localisation of R&D units in Europe, as well as to reduce the delay patients experience 
before being able to access the treatment.
Innovation is not everything. Production also matters, and requires investment 
in production lines. This fact is highly visible for vaccines against COVID-19, for 
which limited production capacities reduce the speed at which populations could be 
vaccinated throughout the world. And though we do not know when a new virus will 
strike, we know it will happen again, some time in the future. However, we do not 
know its features, and of course we do not have treatments nor vaccines on the table 
for these future viruses. New technologies such as mRNA have shown their ability to 
offer a fast and efficient response to new viruses, and seem particularly powerful in a 
situation with a high uncertainty, as they can be adjusted to the specific characteristics 
of the still-to-come virus. 
In that sense, setting up large production lines (which can be mobilised rapidly 
whenever a new pandemic hits the world) now is also an investment that could enable 
us, in the future, to respond much more rapidly and to avoid the health, economic, 
and social crises that we witnessed in 2020 and 2021. Investing in flexible, adjustable, 
vaccine production lines could be worth considering.
Finally, the COVID-19 crisis has also shown how the whole supply chain for certain 
pharmaceutical drugs can be very fragile, as it relies on a very small number of 
upstream producers of active ingredients, mostly located outside Europe. Relocating 
the production of some of these components in Europe could indeed be an answer to 
this fragility, but it will also require important investment.
8.5 Prevention
Preventing, at the individual or societal level, the occurrence of a future illness, or 
reducing its severity, is a textbook example of investment in health. As an old proverb 
attributed to Erasmus says, “Prevention is better than cure”. Is it really? The answer 
is a typical economist one: “It depends”. Some preventive actions, like vaccination, 
come at a small cost, and may produce high health benefits in the future. However, 
some other preventive actions do improve future health or reduce future mortality, 
but the cost per life saved, or per year in good health gained, is out of range with other, 
preventive or curative, interventions (Tengs et al. 1995).
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Preventive care also typically represents a small share of total healthcare expenditure 
(Figure 4), and varies a lot across countries, ranging from 5.1% in the UK to less than 
0.8% in Slovakia.
Fig. 4 Share of Preventive Care in Total Healthcare Expenditure, 2018.
Source of data: Eurostat, https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/databrowser/view/HLTH_SHA11_HC__ 
custom_423640/bookmark/table?lang=en&bookmarkId=5a8bfe63-5f2d-475c-b221-d7480f54fba3.
Notice that the average share of healthcare expenditure devoted to prevention dropped 
from 3.12% to 2.77% when the UK left the EU. This points out how much the UK 
National Health Service is rooted in prevention. Physicians, or more precisely group 
practices made up of several healthcare professionals, are partly financed according 
to their involvement in prevention. The health indicators in the UK are comparable to 
other countries of similar per capita GDP (e.g., same life expectancy at birth for men 
as in France), but the UK devotes a substantially lower share of GDP to healthcare 
expenditures (9.8% in 2019). In addition, whereas economic inequality is large in the 
UK, the association between socioeconomic status and health, at the individual level, 
seems weaker than in other comparable countries. In most countries, shifting from a 
healthcare system mostly centred on hospital care towards a more decentralised system, 
where general practice is the entry point into healthcare and tackles prevention as well 
as reduction of health inequalities, is an option to consider. Would such a shift require 
huge investment? Not necessarily, but such a reorganisation would be so disruptive 
to many healthcare professionals that it would surely need to be accompanied by 
important investment in organisation strategy, information systems, and training. 
More generally, in the era of evidence-based medicine, prevention suffers from 
a disadvantage with respect to curative medicine: it is less often evaluated, impact 
evaluation being more difficult to assess due to the multiplicity of causes for any 
disease, the unknown duration before effects materialise, and the huge heterogeneity 
of situations. Better evidence on the costs and benefits of disease prevention across 
8. Investing in Health  137
the board could yet be produced. Another similar investment in knowledge would 
also be welcome, to better understand the causal mechanisms underlying the strong 
socioeconomic inequalities witnessed in all countries.
To conclude on prevention, the ongoing COVID-19 crisis has shown a major 
weakness of health systems in Europe and elsewhere. Epidemiological surveillance 
failed to detect early diffusion of the virus in certain European countries or regions, at 
a time where it would have been possible to break, or at least to delay, the epidemic. 
This, also, needs to be strengthened in the future, if we want to be better prepared for 
the next pandemic.
8.6 Conclusion
The healthcare sector is, in essence, a very innovative industry in all its components. 
In conclusion, it should be reminded that if the years to come are associated with 
attempts to reduce public expenditure in order to repay the debt inherited from the 
COVID-19 crisis, such budget cuts should be contemplated with great prudence if they 
affect healthcare expenditure. In a sector where the main input is labour, budget cuts 
often lead to delayed or foregone capital investment, not because they are less efficient, 
but because they are easier to reduce. 
However, demographic trends, digitalisation, and an increased role of prevention 
are the structural drivers of transformation in healthcare, and such changes will 
require important investment in the future.
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9. Education, Human Capital, 
and Social Cohesion
Lieve Fransen, Romano Prodi, and Edoardo Reviglio
Introduction
The pandemic has speeded up many of the great transformations that are taking place 
in society. Pervasive digitalisation, green transition, major changes in job markets due 
to the new industrial revolution, the ageing society, growing inequalities and poverty, 
geo-political changes—the list goes on. In this sense, the pandemic has become an 
unexpected “experimental laboratory” for what may become our new world. The 
evolution of this new world can still be directed in one way or another, and it represents 
both risks and opportunities. We must be careful to think through and design the most 
effective policies and investments that leave no-one behind and protect us from the 
risks inherent in such transitions. 
Indeed, it is of paramount importance that we invest massively in our human and 
social capital—and especially in education and lifelong learning. 
In the 1950s and 1960s, scholars like Jacob Mincer, Theodore Schultz, and Gary 
Becker documented and explained the close connection between human capital (i.e., 
the stock of skills, abilities, and knowledge an individual possesses) and economic 
returns. Their groundbreaking studies stimulated a growing research agenda, which is 
still contributing to our knowledge concerning the relationship between the educational 
system and the economy. For example, we know that education, combined with other 
variables, significantly affects an individual’s social mobility, earnings, employability, 
and health too. But we also know that a better educated society is correlated with 
economic growth and prosperity. 
However, the mere focus on the economic effects of human capital should not 
let us forget about the social and political “returns” of education. Indeed, not only 
is education one of the main drivers of economic growth, but it is also one of the 
great equalisers within and across societies. Social justice, intended as equality of 
opportunities, begins in the classroom, and gaps in the educational systems are gaps 
that we find in society. In order to go beyond the rhetorical commitment to inclusion 
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and equality of opportunities, there is now, more than ever, a need to invest in an open 
and collaborative education, based on information-sharing where students are active 
contributors in connection with teachers. 
Moreover, in a world where the spread of democracy cannot be taken for granted 
anymore, the goals of educating thoughtful citizens of and for a democratic society 
should permeate how we think about the classroom of the future. Indeed, education is 
not only about increasing knowledge and skills for personal and social growth, but it is 
also about the attempt to foster in pupils those values and ideas that make democratic 
life possible, such as critical reflection, the capacity to balance individual rights and 
responsibilities, the ability to judge and evaluate ideas on the basis of their intrinsic 
value rather than their popularity, etc. 
In this chapter, we discuss the impact of digital distance learning during COVID-19, 
along with the need to transform our education and learning models and to invest in 
physical and intangible infrastructure, based on new needs. We discuss recent data 
on expenditures on education in the EU, make concrete proposals for a change in the 
Growth and Stability Pact (GSP)―especially with regard to social investment and 
infrastructure―and propose new models for financing social infrastructure. We show 
that the new expansionary policy will increase the demand for “safe assets”, which 
includes financial instruments for social and green infrastructure. We also stress the 
role of multi-lateral and national promotional banks and institutions in becoming new 
“market makers” by increasing “patient capital” going into the real economy. Finally, 
we look at the InvestEU programme and the Next Generation EU (NGEU) fund and 
discuss their potential contribution to education investment. 
9.1 Digital Learning: A Boost During the Pandemic but and 
Increaser of Inequality and Stress on Public Investment
Twelve years after the financial and economic crash, Europe seemed to have passed 
the worst of the recession and the austerity response, only to find itself in the midst 
of a major health crisis with the COVID-19 pandemic. The response to the pandemic 
illustrates how austerity measures and a lack of investment in health and human capital 
left Europe poorly prepared—and how distance learning, tele-medicine, tele-working, 
and tele-education were boosted at great speed, while the growth and stability rules 
were upended in 2020. 
For many years, the world has tried to reimagine education and lifelong learning 
for the digital age (Camara, Biglia, Van Looy et al. 2020), but nobody predicted that 
the greatest transformation would be caused by communicable disease spreading 
globally. While historically, crises have often been at the origin of major changes in 
social systems, COVID-19 changed socializing, learning, working, and parenting 
globally and at a scale never seen before. By mid-April 2020, more than 90% of Europe’s 
students had been locked out of classrooms for months, and teachers and parents were 
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confronted with teaching, supervising, and guiding young people during a radically 
changed situation for all. The pandemic demonstrated that investing in human capital 
in the digital age is essential, while the socialising role of schools and peer groups has 
been highlighted as never before.
Digital learning received an enormous boost during the pandemic, forcing 
education professionals and learners to rapidly adapt their competences. It had 
a positive impact by limiting the loss of human capital for some (The World Bank 
Group 2020). But for others, adaptation has been slower and not well managed due to 
multiple factors including the lack of or asymmetric distribution of infrastructure and 
connectivity; inadequate preparation of teachers, parents, and pupils; some students’ 
low motivation for learning; social isolation; cyber risks; technical incompatibilities 
among the learning systems available; technology dependency; and higher costs for 
the institutions and the families involved.
Estimates for France, Italy, and Germany suggest that students suffered a significant 
learning loss (time spent on formal learning) when switching from offline to online 
learning. Using PISA 2006 data, it was demonstrated that one additional weekly hour 
of instruction over the school year increases test scores by about 6%. Therefore, the 
loss reported in France, Italy, and Germany reflects the reduction in test score students 
would be experiencing because of less time spent in learning compared to the amount 
of time they typically invest when they are in school (Di Pietro, Biagi, Costa, Karpinski, 
and Mazza 2020). 
Learning loss does not impact all students in the same way. An analysis of 
learning loss during the COVID-19 school closures shows a substantial divergence by 
socioeconomic status. Therefore, addressing learning loss and implementing large-
scale catch-up programmes should be a top priority of the recovery in Europe (Algan, 
Brunello, Goreichy, and Hristova 2021). Investment in targeted interventions for the 
most vulnerable could limit the inequality between rich and poor children—which 
widened during the months of school closure (Nugroho, Pasquini, Reuge, and Amaro 
2020; Ionescu, Paschia, Nicolau, Stanescu, Stancescu, Coman, and Uzlau 2020).
Data collected by OECD in 2018, prior to the pandemic, speak for themselves: on 
average, less than 40% of educators across the EU felt ready to use digital technologies 
in teaching, with divergences between EU member states (Tiven, Fuchs, Bazari, and 
Quarrie 2018). 
More than one third of 13–14 year old who participated in the International 
Computer and Information Literacy Study (ICILS) in 2018 (European Commission 
2018) did not possess the most basic proficiency level in digital skills. A quarter of low-
income households have no access to computers and broadband, with divergences 
across the EU affected by household income (Eurostat 2019).
The Global Survey on Youth and COVID-19 by the International Labor Organization 
in 2020 (ILO 2020) found “the impact of the pandemic on young people to be 
systematic, deep and disproportionate.” The report mentions that COVID-19 left 13% 
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of young people without access to learning; 65% reported having learned less since the 
pandemic began, and 51% believe their education will be delayed. The pandemic has 
also had a heavy impact on young workers: 17% stopped working and 42% reported a 
reduction in income. 
The pandemic is clearly far more than a health crisis alone: it is affecting human 
capital formation and retention, affecting societies and economies, and will have long-
term consequences. 
To foster the consolidation and the resilience of education, training, and employment 
in Europe, the European Commission adopted a renewed Digital Education Action 
Plan, reflecting on the lessons learned from the crisis. 
However, soon there will be even fewer resources and potentially lower investment 
in education and learning. Large debt and slower growth mean that education budgets 
will not rise in absolute terms as needed. Education budgets as a share of national 
spending are likely to be squeezed.
When the World Bank analysed education spending after the Global Financial 
Crisis in 2008, in lower-middle-income countries (LMICs) it observed a large dip in 
education spending in the immediate aftermath of the crisis that did not recover for 
several years (The World Bank Group 2020). 
Despite high hopes that technology and connectivity would be the answer to 
learning continuity and reskilling during the crisis, there is not yet any evidence that 
those can replace teachers or reduce inequality. This isn’t surprising, because we are 
depending on technologies that many households around the world do not have 
access to or have not developed the skills to use or to help the students use. In low- and 
lower-middle-income countries, only 20% of households have access to the internet 
(The World Bank Group 2020). Even in the EU, stark digital divides along lines of 
income, race, and geography characterised distance learning experiences, particularly 
for low-income households.
9.2 Reforming Education and Lifelong Learning, and Ensuring 
Adequate Investment
Reform of education and lifelong learning is essential to raise and preserve human 
capital, facilitate life course transitions, provide a buffer against risks such as 
unemployment and disease, and guide long-term investors (Vandenbroucke, 
Hemerijck, and Palier 2011; Hemerijck and Santoni 2019; Fransen, Prodi, and Reviglio 
2018).
The world today and the society our children will work and live in are very different 
to the world our schools and universities were designed to serve decades ago. Formal 
education was implemented around the time of the first Industrial Revolution; schools 
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Box 1. on definitions
Formal learning takes place in the education and training system, in 
universities and in the high-level arts education institutions. It leads 
to a certification or a vocational qualification that can also be obtained 
through an apprenticeship. 
Non-formal learning is an intentionally chosen learning that takes 
place outside the formal education and training system. It takes place 
in any organization with educational and training purposes, also in 
voluntary bodies, national civil service organizations, organizations 
of the private social sector or enterprises.
Informal learning refers to activities carried out in every-day life, at 
work, at home and in leisure time, even without an intentional choice.
Source: European Commission 2018
then were less about improving children’s human capital than producing a punctual 
and obedient workforce for the factories. This concept is no longer fit for purpose and 
reforms are long overdue. 
The main drivers for education and lifelong learning reforms are:
• Changing work patterns (the need to work longer and on consecutive careers 
requiring a high degree of flexibility) and societal realities (new lifestyles) 
requiring regular upskilling.
• Opportunities offered for the creation of a large learning ecosystem because 
of the availability of new technologies. 
• The need for transformation to adapt to demographic realities (ageing 
populations, low fertility rates, and economic and political migrations) and 
location changes (rural-urban movements). 
Schools are now only one part of a far bigger learning ecosystem. In the digital age, 
learning can and must become a lifelong experience. We should aim to improve learning 
opportunities not only in schools but also in homes, community centres, museums, 
and workplaces. The internet has created new learning opportunities, enabling online 
learning communities in which children and adults around the globe collaborate on 
projects and learn from each other (Resnick 2020). 
The unexpected boost for tele-education provided by the COVID-19 pandemic 
should now require major of structural reforms, and help boost and guide larger 
long-term investment in those areas. The Economist in January 2021 reported that: 
“Lots of children could benefit if the pandemic raises awareness that not all pupils are 
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well-served by a one-size-fits-all approach to schooling, and if it directs attention and 
funding to improving alternative models.”
The content of learning activities, as well as how learning is organised, needs drastic 
transformation and adaptation. For example, digital native students simply search the 
internet for information, while many teachers and parents have not grown up with the 
same digital skillset. With information more widely available and theoretically more 
accessible, learners could take more ownership and initiative, and educators could 
provide mentorship, context, and more individualised guidance. 
Providing equal opportunities and adequate attention to social and gender inclusion 
and participation implies that access to quality childcare and education should also 
be ensured from an early age, including for those children and students with special 
needs, migrants, minorities, those who are low-income, etc. (Muraille 2020). 
Education in the future should be founded on multifunctional community learning 
centres that provide virtual and actual space, have reliable connectivity, and mobilise 
teachers/trainers and learners. The future community learning centre focuses on 
including all potential learners, with greater inclusion of pupils with socioeconomic 
disadvantages and special educational needs, equipping them with appropriate skills 
to improve their chances of finding rewarding work, leading independent lives, and 
actively contributing to society. 
Transformation will require re-envisioning the spaces where learning takes place 
and changing how people learn by using multiple physical and virtual spaces in and 
outside of formal settings. This would see full individual personalisation of content 
and pedagogy enabled by leading-edge technology, and drawing on body information, 
facial expressions, neural signals, and AI (Khan, Ihalage, Ma, Liu, Liu, and Hao 2021). 
As the distinction between formal and informal learning blurs and eventually 
disappears, individual learning can advance by taking advantage of collective 
intelligence being rapidly accessible through new technologies, helping us to solve 
real-life problems. 
Technologies are changing not only what students should learn, but also what they 
can learn. Fresh ideas are now accessible through creative use of digital technologies. 
For example, you can now use simulations to explore ecosystems, economic systems, 
and immune systems in ways that were previously not possible. 
In terms of bricks and mortar, the community learning centres should be 
constructed as passive buildings, with sustainable design working in two ways. First, 
because of low energy costs, additional costs will be earned back in the long run. 
Second, such designs trigger children to reflect on environmental and sustainability 
issues. Spaces can be used for different purposes, and areas such as sports facilities 
and libraries could be used by third parties in the evening or weekends. Investment 
must be made in digital and ICT facilities and connectivity, such as digital whiteboards 
and programmable robots. 
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The returns on investing (ROI) in such centres could include savings on welfare 
and assistance, in addition to economic returns. 
Universities could become hubs for advanced learning, research, and innovation 
for a larger geographical area, and facilitate the provisions for a learning society. These 
hubs would be interconnected with local businesses, public bodies, and other research 
institutes, attracting private capital to develop innovative technologies, incubate 
startups, and develop new business models.
ROI from such advanced learning hubs would need to include the wider economic 
benefits of innovation and impacts on productivity and on competitiveness. 
Current expenditure may not need to increase significantly everywhere, but instead 
be reallocated towards the new approaches. However, some geographic areas do have 
critically underfunded education and lifelong learning. This is especially the case in 
regions that cut investment in social sectors drastically with austerity measures after 
the financial crisis. This lack of investment in health, human capital, and connectivity 
left Europe poorly prepared for the COVID-19 pandemic.
Capital expenditure for education and lifelong learning in the EU was approximately 
€65 bn in 2015 (national accounts data from Eurostat), with the UK, Germany, France, 
and the Netherlands accounting for around two thirds of the total (Fransen, del Bufalo, 
and Reviglio 2018).
• Spain, Italy, Austria, Denmark, Ireland, and Slovakia invest 0.3 % of their 
GDP or less
• Czechia, Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia, Finland, and the Netherlands invest 
0.8 % or more
Per pupil, Spain spends €183 and the Netherlands €1,283.
Box 2. On Education & lifelong learning
Total estimated at +/- €65 bn. Education infrastructure spending by:
• The public sector as a percentage of GDP: public investment 
in the EU-28 was €65 bn in 2015 including gross capital 
formation and capital transfers. This is equal to 0.43 % of 
GDP―€580 per student, ranging from €382 at primary level 
to €723 at third level.
• The private sector as a percentage of GDP: private 
investment in education is more difficult to gauge. The 
OECD says private expenditure represents 15 % of total 
expenditure. Almost all of this consists of household outlays 
for tuition and other current costs; private sector investment 
only makes up a small fraction.
Source: Fransen, del Bufalo, and Reviglio 2018.
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It was estimated that a minimum additional capital investment is needed annually of 
15 bn per annum (Fransen, del Bufalo, and Reviglio 2018).
The total average public expenditures for education also decreased constantly from a 
share of 5.5% of GDP in 2009 to only 4.7% in 2018, representing a 17% disinvestment 
since 2009. While the absolute amount of resources destined towards education and 
training has increased, it is the percentage over GDP that gives the real measure of the 
importance.
The breakdown of the data by countries in 2018 gives us an even grimmer image. 
Only three countries have increased their percentage of investment in education: 
Belgium (+0.1%), Sweden (+0.1%), and Croatia (+1.7%). On the other side of the 
scale, most countries have registered a decrease: Cyprus (-1.2%), Slovenia (-1.2%), 
Ireland (-1.5%), Portugal (-2.0%), and Lithuania (-2.6%).
Fig. 1 % GDP Investment in Education in EU-28 (2009 vs 2018).
Source of data: Lifelong Learning platform 2021, Europe’s share of GDP for education and training has 
never been this low. A comparative analysis, 23rd March 2020.
However, while investing sufficient long-term resources in reformed education and 
learning is critical, according to OECD, the relation between expenditure and learning 
outcomes breaks down after a certain threshold is passed: after reaching a minimum 
level of inputs, more resources do not necessarily imply an improvement (Canton, 
Thum-Thysen, and Voigt 2018).
It is important to note that the figures mentioned above refer to formal education 
and do not capture potential investment effort made in informal and non-formal 
education contexts.
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9.3 New Models for Financing Social Infrastructure  
for Education 
How shall we finance such great needs of education infrastructure within the huge 
transition which we tried to describe above, which will characterise our educational 
system and lifelong learning in the future, without weighing too much on high public 
debts across the EU?
Schools and related education infrastructure were traditionally financed directly 
by local authorities, eventually with contributions from the state, by raising long-term 
debt from public institutions. The interest rates of debt were very close the one paid 
on sovereign debt, because institutions providing the financing were using funding 
guaranteed by the state. The technical capacity of local authorities was much better 
than it is today, but the infrastructure was also simpler and more basic. Today, as we 
have seen above, much more complex education infrastructure is needed, and technical 
capacities to project, build, and manage must be much more sophisticated.
In this section, we will try to describe the new innovative schemes which are 
emerging across the EU in financing education infrastructure. 
To accommodate this changing world, the model that is used to finance 
infrastructure in the EU is rapidly changing. With public budgets under stress and a 
huge demand for new infrastructure due to green and digital revolutions, we will see a 
growing involvement of private and institutional investors in public-private initiatives, 
including infrastructure for education. 
Institutional long-term investors with more than $130 tn of assets under 
management at the global level are looking at “education infrastructure” as a new, 
fully-fledged asset class to invest in (OECD 2013; Garonna and Reviglio 2015; Inderst 
2021). Moreover, as we shall discuss later, there is a growing demand for “safe assets” 
by long-term investors, to match long-term assets to long-term liabilities.
Economic infrastructure, such as energy, transport, and telecommunications, 
produces cashflows on its own that can repay the cost of construction. Such 
infrastructure involves construction, tariffs, and market risks, and this makes their 
yield higher. With social infrastructure mostly financed by public money and paid for 
by taxpayers, it does not have the same risks (Figure 4) and the risk/yield profile is 
lower. Both types of infrastructure investment are attractive to institutional investors 
who like to diversify the risk in their portfolios. 
Social infrastructure investment has distinctive features that distinguishes it from 
economic infrastructure (EDHEC-Risk Institute, February 2012; Fransen, Prodi, and 
Reviglio 2018). Generally, it tends to be illiquid investment. This type of investment 
has long time horizons and, if equity is invested, it becomes difficult to exit. However, 
on the debt side, ever larger, deeper, and more liquid social and green bond markets 
are emerging and may overcome this problem, making it far more attractive for 
institutional and even retail investors to invest in education infrastructure. Moreover, 
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default rates and recovery rates of infrastructure debt, in general, are relatively lower 
than high-rated corporate debt.1 
Infrastructure projects in education (and health) are usually relatively small. 
According to EDHEC-Risk Institute (EDHEC 2012), roughly 99% of existing social 
infrastructure projects in Europe entail a total capital investment of less than €1 bn, 
with the great majority of projects below €30 m. The small-average size is good for 
spreading risk (portfolio diversification), but it reduces cost synergies during the 
structuring and arranging phase. Unlike many economic infrastructure projects, 
such as toll roads, ports, airports, or power generation plants, which usually collect 
revenue from end users, social infrastructure projects often rely on the availability of 
fees paid by the public sector. Therefore, from a financial (and financing) perspective, 
it is key to bear in mind that the cashflow streams to repay the financing of social 
infrastructure investment come ultimately from public budgets. This means that 
education infrastructure investment risk is only slightly higher than sovereign bonds’ 
risk. To overcome the potential small-average capex size “bottleneck” while preserving 
the sought-after portfolio diversification, a solution could be the efficient “bundling” 
of similar education infrastructure projects. In fact, when bundled into a single, larger 
procurement, a beneficial structure can be implemented to address:
• A group of similar assets across multiple sites.
• An assortment of different assets at a single site.
• Different assets across multiple sites. 
In addition, the bundling of similar assets can save on design and construction costs, 
as similar materials can be used and bought in bulk. More standardized design and 
construction processes also create the opportunity to save on long-term maintenance 
due to similar replacement parts and equipment used.
Availability payments from the public sector are usually agreed beforehand and 
tend to be inflation-linked. Predictable and steady real returns are attractive for 
investors.
The small-average capital investment size of social infrastructure projects, however, 
makes direct infrastructure investment unattractive to large long-term investors, as they 
face relatively high active management costs for such modest investment. Therefore, 
financial intermediaries are key to channeling institutional investors towards social 
infrastructure. Institutional investors have the possibility of investing in equity through 
listed infrastructure funds, unlisted intermediary funds, or directly at the SPV level.
Political and regulatory risks, often linked, are another key dimension of social 
infrastructure investment. Public policies might change over the extended life span of 
1  See Moody (2017) Default and Recovery Rates for Project Finance Bank Loans, 1983–2015, Default Research, 
Moody’s Investors Service, 6 March 2017; Moody (2017) Addendum: Infrastructure Default and Recovery 
Rates, 1983–2015, Default Research, Moody’s Investors Service, 27 April 2017; and Moody (2016) 
Infrastructure Default and Recovery Rates, 1983–2015, Default Research, Moody’s Investors Service, 18 
July 2016. 
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an asset. Governments may renege on commitments and regulators may change the 
regulatory framework. 
Even so, innovative solutions for financing education, health, and social housing 
at a sustainable cost for European public finances are becoming more widespread. In 
the main, direct contracts by the public authority to a private enterprise are financed 
by long-term loans. Quantitative easing means the spreads between EU member states 
have been reduced significantly, but this will not last forever, and local authority debt 
offers little room for maneuvering. 
It will be important to crowd in as much institutional and private investment in 
social infrastructure financing as possible. The added value is not merely providing 
financing so much as the quality of the schemes required to attract investors and 
others. The public sector, generally, does not have the necessary technical competencies 
to effectively plan, build, and manage complex projects. If they had such skills, as 
we already mentioned, it would be cheaper to finance schemes directly through 
sovereign funding. The complexity of today’s integrated and eventually bundled 
sets of infrastructures is typically handled by the many specialised players who are 
generally not within the public sector. To ensure that every single stakeholder play 
fair, promotional banks and the EIB, CEB, and other institutional regional platforms 
can play a crucial role in organising and giving technical assistance to public sector 
promoters. Moreover, other contributions from various sources can be “blended” to 
reduce direct costs to taxpayers (Prodi and Reviglio 2019).
In general, we need a clearer and friendlier system of rules by Eurostat to understand 
if a project is an on- or off-balance sheet (Fransen, del Bufalo, and Reviglio 2018). 
Now consider, for instance, that a municipality, group of municipalities, or other 
public administration needs to invest in education or other social infrastructure. They 
can decide to implement it through innovative forms of institutional public-private 
partnerships or investment platforms:
1. The local administration will pay for the work through an availability fee 
that will affect expenditure year after year.
2. Costs can be kept down by a national or European grant, public guarantees, 
or tax incentives.
3. Fiscal space can be provided through a special clause for social investment.
4. Contributions in kind can be made using local public heritage assets, land, 
or buildings, for example. 
5. An institutional “technical assistance” system can ensure risks and profits 
are well distributed between public and private sectors. 
This solution, known as “blending”, helps to contain the cost of public administration 
and increase the quality and timing of the construction of infrastructure (EPEC 
2017; Fransen, Prodi, and Reviglio 2018; Inderst 2021). There is also the possibility 
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of creating public-private-institutional vehicles that may bundle different projects to 
reach a critical mass for investors and to achieve similar high quality across several 
municipalities or regions involved in a bigger project.
Why are institutional investors so interested in infrastructure investment? Because 
infrastructure is a “safe asset”, and there was a huge shortage of this type of financial 
instrument after the 2008 financial crisis. Indeed, the importance of safe assets has 
become central since that crisis. 
Safe assets are a pillar of an ordered financial system. They are a store of value for 
institutions, including pension funds and insurance companies, as they allow them 
to match long-term assets to long-term liabilities. They are also structural elements of 
commercial bank balance sheets (Reviglio 2020).
More generally, they are used by financial institutions to meet regulatory requirements 
and provide collateral for borrowing additional funds. These stores of value come in 
many forms: cash, bank deposits, US Treasury bills, European government bonds, 
projects bonds, recovery bonds, infrastructure bonds, green and social bonds, and bonds 
raised by the EIB and by national promotional banks and institutions. They can include 
high-rating corporate bonds, stocks, and equity in infrastructure funds and/or projects.
There is another reason why education and social infrastructure in general are 
considered good investments for institutional investors. They are generally “green” 
and/or come with strong social externalities at a point when markets’ short-termism 
has not yet priced upcoming taxation on polluting investment. 
To hedge climate risks, investors can either divest polluting investment in their 
portfolio, invest in low-carbon indices, or invest in green and social bond companies.2 
Indeed, investing in properly constructed decarbonised investments, such as those in 
education infrastructure, can allow long-term passive investors to hedge climate risk 
without sacrificing financial returns (Andersson, Bolton, and Samama 2015; see also 
Bolton, Depres, Pereira da Silva, Samama, and Svartzman 2020).
Now, with the Next Generation EU fund (2021–27), the American Rescue Plan Act 
(2021–31), and other recovery plans in many countries, the number of safe assets will 
grow at unprecedented levels. This is a unique opportunity to move to a more long-
term finance approach that is oriented towards infrastructure and the real economy.
9.4 The Golden Rule for Social Investment, Reforming 
the Stability and Growth Pact, and Next Generation EU 
For many years, it was argued that investing in education and health should be an 
investment and not a cost in budgetary terms, and it was vital to boost investment in 
2  There exist two main types of low-carbon indices: “pure-play” indices, including stakes of green (and 
social) companies, and “decarbonised” indices (or “green beta indices”), constructed by excluding 
the largest GHG emitters from a benchmark index.
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social infrastructure. But despite fine words and new instruments doing some of this, 
the pandemic has shone a light on failings.
Because of the pandemic, the EU institutions suspended the Stability and Growth 
Pact (SGP) rules for government spending and debt reduction through activation of the 
General Escape Clause. This will remain in place until the end of 2022. The pandemic 
led to a remarkable consensus among EU member states on the need to provide fiscal 
stimulus beyond the levels allowed by the rules. As the recovery continues, different 
views on debt consolidation are likely to emerge and old differences to re-emerge. 
However, returning to pre-coronavirus rules would be counterproductive. The need to 
reform the EU’s fiscal framework has, in the meantime, gained traction and could be 
an opportunity to introduce meaningful reforms to boost social investment and social 
infrastructure investment sooner rather than later.
The priority now should be to allow for more long-term public investment, including 
in social sectors. This raises the question of whether fiscal rules can be amended 
to encourage countries to step up their national social investment strategies while 
maintaining the overall integrity of a rules-based budgetary framework, including the 
Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) 3% deficit and 60% debt limits, and crowding in 
private sector investment at the same time. 
Public investment in general, as a % of GDP, continued to decrease years after 
the Global Financial Crisis and only recently started picking up, slightly before the 
pandemic. However, the slight increase in public investment suffers from a pro-cyclical 
bias and a short-term orientation, while still insufficiently targeting social investment 
in human capital formation and in social infrastructure.
Investing in education and in social infrastructure in general should be given 
special consideration, and it is unclear if the new financing instruments of the EU will 
do so at all. In the 2021 European Outlook on Public Investment, in the chapter on Social 
Investment and Infrastructure (Hemerijck, Mazzucato, and Reviglio 2020), a Golden 
Rule was proposed to exempt human capital stock spending from the euro area fiscal 
rulebook for 1.5% of GDP for around a decade, as a flagship initiative of the new 
European Commission. Today, this move has become even more urgent. 
The Next Generation EU fund comprises the Recovery and Resilience Facility and 
several other EU programmes. It is clearly a missed opportunity that social infrastructures 
did not receive a unique dedicated “window”, but instead are spread across other missions 
and programmes. This is most likely because they include strong digital, green, and social 
cohesion components. However, this approach goes against EU best practices around highly 
integrated systems (school, health, housing, etc.). In InvestEU, for example, more than 
sixty-five guaranteed funds and twelve financial instruments are combined in only four 
policy windows, as also recommended in the 2018 “Prodi Report” on social infrastructure 
(Fransen, del Bufalo and Reviglio 2018). The policy windows in InvestEU are sustainable 
infrastructure, research, innovation and digitalisation, SMEs, and social investment and 
skills. From this perspective, Next Generation EU is a step backwards. Digital, green, and 
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transport are undoubtedly essential elements of EU recovery, competitiveness, and social 
cohesion. However, integrated social infrastructure and investment will be as important, 
if not more so, especially early in the post-pandemic period. Next Generation EU does not 
have such an integrated view. As a result, education, health, and social housing are spread 
here and there without a coherent view, and with fewer resources directly dedicated to 
these sectors, including education. Therefore, we should aim to integrate more successfully 
the elements contained in the EU Plan, including digital and green, alongside renewed 
investment in education, health, and social housing. 
9.5 Conclusion
Since the 2008 crisis, investment in education has been greatly reduced. The austerity 
policies which have characterised the EU have had a strong negative impact on education, 
health, and social housing. This is partially because social infrastructure is largely 
financed by local authorities, which have seen their budgets substantially reduced. 
We demonstrated that the gap between the actual investment and the needs is large 
in most of the EU member states. Now, because of the suspension of the Growth and 
Stability Pact since the COVID-19 pandemic, more resources should be available, at 
least temporarily. Moreover, the Next Generation EU instrument provides substantial 
funds for digital and green transition, including education infrastructure. 
The world today and the society our children will work and live in are very different. 
Our schools and universities were designed to serve the needs of a very different 
society. Formal education was implemented around the time of the first Industrial 
Revolution; schools then were less about improving children’s human capital than 
producing a punctual and obedient workforce for the factories. This concept is no 
longer fit for purpose and reforms are long overdue. 
The schools of the future are going to be very different from those of the past. 
Changing models of education, plus more pervasive digitalisation, will lead to the 
need to restructure and build new schools. Moreover, lifelong learning has become 
even more important than in the past due to the transformation of the job market. 
Much more mobility from one type of job to another is going to be required. 
How will those great needs of education infrastructure be financed in the future? 
We described innovative schemes which are emerging across the EU in financing 
school and other education infrastructure. 
It will be important to crowd in as much institutional and private investment in 
education infrastructure financing as possible. The added value, we argued, is not 
merely providing financing so much as the quality of the schemes required to attract 
investors and others. The public sector, generally, does not have the necessary technical 
competencies to effectively plan, build, and manage complex projects. If they had such 
skills, it would be cheaper to finance schemes directly through sovereign funding. 
The complexity of today’s integrated and eventually bundled sets of infrastructures 
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is typically handled by the many specialised players who are generally not within 
the public sector. To ensure that every single stakeholder play fair, promotional banks 
and the EIB, CEB, and other institutional regional platforms can play a crucial role 
in organising and giving technical assistance to public sector promoters. Moreover, 
other contributions from various sources can be “blended” to reduce direct costs to 
taxpayers.
Institutional long-term investors are looking at “education infrastructure” as a new 
fully-fledged asset class to invest in.
Social infrastructures have interesting characteristics for private/institutional 
investors, such as low volatility of returns (payments from the public sector are generally 
agreed ex ante and tend to be linked to inflation) and low correlation with the resulting 
risks from other assets (the nature of a social infrastructure investment reduces 
exposure to market risk and capital market volatility), high value of physical assets 
that can act as collateral for loans, and a stable long-term investment prospect term 
(twenty to thirty years). 
Institutional investors have the option of investing capital through infrastructure 
funds, investment platforms, or directly into projects. 
Why are institutional investors so interested in infrastructure investment? 
Infrastructure is a typical “safe asset”, and there was a huge shortage of this type of 
financial instrument after the 2008 Global Financial Crisis. Indeed, the importance of 
safe assets has become central since that crisis. 
Public debt of advanced economies is projected to raise from 87% in 2019 to 109% 
in 2021 (IMF data 2021): in the US from 103% to 125%, in the Eurozone from 86% to 
99%, in the UK from 84% to 111%, and in Japan from 232% to 258%. 
The US has passed an Infrastructure and Job Bill worth $1 tn (with a very large 
component in social investments); the Next Generation EU fund, at the level of current 
prices, is worth around €800 bn over the next six years. 
Finally, COVID-19 may help capital markets overcome the so-called “safe asset trap” 
(i.e., the lack of long-term financial instruments that match the long-term liabilities 
and assets of institutional investors, such as pension funds and insurance companies). 
Investment in education infrastructure should be as great as it ever has been in the 
history of the EU. So, it is time to be brave. Much of the future of our new generation 
depends on education systems which properly prepare students and workers for a 
changing world.
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10. COVID-19 and the Corporate 
Digital Divide1
Désirée Rückert, Reinhilde Veugelers, Antilia Virginie, 
and Christoph Weiss
Introduction
The COVID-19 crisis is likely to play a dual role in digital technology adoption. On 
the one hand, the crisis has led to wider recognition of the importance of innovation 
and digital transformation. According to the 2020 results of the EIB Investment Survey 
(EIBIS), a majority of firms in the EU and the US expect COVID-19 to have a long-
term impact on the use of digital technologies (EIB 2021a). On the other hand, many 
firms have experienced a falloff in revenue and liquidity during the pandemic. This 
may force firms to focus on short-term survival strategies (Revoltella, Maurin, and 
Pal 2020), leading them to delay or cancel investment. Therefore, whilst the need to 
adopt digital technologies is more salient than ever, a collapse in firm investment may 
impede the creation, transfer, and adoption of new digital technologies.
The benefits associated with digital adoption have long been established. Digital 
technologies, such as advanced robotics, 3D printing, artificial intelligence, or the 
internet of things, are associated with higher firm productivity and innovation activities 
(Gal et al. 2019; Rückert, Veugelers, and Weiss 2020; EIB 2021a). Policymakers should 
pay particular attention to digital technology adoption as its impacts extend beyond 
firms’ productivity and competitiveness to also include labour markets effects (Frank 
et al. 2019; Acemoglu and Restropo 2020; EIB 2021a).
Until recently, the implementation of digital technologies was usually associated 
with the largest, most innovative and modern companies. However, the pandemic has 
placed issues of digital transformation at the heart of many firms’ survival. Digital 
technologies were indispensable to preventing business disruption, organising work 
remotely, improving communication with customers, suppliers and employees, and 
1  The views expressed in this paper are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of 
the European Central Bank or the European Investment Bank.
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selling products and services online. Businesses that had adopted digital technologies 
were therefore better able to cope with the disruption unleashed by the COVID-19 
pandemic and better able to forge ahead with digital technology adoption. Due to 
the pandemic, digitally laggard firms were exposed ever more clearly to the need 
for change, whilst simultaneously being less able to move into a higher digital gear. 
Will the pandemic turn out to be a momentum for catching up and closing the digital 
divide? Or in contrast, will it lead to a more polarised economic structure, with the 
benefits concentrated in a few “superstar” firms leaving many firms and workers on 
the losing side?
Several recent studies provide evidence of polarisation and of “winner-takes-
all” market dynamics linked to the use of digital technologies, especially on a 
global scale. Andrews, Criscuolo, and Gal (2016) show an increasing productivity 
gap between firms at the global frontier and laggard firms.2 Debates surrounding 
“winner-take-all” markets have been particularly strong in the EU, as the winners are 
most associated with “Big Tech” firms coming from the US, South Korea, or China. 
EU firms are hardly present among the Big Tech giants or the leading digital R&D 
investors that push the frontier of digital technology (Veugelers 2018; EIB 2021a). 
This growing digital polarisation in the global corporate landscape has implications 
for the rising polarisation of firm productivity and performance. If EU firms are 
unable to integrate new digital technologies into their business models, they will 
lose out, even in the sectors where they are currently still global leaders such as the 
automotive sector. 
Even though these are first-order concerns, recent large-scale firm-level evidence 
about digital technology adoption across EU countries and the US is scant. Measuring 
digital adoption by firms and assessing the extent to which digitalisation may be 
transforming and affecting different economies can be challenging due to the lack of 
comparable firm-level data across countries. 
To foster an evidence-based debate on the impact of digitalisation, this chapter relies 
on annual EIBIS data on more than 13,000 companies from twenty-nine countries. 
In 2020, the survey was conducted between May and August, several months after 
the outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic. The survey monitors firms’ use of various 
advanced digital technologies, allowing us to capture digital adoption rates and assess 
the impact of digital transformation on different economies. In 2020, EIBIS also asked 
firms about their future digital perspectives. 
Our main contributions are as follows. First, we identify digitalisation profiles based 
on firms’ current use of digital technologies and their perspectives on the expected 
long-term impact of COVID-19 on digitalisation. Using these profiles, we first show 
a growing digital polarisation. Second, we show that this digital polarisation matters 
2  Andrews, Criscuolo, and Gal (2016) define global frontier firms as the top 5% of firms in terms of 
labour productivity levels, within each two-digit sector and in each year, across all countries since the 
early 2000s. All other firms are defined as laggards.
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by investigating the relationship between digital profiles and various measures of firm 
performance—including innovation activities, labour productivity, and employment 
growth. Our survey data also allow us to provide evidence that firms along the digital 
divide grid face different obstacles to investment. The findings suggest that addressing 
barriers to digital infrastructure and skills, which are both major impediments to 
digital technology adoption, should be a priority if policymakers want to support 
digital transformation and redress the digital divide. Addressing the regulatory 
burden and the uncertainties regulations can create should also be high on the digital 
policy agenda.
10.1 Adoption of Digital Technologies and Their Increased Use 
after COVID-19
The analysis presented here relies on data from EIBIS, a firm-level survey administrated 
annually to senior managers or financial directors of a representative random sample 
of firms in each of the twenty-seven countries of the EU, the UK and the US.3 EIBIS is 
designed to be representative of the business population in each country for different 
sectors and firm size categories.4 Importantly, the design and implementation of the 
survey is consistent across countries, which is critical for understanding differences in 
the adoption of digital technologies. In addition, the survey does not only cover firms 
in the manufacturing sector but also firms in services, construction and infrastructure. 
In EIBIS, firms are surveyed about the use of four advanced digital technologies 
that are specific to their sector.5 They are asked the following question: “Can you tell 
me for each of the following digital technologies if you have heard about them, not 
heard about them, implemented them in parts of your business, or whether your 
entire business is organised around them?” A firm is identified as “digital” if at least 
3  Eligible respondents are senior persons with responsibility for investment decisions and how 
investments are financed. This person can be the owner, the finance manager, finance director, head 
of accounts, Chief Financial Officer (CFO), or Chief Executive Officer (CEO). 
4  See Ipsos (2020) for a description of the sampling methodology. The sample is stratified by country, 
sector, and size class. Brutscher et al. (2020) provide evidence on representativeness of the data for the 
business population of interest (namely enterprises above five employees) by comparing distributions 
in EIBIS with the population of firm-level data available in Eurostat’s Structural Business Statistics 
(SBS). 
5  The state-of-the-art digital technologies considered are different across sectors. Firms in manufacturing 
are asked about the use of: (a) 3D printing: also known as additive manufacturing; (b) robotics: 
automation via advanced robotics; (c) IoT: internet of things, such as electronic devices that 
communicate with each other without human assistance; (d) big data/AI: cognitive technologies, 
such as big data analytics and artificial intelligence. Firms in construction are surveyed about the use 
of: (a) 3D printing; (b) drones: unmanned aerial vehicles; (c) IoT; (d) virtual reality: augmented or 
virtual reality, such as presenting information integrated with real-world objects presented using 
a head-mounted display. Firms in services are surveyed about the use of: (a) virtual reality; (b) 
platforms: a platform that connects customers with businesses or customers with other customers; 
(c) IoT; (d) big data/AI. Firms in infrastructure are surveyed about the use of: (a) 3D printing; (b) 
platforms; (c) IoT; (d) big data/AI. 
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one digital technology is implemented in parts of the business and/or if the entire 
business is organised around at least one digital technology. 
The survey thus provides us with unique information on the adoption of digital 
technologies in the EU and the US compared to other databases. Eurostat data used 
in the Digital Economy and Society Index (DESI) do not include US firms, which is 
paramount information for the analysis of the digital divide discussed in this paper.6 
Similarly, OECD statistics on ICT access and usage by businesses provide data on two 
indicators for the US, but only in 2007 and 2012.7
10.1.1 Taking Stock of Digital Adoption
The results of EIBIS show that digital technology adoption is spreading rapidly (Figure 
1): the share of digital firms has increased by 5 pp compared to 2019, both in the EU 
and in the US. However, the EU is not closing its digital gap with the US. EU firms are 
and continue to be lagging behind the US in terms of digital adoption. In 2020, only 
63% of EU firms have implemented at least one digital technology, compared to 73% 
in the US (Figure 1).
Fig. 1 Adoption of Digital Technologies (% of Firms).
Source of data: EIB Investment Survey (EIBIS wave 2019 and 2020). 
Note: A firm is identified digital if at least one advanced digital technology was implemented in 
parts of the business. Firms are weighted using value added. 
6  For example, Eurostat provides data on the share of enterprises (with more than ten employees) 
using industrial robots (17% of the enterprises in manufacturing) in the EU in 2020, which is very 
similar to the share of manufacturing firms that have implemented automation via advanced robotics 
according to EIBIS in 2020 (18%). However, there are larger differences between Eurostat data and 
EIBIS in the use of other digital technologies (such as 3D printing or IoT). 
7  For the US, the ICT Access and Usage by Businesses Database provides data on (i) the share of 
business with a website or home page (in 2007 and 2012) and (ii) the share of business placing orders 
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The differences between the adoption rates in the EU and the United States are mainly 
driven by the lower use of technologies related to the internet of things (IoT), i.e., 
electronic devices that communicate with each other without assistance (Figure 2). 
On average, 34% of European firms have adopted this technology, compared to 53% 
of US firms. EU firms also fall short when it comes to the adoption of drones in the 
construction sector. For the other digital technologies captured in the survey, the 
differences in adoption rates between EU and US firms are less pronounced.
Fig. 2 Adoption of Different Digital Technologies (% of Firms).
Source of data: EIB Investment Survey (EIBIS wave 2020). 
Note: A firm is identified digital if at least one advanced digital technology was implemented in 
parts of the business. Firms are weighted using value added. 
10.1.2 The Dual Impact of COVID-19  
on Digital Adoption
Throughout 2020, firms were faced with acutely high levels of uncertainty as the COVID-
19 crisis weighed on the economic outlook. Uncertainty about the future became a 
severe constraint to investment activities with half of EU firms considering it to be a 
major obstacle to investment, up from 34% in 2019 (Figure 3).8 These higher levels of 
uncertainty jeopardising investment also hold for US firms, albeit less intensely than 
for EU firms: 42% of US firms consider that uncertainty about the future limit their 
investment, up from only 18% in the previous year. As a result, we may expect future 
investment in digital technologies to be postponed or abandoned altogether.
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Fig. 3 Uncertainty as a Major Obstacle to Investment (% of Firms).
Source of data: EIB Investment Survey (EIBIS waves 2019 and 2020). 










Fig. 4 Firms Reporting that COVID-19 Will Lead to an Increased Use of Digital Technologies (% of 
Firms).
Source of data: EIB Investment Survey (EIBIS wave 2020). 
Note: A firm is identified digital if at least one advanced digital technology was implemented in 










At the same time, a majority of firms report that they expect COVID-19 to increase the 
use of digital technologies in the long term (50% in the EU and 53% in the US).9 What 
is more, those firms that are already digitally active are more likely than non-digitally 
9  The relevant survey question reads: “Do you expect the coronavirus outbreak to have a long-term 
impact on the increased use of digital technologies (e.g., in order to prevent business discontinuity or 
improve communication with customers, suppliers and employees)?”
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active firms to report that COVID-19 will lead to an increased digitalisation, both in 
the EU and the US: 57% of EU digital firms think COVID-19 will lead to an increased 
use of digital technologies, compared to 40% of non-digital firms (Figure 4). This is 
evidence suggesting that the COVID-19 shock further deepens the corporate digital 
divide, with leading firms pushing ahead whilst laggards are further falling behind 
(Rückert, Veugelers, and Weiss 2020).
This divide in the perceived long-term importance of digital technologies is 
observed both in the EU and in the US, across different sectors and in multivariate 
regression analysis.10
10  The multivariate regression analysis uses the expected long-term impact of COVID-19 on digitalisation 
as the dependent variable and the interactions of firm size and firm age, sector, and country as 
explanatory variables. Marginal effects from Probit estimation show that digital firms are 11% more 
likely to report that they expect COVID-19 to have a long-term impact on digitalisation. 
10.2 Who Are the Firms Falling Behind? Who Is Forging Ahead?
The previous section has identified a corporate digital divide. A next step is to identify 
and characterise the firms on each side of the divide. To address this question, firms 
are classified into four categories based on the combination of their current digital 
status and their digital outlook: potential frontrunners, digitally stagnant, potential 
catch-up, and persistently non-digital. Figure 5 positions firms on the digital divide 
grid according to these categories.
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Firms that have not implemented any digital technology and do not expect digitalisation 
to become more important in the long term due to COVID-19 years face the threat of 
falling behind on the digital divide grid. We categorise them as potentially “persistently 
non-digital”. Companies that are currently non-digital but expect COVID-19 to increase 
the use of digital technologies are categorised as potential “catch-up”. Among firms 
that have already implemented digital technologies, some firms do not expect COVID-
19 to have a long-term impact on digitalisation: we categorise them as potentially digital 
“stagnaters”. Finally, already digitally active firms that are expecting an increase in the 
use of digital technologies are categorised as potential digital “frontrunners”. 
Figure 6 displays the share of firms in each of these categories in the US and the 
EU. The most worrisome part of the digital divide lies with the share of “persistently 
non-digital” firms in the EU (22%), which is significantly higher than in the US (14%). 
These firms likely do not intend to take steps to invest in digital transformation, and a 
policy response may be necessary to prevent them from falling further behind. Perhaps 
unsurprisingly, given the lower share of digitally active firms in the EU, the share of 
potential “frontrunners” is slightly lower in the EU than in the US (36% and 40%). 
In contrast to this stern outlook for the digital divide in the EU, the share of potential 
digital “stagnaters” is lower in the EU than in the US (27% and 33% respectively), and 
the share of non-digital firms that intend to potentially “catch-up” is similar (15% in 
the EU and 13% in the US). 
Fig. 6 Corporate Digital Divide Profiles (% of Firms). 
Source of data: EIB Investment Survey (EIBIS wave 2020). 
Note: See Fig. 5 of the definition of the corporate digital divide profiles. Firms are weighted using 
value added. 
Which companies are falling behind, and which are forging ahead? Grouping the firms 
along the size dimension, it is clear that size plays an important role in the corporate 
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digital divide. Consistently across the EU and the US, smaller firms are much more 
likely to be on the wrong side of the corporate digital divide: they are more likely to be 
“persistently non-digital” and less likely to be potential digital “frontrunners” (Figure 
7). Within every size category, EU-US difference are less pronounced, suggesting that 
the EU-US digital divide differences are due to differences in size composition of the 
firm population. An exception holds for small firms (of ten to forty-nine employees). 
The share of small EU firms that are “persistently non-digital” in the EU is higher 
than in the US (34% and 27%, respectively), while the share of small EU firms that 
are potential digital “frontrunners” is lower (only 23%, compared to 30% in the US). 
This lack of investment in digital technologies by small EU firms is an area of concern 
because there are many more small firms in the EU than in the US (EIB 2021b). The 
fact that EU firms are smaller on average than those in the United States is likely to be 
a major disadvantage for accelerating the adoption of digital technologies (Revoltella, 
Rückert, and Weiss 2020). If EU policymakers want to close the gap in digital adoption 
with the US, they need to particularly address what is holding back small firms. 
Fig. 7 Corporate Digital Divide Profiles (% of Firms), by Firm Size. 
Source of data: EIB Investment Survey (EIBIS wave 2020). 
Note: See Fig. 5 of the definition of the corporate digital divide profiles. Micro firms: 1 to 9 
employees, small firms: 10 to 49 employees, medium-sized firms: 50 to 249 employees, large firms: 
250+ employees. Firms are weighted using value added. 
Differences between the EU and the US in corporate digital divide profiles are also 
associated with firm age (Figure 8). In the US, young firms (less than ten years old) 
are taking digital technologies much more seriously: the share of young firms that are 
“persistently non-digital” is smaller than for old firms. In the EU, the share of young 
firms that are “persistently non-digital” is larger than for old firms, and the share of 
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Fig. 8 Corporate Digital Divide Profiles (% of Firms), by Age.
Source of data: EIB Investment Survey (EIBIS wave 2020). 
Note: See Fig. 5 of the definition of the corporate digital divide profiles. Young: less than ten years. 
Old: ten+ years. Firms are weighted using value added. 
10.3 Firm Performance along the Digital Divide Grid
It is concerning that a large share of non-digital firms that do not take digital 
transformation seriously. This persistent lagging behind could have serious long-term 
repercussions, especially regarding their performance and long-term success. In the 
following, we look at how firms with different digitalisation profiles perform with 
regards to employment growth, skills and training of employees, and innovation 
activities. This analysis is purely correlational and cannot be interpreted as causal.
By comparing the current number of employees with the number of employees in 
the same firm three years ago, Figure 9 shows that “persistently non-digital” firms are 
less likely to increase employment. This holds both in the EU and in the US. Firms’ 
positioning on the corporate digital divide thus matters for employment growth: firms 
forging ahead with digital transformation are more likely to be dynamic than those 
that do not invest in digital technologies and are left behind. Multivariate regression 
analysis confirms the positive association with employment growth: potential digital 
“frontrunners” are 10% more likely to report positive employment growth over the 
past three years than “persistently non-digital” firms.11 
11  Marginal effects from Probit estimation, using positive employment growth as the dependent variable 
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As argued by many economists, digital technologies—such as artificial intelligence, 
machine learning and industrial robots—can have an impact on shifting demand 
for skills, creating winners and losers among employees, impacting job polarisation 
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Fig. 9 Share of Firms with Positive Employment Growth over the Past Three Years (% of Firms), by 
Corporate Digital Divide Profiles.
Source of data: EIB Investment Survey (EIBIS wave 2020). 
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(Acemoglu and Autor 2011; EIB 2018; Frank et al. 2019; Acemoglu and Restrepo 2020). 
We find that there are significant differences in the average wage paid by firms to their 
employees across the corporate digital divide profiles (Figure 10). Potential digital 
“frontrunners” grow faster and tend to pay higher wages to their employees, both 
in the EU and the US. Assuming that average wage per employee can be a proxy for 
the level of the skills of the workers employed by the firm, this suggests that the jobs 
created by the potential digital “frontrunners” tend to be for more skilled workers.
However, the pattern across the other corporate digital profiles differs between the 
EU and the US. In the EU, average wages are higher for more advanced corporate 
digital divide profiles, the highest wages paid by potential “frontrunners”, the lowest 
by “persistently non-digital” firms. For the US, we find a U-shaped relationship. US 
firms that intend to invest in digital transformation (the “catch-up”) or those that are 
already implemented some digital technologies but do not intend to forge ahead (the 
potential digital ”stagnaters”) are paying lower wages on average. This may support 
evidence of wage polarisation due to digital technologies in the US labour market. 
There are also significant differences in investment in employee training across the 
four corporate digital divide profiles (Figure 11): “persistently non-digitally” active 
firms are less likely to invest in human capital of their employees, which might further 
exacerbate the digital job polarisation. This result holds both in the EU and the US and 
in multivariate regression analysis.12 Investment in digital skills—and an environment 
12  The multivariate regression analysis uses positive investment in training of employees as the 
dependent variable and the interactions of firm size and firm age, sector, and country as explanatory 
variables. Marginal effects from Probit estimation show that potential digital “frontrunners” are 16% 
more likely to invest in employee training than “persistently non-digital” firms. 
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Fig. 10 Log Average Wage per Employee (in EUR), by Corporate Digital Divide Profiles.
Source of data: EIB Investment Survey (EIBIS wave 2020). 
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that is conducive to learning about them —is more likely to come from companies that 
take digital technologies seriously.
Fig. 11 Firms Investing in Training of Employees (% of Firms), by Corporate Digital Divide Profiles.
Source of data: EIB Investment Survey (EIBIS wave 2020). 
Note: See Fig. 5 of the definition of the corporate digital divide profiles. Firms are weighted using 
value added. 
Investment in innovation and digital transformation are closely intertwined. Following 
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R&D and introduce new products, processes and services. We would expect digital 
technologies to empower innovation and therefore non-digitally active firms to also be 
less likely innovation active. Figure 12 confirms this: “persistently non-digitally” active 
firms are less likely to be active innovators. This result holds both in the EU and the US 
and is confirmed in multivariate regression analysis.13 
Fig. 12 Active Innovators (% of Firms), by Corporate Digital Divide Profiles.
Source of data: EIB Investment Survey (EIBIS wave 2020). 
Note: See Fig. 5 of the definition of the corporate digital divide profiles. Active innovators are firms 
that invest in R&D and invest to develop or introduce new products, processes or services. Firms 
are weighted using value added. 
10.4 Obstacles to Investment in the EU
EIBIS data also allow us to look at the different barriers and incentives firms perceive 
when contemplating investment decisions. Identifying any barrier to investment 
activities that specifically impedes firms that are left on the wrong side of the digital 
divide is relevant for the identification of policy levers to help move these firms away 
from of their “persistently non-digital” status, addressing the digital divide. Similarly, 
identifying the obstacles faced by digital investors will allow EU policymakers to better 
understand and fast-track investment in digital transformation. 
Uncertainty about the future is the most important constraint to corporate 
investment in the EU, with 50% of EU firms reporting it as a major obstacle (Figure 13). 
Labour market regulations appear to be a more important obstacle for “persistently 
non-digital” firms than for other firms, whereas business regulation and taxation is a 
13  The multivariate regression analysis uses active innovator as the dependent variable and the 
interactions of firm size and firm age, sector and country as explanatory variables. Marginal effects 
from Probit estimation show that potential digital “frontrunners” are 18% more likely to be active 
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major concern for roughly 30% of firms, independently from the profile. At the same 
time, the availability of staff with the right skills is a more severe obstacle for firms that 
consider that COVID-19 will have a long-term impact on the use of digital technologies. 
54% of potential “catch-up” and 47% of potential digital “frontrunners” see it as a 
major obstacle, compared to 42% of “persistently non-digital” firms and 40% potential 
“stagnaters”. Access to digital infrastructure is on average less often reported as a major 
obstacle to investment, but it differs along the digital profile of companies. While 20% of 
potential “catch-up” and “frontrunners” report this as a major barrier, this only holds 
for 10% of the “persistently non-digital” firms and 13% of potential “stagnaters”.
Fig. 13 Major Obstacle to Investment (% of EU Firms), by Corporate Digital Divide Profiles. 
Source of data: EIB Investment Survey (EIBIS wave 2020). 
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Fig. 14 Download Speed Faster than 1/Gbs (% of Households) and Digital Infrastructure as an 
Obstacle to Investment (% of Firms), by Country.
Source of data: EIBIS (2020) and Eurostat. 
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The level of access to digital infrastructure is converging across the EU, with the 
vast majority of households having access to broadband, but more needs to be done 
to accelerate the spread of fast connections. There is a negative correlation across 
countries between the share of households having access to download speeds faster 
than 1/Gbs and the share of firms reporting digital infrastructure as an obstacle to 
investment (Figure 14). This indicates that many EU countries have the potential to 
unlock investment in the digital transformation of businesses by making access to 
faster broadband speeds more widespread.
10.5 Conclusion
The analysis presented in this chapter confirms the trend towards a digital divide in 
the EU and US corporate sector. A substantial share of firms does not implement any 
state-of-the-art digital technology and does not consider that COVID-19 will have a 
long-term impact on digitalisation. This share of “persistently non-digital” firms is 
larger in the EU than in the US, in particular for small firms. 
Our results show that dynamics along the digital divide matter for firm performance 
and employment. “Persistently non-digital” firms are less likely to create new jobs, 
tend to pay lower wages and invest less in training of employees. They are also less 
likely to invest in innovation activities. 
Lifting firms out of persistent digital non-activity by incentivising them to invest in 
digitalisation should be a top priority on the policy agenda. Digital transformation is 
notably a core element of the EU and national recovery and resilience plans to address 
the COVID-19 crisis.
Effective policy guidance and implementation for digitalisation is especially 
needed since the COVID-19 crisis may exacerbate the digital divide between firms. 
Some firms will realise the benefits of implementing digital products, switching to 
robotic production, using internet of things applications or harnessing the power of 
big data and artificial intelligence. However, others that fail to innovate and invest 
in digital transformation are at risk of being left behind. Unprecedented changes in 
workforce arrangements make the crisis a unique opportunity to raise awareness and 
encourage non-digital firms to reassess their management strategies and start taking 
digital transformation seriously before it is too late.
Looking at the major obstacles to investment perceived by firms in the EU also 
allows us to identify the bottlenecks to unlock further digital transformation. The 
findings suggest that addressing digital infrastructure and barriers to skills should also 
be a priority for policymakers to support firms in their digitalisation efforts. Similarly, 
addressing the regulatory burden and its associated uncertainties should also be high 
on the digital policy agenda.
To recover from the long-term impact of COVID-19, the EU will need to rapidly 
create better conditions to foster investment in digital transformation. To ensure that 
EU firms do not lose ground compared to their US peers, policymakers should strive 
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to preserve a well-functioning, competitive, and integrated EU market environment 
that will push firms to invest more in the most advanced digital technologies. For 
example, EU members need to review labour and product market regulations that 
prevent firms from growing and reaching the size needed for the successful adoption 
and integration of multiple technologies within their businesses. Policy action should 
also develop measures to improve the digital skills of workers through training.
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11. EU Investment in Energy Supply 
for Europe
Carlo Jaeger, Diana Mangalagiu, and Jonas Teitge
Introduction
A central element of the European Green Deal is the commitment of the EU to become 
climate neutral by 2050. Against that backdrop, the European Commission promises a 
“shift from strategy to delivery” in 2021, and the 2021 EU climate law states that the EU 
will reduce greenhouse gas emissions by at least 55% by 2030 compared to 1990. The 
“Fit for 55 Package” is wide-ranging in scope, encompassing renewables, delivering 
on the “energy efficiency first” principle, energy performance of buildings, land use, 
energy taxation, effort sharing and emissions trading.1 It goes without saying that this 
requires the multiannual financial framework (MFF) 2021–27 to allocate resources 
accordingly. 
The unprecedented measures taken in the spring of 2020 by the EU to counter the 
unprecedented crisis triggered by the spread of the coronavirus SARS-CoV-2 have 
been designed in the spirit of “building back better”: they shall not simply get the EU 
economy back on the trajectory it was on before the crisis, rather they shall help switch 
this huge economy to an ambitious trajectory that realises the European Green Deal.
One of many aspects of this endeavour is the allocation of public investment 
resources for the energy supply for Europe. Such resources fall into three categories. 
First, there are those mobilised in the 2021–27 MFF. Second, there are the exceptional 
resources made available through what Olaf Scholz, the German minister of finance, 
labelled as a Hamilton moment for Europe (more about this below): the decision that 
the EU would raise €750 bn (at 2018 prices) on the international financial markets. 
Eventually, these resources were grouped under the label Next Generation EU 
(NGEU). And third, there are the resources that the European Investment Bank, EIB, 
by its mandate, can regularly raise on the same markets. 
1  “Energy efficiency first” is one of the key principles of the Energy Union, intended to ensure secure, 
sustainable, competitive and affordable energy supply in the EU. The adaptation of the EU ETS, 
covering 40% of Europe’s emissions, is seen as the central instrument for reducing GHG emissions in 
the “Fit for 55” package.
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With regards to investment for the energy supply for Europe, estimates for the 





Table 1a, 1b, 1c: EU Investment in Energy Supply for Europe in 2021
For sources and supplementary information, see the Annex.
The total over the three budgets is €46.8 bn. The three totals come with leverage rates 
for investments of various kinds that will be discussed in more detail below. For the 
MFF, a reasonable leverage ratio is 1.2, leading to an enhanced amount in the order of 
€4.1 bn. For NGEU, a reasonable leverage ratio is 1.5, leading to an enhanced amount 
in the order of €50.1 bn. For the EIB, a reasonable rate is 2, yielding €20 bn. All three 
together then amount to an investment flow of €74.2 bn. To put these numbers in 
perspective, one needs to consider some implications of the 55% reduction goal of the 













11. EU Investment in Energy Supply for Europe  175
11.1 The 2030 Challenge
Several studies (EEA 2020; Agora Energiewende & Ecologic Institute 2021) based on 
EU Long-Term Strategy and European Green Deal project at least a 10% gap for EU 
emissions reductions in its current baseline scenarios for 2030. They also estimate that 
in the 2021–30 period the EU will need to invest €35–88 bn per year more for buildings 
and transport alone. Despite significant climate financing allocated in the European 
Green Deal, EU financing alone will not close the projected investment gap. McKinsey 
& Company (2020) state that an average incremental investment of €160 bn per year is 
needed for the 2021–30 period. Of this amount, 31% (€50 bn) is allocated to buildings 
and 12% (€19 bn) is allocated to transport.
In 2019, 69.3% of all energy in the EU was produced from fossil fuels, namely coal 
(11.6%), oil and petroleum products (34.5%), and natural gas (23.1%) (all numbers 
from Eurostat 2021a). Renewable energies made up 15.8% of the total, nuclear 
accounted for 13.5%. A 55% reduction of emissions implies a reduction of fossil fuels in 
the order of 30% of total energy use (38% if the fossil fuel mix should stay unchanged). 
To replace this with renewables, the EU would have to triple the present production 
of renewable energy within ten years. Alternatively, one might double the amount of 
both renewables and of nuclear. The contribution of renewable energy sources showed 
a stable growth, having already surpassed coal in 2018 and further increasing in 2019. 
Coal decreased by 19.7% in 2019 and reached the record lowest value since 1990. 
One may try to boost this process by importing renewable energy from outside 
the EU. Presently, about 60% of fossil fuels used in the EU are imported (Eurostat 
2021a). In principle, large scale imports of renewable energy are feasible, e.g., as green 
hydrogen or via high-voltage direct power transmission. But this presupposes the 
establishment of large infrastructures and institutional arrangements that are hardly 
feasible before 2030. 
A different option is the reduction of energy use, often labelled as increasing 
energy efficiency (European Commission 2020). A reduction of energy use by one 
third in the nine years remaining until 2030 is not impossible, but hard to achieve and 
definitely harder without increasing the EU’s current energy efficiency target (32.5% 
for 2030). The 55% reduction could then be achieved by doubling renewable energy 
generation. Clearly, this requires massive investments in wind and solar power plants, 
combined with similarly massive investments in power grids. Green hydrogen may 
play an increasing role, but it will hardly reach a sufficient volume to make a huge 
difference by 2030.
In view of the energy supply for Europe, the upshot of this analysis is that the 2030 
goal will require unprecedent investments in renewables. So far, the highest investment 
in Europe in wind energy alone took place in 2016, when it reached €46.8 bn for a total 
new capacity of 20.2 GW, followed by 2020 with 42.8 for 19.6 GW (Figure 1).
With the previous, less ambitious targets for 2030, total annual investment needs 
for wind, solar, transmission, distribution, and storage were estimated in the range 
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Fig. 1 New Asset Finance in Wind Energy 2011–20 (GW and € bn).
Source of data: Wind Europe (2021).
of €95–145 bn (Trinomics 2017). With the raised ambition of the -55% target, €150 
bn is more realistic. The leveraged figure of about €75 bn from Tables 1 a, 1b, and 1c 
may give the impression that the door for those investments is wide open. However, 
these numbers are for the envisaged disbursements from the EU to member states, the 
actual investments will come with a delay. What is more, the grant allocations last for 
three years only, allocation of loans for two years. Front loading these financial flows 
is appropriate for the purposes of economic recovery, but for the needed changes in 
energy supply up to 2030 they cannot suffice.
Of course, additional investments for renewable energy supply can and will be 
induced by specific regulation and increasing CO2 prices. The political, economic, 
and technological obstacles to be overcome EU-wide, however, are substantial. And 
without further measures to stimulate effective demand, these politically induced 
investments will crowd out other investments, putting a drag on growth and thereby 
employment in other sectors.
The macroeconomic impact of EU investments in energy supply must not be 
overestimated. In 2019, gross investment in the EU was 22.1% of GDP, i.e., €3.1 bn. Of 
these, energy supply investments of €150 bn would make up 1% of EU GDP. As long 
as they are mainly shifted from other sectors and lasting only two or three years, the 
overall economic impact will be limited. 
A substantial positive effect, however, can be reached if EU energy supply 
investments will be additional and steady until 2030 or later. We are well aware of 
how contentious the debate about such possibilities is (Amato et al. 2020; Arnold et 
al. 2018; Bini-Smaghi 2021; Schäuble 2021). Unfortunately, the debate is still rather 
obsessively focused on the volume of public debt. But the historical breakthrough of 
the original Hamilton moment, the compromise struck between Hamilton, Jefferson, 
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and Madison in 1790, was not about an increase of public debt (public debt was only 
shifted from single states to the US), but about the creation of an effective market 
for US bonds. Without this market, the US would never have achieved its impressive 
successes. Nowadays, the financing and possible success of the European Green Deal 
are tied to an analogous challenge.
Whether the Franco-German compromise of 2020 will usher in a Hamiltonian 
dynamic for the European Green Deal remains to be seen. It will critically depend on 
whether Germany will develop the will and competence to become the benevolent 
catalyst of a European Renaissance, or whether it will stick to a mercantilist 
interpretation of its national interest.
11.2 Employment and Geography
In terms of economic variables, the energy sector is a small part of the economy (Taylor 
2021). We have seen this by comparing investment in the energy sector with overall 
investment. The same holds when considering employment. However, the effects of 
decarbonisation on employment are a big topic, especially as decarbonisation is being 
pursued in a global context of digitalisation. A closer look at employment is warranted, 
especially in view of the European Green Deal.
Table 2 shows a breakdown of employment in the energy sector, broadly defined, 
for EU28 from 2010 to 2018. Taking Brexit into account, employment in the EU27 by 
now is somewhat below 2 million people. The number of employees in the EU27 in 
turn is in the order of 220 million: the energy sector amounts to less than 1% of total 
employment. Table 2 also suggests that the bulk of energy sector jobs is in electricity, gas, 
steam and air conditioning supply. An emissions reduction of 55% by 2030 is unlikely 
to reduce the number of jobs in this domain; quite the opposite: the transformation of 
the energy system will require more craftspeople and professionals able to handle the 
new devices and technologies to be introduced. 
Table 2: Employment of the EU28 Energy Sector, 2010–18 (Czako 2020).
Thousands 2010 2015 2016 2017 2018
Mining and Coal Lignite 331.2 294.5 274.1 258.9 247.6
Extraction of Crude 
Petroleum and Natural Gas
103.8 88.9 81.4 70.0 60.7
Extraction of Peat 11.1 11.1 9.9 9.7 9.7
Support Activities for 
Petroleum and Natural Gas 
Extraction
47.7 56.8 48.0 41.4 41.4
Manufacture of Coke and 
refined Petroleum Products
218.7 190.0 186.5 188.6 193.6
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Thousands 2010 2015 2016 2017 2018
Electricity, Gas, Steam and 
Air Conditioning Supply
1645.3 1550.5 1553.0 1546.0 1569.1
Broad Sector Total 
Employment
2357.9 2191.8 2152.9 2114.5 2122.0
Of course, things may look very different in other sectors. But as far as the energy 
sector is concerned, the challenge at the scale of the EU labour market as a whole 
concerns about 0.25% of the total labour force. Regular fluctuations on the labour 
market are much larger than this. However, here we are faced with half a million people 
concentrated in regions where the fossil fuel-based energy sector plays a prominent 
role. Whether employment in a coal-mining region can turn into jobs focused on 
generating wind and solar power is far from obvious. How to address the challenge 
these regions are faced with is a hard problem that needs and deserves in-depth 
research (for an example of research in this direction, see https://tipping-plus.eu).
When looking at employment, geography matters. In the EU and especially the 
Eurozone, this is particularly relevant with regard to the divergence of the Eurozone 
(Gräbner et al. 2020). In the Next Generation EU package, this divergence is addressed 
by allocating the largest budget to Italy and the second largest to Spain. 
Looking first at Italy, one of the most pressing problems is indeed the one of 
employment (the following numbers are from https://tradingeconomics.com): at 
the time of writing, the unemployment rate is larger than 10% for Italy as a whole, 
with youth unemployment higher than 30%. Moreover, unemployment is heavily 
concentrated in the south of Italy. The plan for how the Italian government, led by 
former ECB president Mario Draghi, intends to use the money from the EU pandemic 
recovery funds reflects this challenge (MEF 2021; Johnson and Fleming 2021). The 
priority is on digitalisation and high-speed rail. These technological investments shall 
help increase productivity across the whole of Italy, including both the private and the 
public sector. They are explicitly planned in the perspective of the European Green 
Deal, but with an emphasis on energy renewal of the—private and public—buildings 
more than on expanding renewable energy generation. This makes perfect sense, as 
construction has a much larger potential for job creation than the energy sector. And 
according to the European Commission (2020) the contribution of energy efficiency 
to the -55% reduction goal for 2030 is as important as the expansion of renewables 
generation. Last but not least, by improving train connections across Italy, explicitly 
aiming at sustainable mobility at the local scale, and strengthening the health sector 
shattered by the pandemic, tourism can rebound as a key sector of the Italian economy. 
The details of the Italian plan are sound, and the argument from the previous 
section applies here, too: it will be crucial to avoid the temptation of a new austerity 
cycle in the coming years and instead stabilise the measures undertaken as a reaction 
to the pandemic at least until the 2030 goal has been reached.
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The situation in Spain is similar in many respects, although internal tensions 
are presently making the task of forming a common will even more difficult than 
in Italy. At the time of writing, the unemployment rate is in the order of 15%, with 
youth unemployment at nearly 40% (numbers from https://tradingeconomics.com). 
For good reasons, the goals are similar to those in Italy: strengthen employment and 
foster growth (Gobierno de España 2021; Lázaro Touza 2020). Given the structure 
of the Spanish economy, including its tourist sector, the plan has a strong focus on 
supporting SMEs. Again, digitalisation is high priority, as is sustainable mobility. 
Generation of renewable energy is included, but not at a scale that would change the 
energy supply for the EU or the growth rate of the Spanish economy. However, a long-
term strategy in the direction of green hydrogen production is embedded in the plan, 
as is an emphasis on science, technology, and education.
When it comes to renewable energy supply for Europe, the big difference in the 
present decade will not come from the countries prioritised by Next Generation EU, 
but from countries like Germany and Denmark, who can expand renewable generation 
with domestic means if they avoid a return to austerity. 
11.3 “There is No Alternative” or Experimentalist Governance?
When thinking about a historical project like the European Green Deal, one may be 
forgiven for imagining it as defined by necessities that are as inevitable as they are 
foreseeable. The whole process is then governed by “TINA”: there is no alternative. 
Once this perspective is embraced, the transition to a climate neutral Europe starts 
looking like a journey on trains with well specified timetables, clearly foreseeable 
transfers from one train to another, and a sense of safety strengthened by smoothly 
running organisations. Expanding the generation of renewable energies can be 
envisaged with such a mindset, too, and in many contexts this is the way to go. But 
there is danger in ignoring the fact that contexts change, and often in unexpected ways. 
An important example is the idea of leveraging large private investments with small 
public ones. As we have seen, the public investment in renewable energy financed 
through the combination of MFF, NGEU, and EIB is quite small; first, because the 
largest annual budget, the one of NGEU, is designed for no more than three years, 
and second, because for perfectly understandable reasons the main recipients of 
NGEU funds, while determined to use them for a broad ecological transition, don’t 
focus on large-scale expansion of renewable energy generation. In this situation, the 
idea of leveraging large private investment through small public ones is comforting. 
In fact, there is overwhelming evidence to the effect that there are contexts where 
such leverage is considerable, but there is also evidence for contexts where the effect 
is much smaller (Boitani and Perdichizzi 2018). Moreover, while some of the relevant 
contexts are known (economic recessions vs economic booms), many of them defy 
easy definition (e.g., through output gaps; see Heimberger and Kapeller 2016). 
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In the case of NGEU, the leverage ratio boils down to the multiplier linking 
government expenditure to effective demand. As NGEU funds are disbursed in 
situations of economic crisis, high unemployment, capacity underutilisation, and 
strong incentives for investing in renewable energy, the leverage of 1.5 used in Section 
1 is a conservative estimate. The same holds for those MFF expenditures that go into 
investment for expanding capacity of renewable energy generation. ITER and Euratom 
are not in this category (if some day nuclear fusion should really work, the whole 
analysis about renewables might have to change—but that’s certainly irrelevant for the 
present decade). That’s why for MFF a leverage of 1.2 is more appropriate. 
The EIB presents a fundamentally different situation. First, the EIB engages 
in co-financing of investments. From the point of view of the investor, alternative 
co-financing is usually available, although often at somewhat less advantageous 
conditions. Many profitable investments co-financed by the EIB would still take place 
with other co-financing partners. Simply using the ratio of the total investment volume 
to the EIB contribution as a leverage factor is misleading. On the other hand, the EIB 
does encourage and sometimes trigger investments—especially by public authorities—
that would not take place otherwise. That’s why a leverage factor of 2, i.e., somewhat 
higher than for NGEU, is a reasonable estimate in this case.
In the past two decades, the EU economy, like smaller and even bigger economies, 
has experienced diversity of contexts and their often unforeseen changes on two 
dramatic occasions: the Global Financial Crisis and the COVID-19 pandemic. Perhaps 
no surprises of that scale will happen during the transition to climate neutrality, but for 
sure surprises will happen. This is where the concept of experimentalist governance 
(Sabel and Zeitlin 2012; see also Foray and Woerter 2021) matters for the expansion of 
renewable energies as well as for other dimensions of the European Green Deal.
Experimentalist governance can build on the diversity of regional contexts by 
creating conditions that allow and enable different regions to implement different 
strategies. For this purpose, regions need a safety net to engage in risky endeavours. 
And if they succeed, they need to share their learning experience with others without 
trying to impose a simplistic recipe. In this spirit, a Spanish region may aggressively 
explore the options for green hydrogen, while a region in Italy may gather experience 
with methanol gained from air capture of CO2 in a circular economy perspective (Olah 
et al. 2018). 
Public and private investments in expanding renewable energy generation offer 
scope for strategic leadership, e.g., in expanding offshore wind wherever it is possible 
and reasonable. And they offer scope for complementary approaches in different 
regional contexts as illustrated above. What matters is to combine the diversity of 
experiences needed to navigate future surprises with the perseverance of pursuing 
the opportunity created by the near-Hamilton moment in the midst of the COVID-19 
pandemic. 
11. EU Investment in Energy Supply for Europe  181
ANNEX: Background for Tables 1a, 1b, 1c
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Budget items Total 
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Introduction
The EU aims to be climate neutral by 2050, which includes the goal of a 90% reduction 
in greenhouse gas emissions from transport (EC 2019). The transport sector alone 
accounts for around 25% of the global carbon (CO2) emissions and consumes 
more than half of the global demand for fossil fuels (IEA 2019). The Agenda 2030 
specifically states that “more freight should be transported by rail” (EC 2019). With 
a study published in 2018 proposing the construction of a European Silk Road, the 
Vienna Institute for International Economic Studies (wiiw) proposed a contribution 
to achieve this envisioned shift to rail, suggesting inter alia a high-speed rail network 
along the envisaged routes. It would extend around 11,000 kilometres on a northern 
route from Lisbon to Uralsk on the Russian-Kazakh border, and on a southern route 
from Milan to Volgograd and Baku, also including other modes of transport and a 
string of logistic centres and ports. A central part is the route from Lyon to Moscow 
(Figure 1). The idea for a trans-European high-speed rail network is not necessarily 
new. Such a network was defined by the European Council Directive 96/48/EC of 23 
July 1996. However, as noted in ECA (2018), a European high-speed rail network is 
not a reality but an ineffective patchwork of a few national lines. So far, the political 
will of the EU member states was lacking to build a network across national borders. 
However, in the current circumstances, when joint climate action gains support in all 
European societies, chances are increasing that consensus over cross-border high-
speed railway infrastructure construction can be reached.
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Fig. 1 European Silk Road Routes including the Proposed Trainline from Lyon to Moscow Source of 
data: Holzner et al. (2018).
The wiiw report sets out the economic effects and advantages of a European Silk Road. 
In Europe, connecting the West with the East will generate growth and employment in 
the short- and long-term. Conservative estimations found a potential of 3.5% economic 
growth on average as well as an increase of employment of around two million over 
an investment period of ten years, due to the construction efforts in the countries 
concerned (Holzner et al. 2018). Under favourable circumstances and at continued 
low interest rates, an employment creation of over seven million can be expected in 
greater Europe. Furthermore, such large-scale investments into infrastructure projects 
can reduce the economic disparities around various regions and have long term 
productivity and trade gains. They can not only remove economic divergence but also 
create a move towards political integration, offering a new narrative for Europe. This 
is specifically important in the context of inequalities that persist between Western 
and Eastern European countries, as well as the European disintegration process, that 
culminated for the time being with Brexit.
Specific extra-budgetary financing models were proposed for the European Silk 
Road, which was estimated to cost in total about €1 tn, or roughly 7% of the EU’s 
GDP (Holzner 2019). In order to conduct and finance the project, the establishment 
of a European Silk Road Trust owned by the euro area countries, other EU countries 
and third countries wishing to join the construction of the European Silk Road was 
suggested. The trust could rely on a public guarantee when it came to issuing long-
term bonds (at currently zero or even negative real interest rates). It would formally be 
part of the private sector, especially as it would have sufficient income of its own from 
private customers (tolls).
As a strong core guarantor for the trust, the gradual development of a European 
Sovereign Wealth Fund by the euro area member states was suggested, following the 
structure of the Norwegian oil fund, for instance sourced from a part of the profits of 
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the ECB. Other options, which would make use of existing institutions, would include, 
for instance, a substantial increase in the European Fund for Strategic Investments 
and/or a larger capital injection in the European Investment Bank (EIB), in order to 
finance the European Silk Road.
Recently, the proposal by the wiiw has gained significance as the idea of a European 
high-speed railway (HSR) network is also being considered as a mechanism for 
economic recovery after the COVID-19 pandemic. The Macroeconomic Policy Institute 
(IMK) in Düsseldorf, the Observatoire Français des Conjonctures Économiques 
(OFCE) in Paris and the wiiw have jointly proposed to dedicate a part of the EU’s 
Recovery Fund inter alia to the development of a pan-European HSR network—an 
Ultra-Rapid-Train connecting EU capitals (Creel et al. 2020). Apart from the economic 
recovery, an HSR network could also be an important step towards achieving the 
announced goal of reducing greenhouse-gas (GHG) emissions in the Paris Agreement 
and the Agenda 2030. While the economic analysis as well as the financing of the 
project have been studied comprehensively, the environmental effects of constructing 
a European Silk Road, specifically the HSR network, have not been examined, so far. 
This study closes the gap by conducting an environmental impact evaluation of the 
proposed European HSR network. Given that this is about a hypothetical railway line, 
the calculations must remain rough and based on the results of studies on similar 
existing lines. Nevertheless, the goal is to determine in various scenarios the possible 
range of net GHG emissions of constructing and operating an HSR network and to 
provide a crude estimation of how many tonnes of CO2 could be saved as compared 
to road and air travel, over the life cycle of sixty years. The analysis will focus only on 
the northern, proposed core HSR line from Lyon to Moscow, the cost of which was 
estimated at €200.4 bn. By comparison, this is approximately the amount that Italy 
receives in pandemic-related EU grants and loans from the Next Generation EU fund. 
However, it has to be noted that the assumptions about the unit costs were extremely 
conservative in the sense that the highest possible costs were assumed, i.e., for a new 
two-track railway line with a tunnel system. Thus, these cost estimates (and other 
economic estimates made in Holzner et al. (2018)) cannot be used for tying back 
the emission calculations. Instead, a range of potential GHG emissions based on the 
literature will be employed in the following exercises.
12.1 Life-Cycle Assessments—Calculating the Environmental 
Burden of HSR Networks
Generally, an LCA is defined as an analysis that evaluates the environmental impact 
of a product. In our case, this is the entire life cycle of the proposed HSR line from 
Lyon to Moscow. Input factors are compared and quantified and contain construction, 
operation, maintenance, and waste disposal in a period of sixty to one hundred years. 
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The output is the total burden the line will impose on the environment, measured in 
CO2 or rather CO2-eq. (Asplan Viak 2011).
Many studies focus on the Life-Cycle Assessment (LCA) of railways but are very 
specific to pre-existing train line infrastructures. While these studies give good insights 
on how to assess the CO2 or CO2-eq. of existing infrastructures, the study at hand is 
conducted for a hypothetical line from Lyon to Moscow, rather than an existing project. 
The aim of the literature review was therefore to find reliable data as a baseline on 
which to build our model.
This is possible because LCAs are standardised under the International 
Organization for Standardization (ISO). The ISO requires adherence to certain norms, 
namely ISO 14040 and ISO 14044, to allow a comparison and quantification of different 
studies. Despite the comparability through the framework of the ISO standards, a 
review of the literature revealed significant differences in results. Decisive factors for 
the differences turned out to be mostly geographical location, including the share of 
bridges and tunnels, materials used for construction and various energy mixes among 
the different countries. To use reliable data for our calculations, we consider twelve 
studies to incorporate into our model (Table 1). These are mainly European studies, 
from Germany (von Rozycki et al. 2003), Scandinavia (Åkermann 2011; Grossrieder 
2011), Portugal (Jones et al. 2016) and Spain (Kortazar et al. 2021). Outside of Europe 
studies from the United States (Chester and Horvath 2012) and China (Yue et al. 
2015) were considered. Relying on studies covering a broad geographic area as well 
as different methods will ensure a balanced approach and a realistic estimation of the 
range between possible outcomes.
12.2 Methodology for the Environmental Impact Evaluation
While HSR infrastructure already exists in some parts of the route and other networks 
would need updating, the analysis builds on the assumption that the entire route 
Lyon-Moscow of 3434 kilometres would need to be constructed. This implies that 
our results for CO2-eq. emission savings—all GHG emissions are expressed as CO2-
equivalent—are per definition lower-bound estimates.
Drawing on the literature, our study has been developed based on an LCA 
methodology. We calculate the net CO2-eq. emissions of the proposed HSR line from 
Lyon to Moscow considering the phases of construction, maintenance, operation, and 
disposal. While the construction of new HSR infrastructure will create new CO2-eq., 
the environmental benefit lies in the modal shift of passengers from more polluting 
modes of transport such as air and road travel (Kortazar et al. 2021). Mathematically 
this can be represented as:
𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶2𝑁𝑁𝑒𝑒. = ∑ 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶2𝑁𝑁𝑒𝑒.𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻 + ∑ 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶2𝑁𝑁𝑒𝑒.𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻 − ∑ 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶2𝑁𝑁𝑒𝑒.𝐻𝐻𝑎𝑎𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻 [
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Table 1: Comparison of LCA Studies
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where a denotes the alternative passenger modes of transport to the HSR and the 
emissions are summed over sixty years, which is a common period analysed in the 
literature.
Simplifying the equation provides:
The following analysis takes a two-step approach according to the two parts of this 
equation. First, the life cycle emissions from HSR infrastructure are estimated. Second, 
avoided CO2-eq. emissions compared to aviation and road transport are calculated. 
This provides an indication on how much CO2-eq. could be saved if an HSR network 
was constructed.
12.2.1 Calculating Emissions from Construction
The emissions for constructing 3434 kilometres of line are estimated according to 
emission factors deduced from the existing life-cycle assessment studies for railway 
infrastructure. Hence, the emission factor includes all inputs for construction of rails, 
maintenance, operation and disposal of the infrastructure. Some studies also include 
vehicle manufacturing, maintenance, operation and disposal (Akerman 2011; Chester 
and Horvath 2010; Yue et al. 2015).
The CO2-eq. emissions per kilometre of constructed railway vary widely among the 
different studies (Figure 2). This is due to two reasons. First, as explained above, some 
LCA include more input factors than others. Second, the complexity of construction 
varies widely among different studies. Bridges and tunnels account for the highest 
emissions during construction (Asplan Viak 2011). As the share of bridges and tunnels 
ranges from under 30% to over 80%, these differences lead to emission factors ranging 
from 4,735 tCO2/km (Baron et al. 2011) to 28,224.6 tCO2/km (Yue et al. 2015) (Figure 
2). For the trainline from Lyon to Moscow, the number of bridges and tunnels required 
can hardly be estimated within the scope of this study. The analysis therefore covers 
three models: an optimistic, a moderate, and a conservative model. The moderate 
approach uses the mean of the available data on railway construction emission factors. 
The optimistic and conservative approaches rely on values of one standard deviation 
from the mean, covering the upper and lower bounds of available data (Table 1).
𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶2𝑁𝑁𝑒𝑒. = ∑ 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶2𝑁𝑁𝑒𝑒.𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻 − ∑ 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶2𝑁𝑁𝑒𝑒.𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 [
12.2.2 Calculating Avoided GHG Emissions
To estimate avoided CO2-eq. emissions the modal shifts from aviation to train as well 
as road to train are determined. This is calculated as:
𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶2𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒.𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 = ∑ 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶2𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒.𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴+ ∑ 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶2𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒.𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴
𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴
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Fig. 2 Construction Emission Models.
Source of data: Bueno et al. (2017).
The avoided CO2-eq. depends on three factors: one, the difference between the 
emission factors for operation of the mode of transport expressed in tonnes per 
passenger kilometre (pkm); two, the number of passengers shifting to train as a mode 
of transport; and three, the average distance travelled by passengers. Multiplying those 
three aspects will provide the sum of avoided GHG due to modal shifts over sixty 
years. Mathematically expressed this means:
12.2.3 Factor 1: Difference in Emission Factors
Emission factors for operation of the different ways of transport are relatively consistent 
across studies and literature. Trains have the lowest CO2 emissions per passenger 
kilometre with a European average emission factor of 0.027 kg CO2/pkm (Jones et al. 
2016). Travelling by plane produces 4.5 times the emissions per passenger kilometre, 
with an emission factor of 0.126 kg CO2/pkm (Fraunhofer ISI 2020). Passenger cars 
travelling on the highway emit 0.132 kg CO2/pkm (Fraunhofer ISI 2020). Consequently, 
for every passenger shifting from aviation to train 0.099 kg CO2/pkm can be avoided 
and for every passenger shifting from road to train 0.105 kg CO2/pkm can be saved.
∑ 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶2𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒.𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑜𝑜𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑜𝑜𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛
𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑜𝑜𝑛𝑛
=  ∆𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶2𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒.𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑜𝑜𝑛𝑛/𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛×  𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝 𝑠𝑠ℎ𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖 × 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖𝑝𝑝𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑒𝑒 𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡𝑝𝑝𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑒𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖 [
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12.2.4 Factor 2: Passenger Shifts from Road and Air Travel
Estimating the expected passenger flows is one of the most important aspects of 
determining the environmental impact of the proposed HSR network. Only if enough 
passengers substitute their current mode of transport for travelling by train can the 
emissions from construction be offset. Estimations are based on current passenger 
flows of which a certain share is expected to shift.
The chosen data is based on values from the year 2019, as the COVID-19 pandemic 
has impacted passenger flows between countries significantly and thus data from 
2020 is not representative. The number of passengers for air could be determined by 
passengers travelling between airports and reporting countries along the proposed 
route from Lyon to Moscow. In 2019, total passenger flows on this route amounted to 
93.5 million (own calculations based on Eurostat 2021a; Eurostat 2021b; IATA 2019).
The number of passengers by road is estimated according to the average traffic 
flow on the nine core network corridors of the Trans-European Road Network (CEDR 
2019). This amounts to 58,952 vehicles per day in 2019. Assuming an occupancy rate 
of 1.6 for cars (Fraunhofer ISI 2020) we can estimate 34.4 million passengers using 
the corridor from Lyon to Moscow within one year. Using these passenger flows as a 
baseline, an annual growth rate of 2% for aviation and a growth rate of 0.75% for road 
travel is assumed (Eurocontrol 2018; Alonso Raposo et al. 2019).
To determine a substitution rate, there are several factors that need to be considered. 
The main factors determining the choice of travel are price, travel time, travel time 
reliability, frequency of the connections and other factors such as convenience, comfort, 
and safety (EEA 2020b). Several studies have shown that trains can substitute aviation 
transport for a travel time of up to four hours (ÖBB 2021). With an average velocity of 
250km/h for HSR (EIM 2008) this means that the train would be a good substitute for 
routes of up to 1000 km. Substitution rates range from 10% up to 90% (Steer Davies 
Gleave 2006) depending on the line length, and availability of other means of transport 
within origin and destinations, which makes it difficult to predict an accurate rate. 
The study therefore looks at three possible scenarios, which are based on the study on 
the California HSR by Chester and Horvath (2010). For air travel a shift of 25%, 50%, 
and 75% of passengers to railway is assumed, and for road transport a shift of 2%, 
2.25%, and 2.5% of passengers is assumed. Taking the three models for construction 
emissions together with these three models provides nine models which are explored 
(Table 2).
12.2.5 Factor 3: Average Distance Travelled
As the emission factors are expressed in passenger kilometres (pkm), the distance 
travelled also plays an important role in calculating the total emissions. As discussed 
above, HSR travel has a cut-off point of around 1000 km. This means it will be used 
as a mode of transport for medium-distance travels which ranges from 300–1000 km 
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(Eurostat 2018). Comparing flight distances regularly used on the route confirms this 
assumption. Only flights to Russia significantly surpass the 1000 km mark. The model 
is therefore built on the median of the medium-distance-range, which is 650 km. A 
more thorough approach would be to look at the individual expected passenger flows 
for the different passages of the route from Lyon to Moscow and use the weighted mean 
distance. Due to limitations in available data, we chose the simplified assumption, for 
both aviation and road travel.
12.3 HSR Networks as a Step towards European Climate Goals
The results show that constructing an HSR network across Europe would be a step 
towards the goal set out by the EU for cutting emissions in the transport sector. All 
the explored models provide net negative CO2-eq. emissions. This indicates that more 
CO2-eq. emissions could be avoided by the modal shift of passengers compared to 
the emissions from the construction and operation of the HSR line. While the most 
conservative model only predicts avoidance of 37.4 million tCO2-eq., the medium 
model calculates 155.7 million tCO2-eq. in savings and the optimistic model implies 
possible savings of 273.9 million tCO2-eq. (Figure 3). Further, in the most optimistic 
model, emissions would be offset already after 3.2 years of operation. In the medium 
model the breakeven would be reached after 11.8 years of operation, while the most 
conservative model construction emissions will be compensated only after thirty-
seven years of operation (Table 3).
To put the results into perspective, the most optimistic model is comparable to 
approximately 10% of net emissions within the EU-27 in a year (EPA 2020; EEA 2020a). 
While this might not seem considerable, several aspects need to be taken into account. 
First, only passenger travel is included and avoided emissions from freight were 
not considered. An additional shift within the freight-transport sector will increase 
the environmental benefits of an HSR line. Second, the construction, maintenance, 
and disposal of the road and air infrastructure have not been considered, while all 
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Fig. 3 Model Estimates of Net Negative Emissions
Source: own calculations (2021).
aspects for rail are included. This disadvantages rail compared to the other modes of 
transport. Third, the wiiw has shown the notable economic benefits of constructing a 
pan-European HSR network. The environmental benefits should thus not be evaluated 
independently but in addition to the economic advantages. Lastly, the examined 
passage of the line is only one part of the bigger network which has the potential to 
save further CO2-eq. emissions. Also, the costs of the Lyon-Moscow HSR, amounting 
to an estimated €200.4 bn euros, have to be taken into consideration.
Looking at the bandwidth of results between the nine models there is a need to 
discuss which model would be the most accurate. Therefore, in the following sections, 
the different models are examined more closely to provide an indication of which 
scenarios should be used as an estimate and as a basis for the impact evaluation.
Table 3 Net Negative Emissions by Model Type
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Table 4 Years to Offset Construction Emissions
12.3.1 Impact of Sustainable Construction Practices
The conservative model is based on the mean plus one standard deviation from the 
considered literature, with 17,668 tCO2-eq./km resulting in a total of 60.7 mil tCO2- eq. 
for construction (Figure 4). The higher emission factor is mostly due to differences in 
construction (Yue et al. 2015). Specifically, the lack of light-weight metals and the usage 
of fly ash in concrete, as well as an unfavourable energy mix, lead to extremely high 
emission factors (Yue et al. 2015; Barnes 2014). As in Europe construction practices 
and materials used are more sustainable and have lower emissions, an emission factor 
as high as assumed in the conservative model is unlikely.
Fig 4 Construction Emissions by Model
Source: own calculations (2021).
The optimistic model, which utilises the mean minus one standard deviation of 
emissions found in the literature, is more plausible. France and Sweden have the 
lowest emissions during the life cycle of railways (UIC 2017). This is due to a less 
carbon-based energy mix, relatively more sustainable construction materials used and 
a lower share of bridges and tunnels. With an emission factor of 4,455 tCO2-eq./km the 
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total carbon emissions for construction amounts to 15.3 million tCO2-eq (Figure 4). In 
comparison to the other two models this is only about 25% of the conservative model 
and 40% of the moderate model total emissions. Nonetheless, this could be achievable 
with a sustainable energy mix, sufficient numbers for passengers and freight, and 
sustainable construction practices, i.e., limiting or cutting out fly ash in concrete.
The medium model is based upon the average of twelve studies of tCO2-eq./km 
emitted during construction. The emissions factor in this model is 11,062 tCO2-eq./
km and total emissions emitted from construction in this model amount to 38 million 
tCO2-eq. (Figure 4). This correlates with other recent projects throughout Europe. For 
example, Spain has the second longest HSR network in the world and several LCAs 
have been conducted for different parts of the infrastructure (Kortazar et al. 2021). The 
quality of assessment is very reliable, because of the diversity of the sample studies 
used.
Additionally, the coherence found within the European studies shows that the 
medium model is the most realistic. Nevertheless, we see potential for outcomes 
according to the optimistic model, if sustainable construction practices are applied 
and cleaner energy mixes used.
12.3.2 Potential CO
2
 Emissions Avoided through an HSR Network
For avoided tCO2-eq. emissions, again a conservative, medium, and optimistic scenario 
have been examined, based on different expected substitution rates for aviation and 
road. While substitution rates range as wide as 10%-90% among the literature, several 
factors can indicate a more accurate expected substitution rate. As mentioned, the main 
factors determining the choice of travel are price, travel time, travel time reliability, and 
frequency of the connections (EEA 2020b). Linked to those factors are the density 
of population and competition by low-price airlines impacting the substitution rate 
(Steer Davies Gleave 2006).
The route from Lyon to Moscow encompasses many corridors where according 
to aforementioned factors a high substitution rate can be expected. Looking at routes 
within the 4 hour/1000 km distance, on the proposed lines this would for example 
include routes such as Lyon to Brussels (730 km), Paris to Berlin (1,050 km), Berlin 
to Warsaw (575 km), Warsaw to Minsk (545 km) and Minsk to Moscow (713 km). 
Duisburg to Warsaw would also only take about 4.5 hours. The data on passenger 
flows show that these routes are currently mainly covered by aviation. For example, 
in 2019, 1.8 million passengers travelled from Brussels’ airport to Germany with an 
average flight distance of 383 km (Eurostat 2021a). If a reliable and fast railway system 
was in place, due to convenience and time of travel for such routes a substitution rate 
in line with the optimistic model can be expected (75%).
One factor which will constrain the substitution rates is the strong competition of 
low-price airlines, which cover most of the routes. From a cost perspective, it may be 
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hard for an HSR network to compete with those airlines. However, with the emission 
trading system adapted by the European Union and possible further policies pushing 
for the reduction of GHG emissions, an increase of prices on flights can also be expected, 
which would benefit the substitution rates. Overall, we believe the substitution rate to 
lie on the upper end of the range, or in other words either the medium or the optimistic 
model, with substitution rates of 50% or 75%.
On the other hand, shifts from travel by car are expected to be very low. All 
factors such as price, reliability, and convenience of the car hinder significant shifts 
to train travel. On top of this, electric cars produce very low carbon emissions. This 
is an enticing alternative for the increasingly environmentally conscious European 
consumer market. For these reasons, the substitution rate can be estimated at only 
around 2–3% (Chester and Horvath 2010). The model does not depend on whether a 
2%, 2.25%, or 2.5% substitution rate for cars is used. Therefore, for road travel it does 
not matter greatly whether the conservative, medium or optimistic model is chosen.
In conclusion, the medium-medium or medium-optimistic models seem to be the 
most likely (Table 2). This would result in total savings of emissions equivalent to the 
net tCO2-eq. of the Netherlands (M/M) or Poland (M/O) for a year (EEA 2020a).
12.4 Limitations
Our study faces three major limitations. First, estimating outcomes over the next sixty 
years provides uncertainties, which could not be accounted for. Assumptions include 
a steady growth rate as well as a continuous substitution rate. Assuming the same 
substitution rate for sixty years may overestimate passenger flows. On the other hand, 
a relatively low growth rate was chosen to account for this aspect.
Second, it could not be considered that the continuous improvement of other modes 
of transport will reduce emissions as technology advances. Electrical cars are expected 
to cut emissions from road travel significantly in the future. Current targets set by the 
EU and member states regarding private car emission requirements aim at eliminating 
combustion engines within the next ten to fifteen years (Wappelhorst 2020). Similarly, 
airplane fuel efficiency has been increasing and is expected to reduce the emission 
factor for aviation (EESI 2019). However, it can be expected that the emissions by train 
will also reduce as the energy mix within the different EU countries moves towards 
renewable energies. Nevertheless, the shift to electric cars barely changes the results 
of our model.
Third, GHG savings from freight transport are not explicitly included in this 
study as their quantification would need further research. Qualitatively, though, we 
see strong grounds to expect a positive impact on emissions if freight transport shifts 
to rail are incorporated. A recent study by the European Environment Agency (EEA 
2021) found that transport of freight via rail emits 43 times less CO2 than transport via 
air. More specifically, a study by Bueno et al. (2017) on evaluating the environmental 
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performance of a high-speed rail project in the Basque Country in Spain demonstrated 
that net CO2 emissions improve by a factor of 1.3–2.1, depending on the model, when 
including freight in the calculations. Although the authors came to the conclusion 
that the Basque Y Line they studied will not reach a net negative CO2-balance, with 
emissions dropping from 1.92 MtCO2 net emissions if only passenger transport is 
considered to up to 0.9 MtCO2 net emissions when including both passenger and 
freight transport. For our study, this is suggestive that the projected CO2 savings could 
potentially double, when including freight into the calculations.
12.5 Conclusion
In conclusion, we could show that a construction of an HSR line between Lyon and 
Moscow along the “European Silk Road” provides not only economic advantages, 
as examined by Holzner et al. (2018), but also presents potential for a positive 
environmental impact. Based on calculations in the related literature, it could be 
determined that the most optimistic model projects an emissions avoidance equivalent 
to 10% net emissions of the EU-27 for a year for passenger transport alone. The bulk 
of the avoidance comes from an assumed reduction in air travel. The emissions from 
construction would be offset after eight to twelve years of operation, relying on the 
medium-medium and medium-optimistic models. Considering that freight transport 
was not incorporated in the calculations, the potential is in fact higher than portrayed 
by this study. Existing studies suggest that projected CO2 savings could potentially 
double, when including freight in the calculations. We argue that the construction 
and operation of an HSR could significantly reduce passenger flows from aviation, 
contributing to the EU’s goal to reduce emissions from aviation by at least 10% (EC 
2019). While the idea, let alone the construction, of an HSR network seems radical, it 
certainly can have an extensive impact not only on the further economic integration 
of Europe but also contribute to a greener, more sustainable, more innovative and 
technologically advanced future. The estimated costs of the European Silk Road HSR 
line between Lyon and Moscow of more than €200 bn are substantial. However, as 
a share of 2020 EU GDP, this makes up only 1.5%. Considering that the investment 
would likely be spread out over at least a decade, the amount involved appears modest 
from a European perspective. Also, this has to be seen against the backdrop of the 
recent signals by the European Commission’s President, Ursula von der Leyen, in her 
2021 State of the Union Address, announcing the presentation of a new connectivity 
strategy called Global Gateway, with investments in quality infrastructure, connecting 
goods, people, and services around the world.
12. Environmental Impact of a Railway Network along the “European Silk Road”  199
References
Åkerman, J. (2011) “The role of high-speed rail in mitigating climate change—The Swedish 
case Europabanan from a life cycle perspective”, Transportation Research Part D: Transport and 
Environment 16(3): 208–17, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.trd.2010.12.004.
Alonso Raposo, M. and B. Ciuffo (eds) (2019) The future of road transport―Implications of 
automated, connected, low-carbon and shared mobility (Luxembourg: Publications Office of the 
European Union), https://doi.org/10.2760/668964.
Asplan Viak (2011) New Double Track Line Oslo—Ski Life Cycle Assessment of the Follo Line—
Infrastructure (UOS-00-A-36100), Jernbaneverket.
Banar, M. and A. Özdemir (2015) “An evaluation of railway passenger transport in Turkey using 
life cycle assessment and life cycle cost methods”, Transportation Research Part D: Transport 
and Environment 41: 88–105, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.trd.2015.09.017.
Barnes, E. (2014) California High Speed Resilience to Climate Change, https://repository.asu.edu/
items/25239.
Baron, T., G. Martinetti and D. Pepion (2011) Carbon Footprint of High-Speed Rail, International 
Union of Railways, https://railroads.dot.gov/sites/fra.dot.gov/files/fra_net/15009/
Carbon%20Foot print%20of%20High-Speed%20Rail%20UIC%202011.pdf.
Bueno, G., D. Hoyos and I. Capellán-Pérez (2017) “Evaluating the environmental performance 
of the high speed rail project in the Basque Country, Spain”, Research in Transportation 
Economics 62: 44–56, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.retrec.2017.02.004.
CEDR (2019) Trans-European Road Network, TEN-T (Roads): 2019 Performance Report (October 
2020), CEDR Working Group 3.5 Performance, https://www.cedr.eu/download/
Publications/2020/CEDR-Technical-Report-2020-01-TEN-T-2019-Performance-Report.pdf.
Chester, M. and A. Horvath (2010) “Life-cycle assessment of high-speed rail: The case of California”, 
Environmental Research Letters 5(1): 014003, https://doi.org/10.1088/1748-9326/5/1/014003.
Chester, M. and A. Horvath (2012) “High-speed rail with emerging automobiles and aircraft 
can reduce environmental impacts in California’s future”, Environmental Research Letters 
7(3): 034012, https://doi.org/10.1088/1748-9326/7/3/034012.
Cornet, Y., G. Dudley and D. Banister (2018) “High speed rail: Implications for carbon emissions 
and biodiversity”, Case Studies on Transport Policy 6(3): 376–90, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.
cstp.2017.08.007.
Creel, J., M. Holzner, F. Saraceno, A. Watt and J. Wittwer (2020) How to spend it: A proposal for 
a European Covid-19 recovery programme, wiiw Policy Note/Policy Report, No. 38, https://wiiw.
ac.at/publications-all-all-all-all-10-year-desc-0-how+to+spend+it.html.
EC (2019) Sustainable Mobility—The European Green Deal, European Commission, https://
ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/fs_19_6726.
ECA (2018) A European high-speed rail network: not a reality but an ineffective patchwork, European 
Court of Auditors, Special Report, No. 19.
EEA (2020a) Approximated estimates for greenhouse gas emissions, European Environment Agency, 
https://www.eea.europa.eu/data-and-maps/data/approximated-estimates-for-green 
house-gas-emissions-2.
The Great Reset200 
EEA (2020b) Transport and environment report 2020―Train or plane? (19/2020), European 
Environment Agency, https://www.eea.europa.eu/publications/transport-and-environ 
ment-report-2020.
EEA (2021) Rail and waterborne—best for low-carbon motorised transport, European 
Environment Agency Briefing, No. 01/2021, https://www.eea.europa.eu/publications/
rail-and-waterborne-transport.
EIM (2008) European Railway Technical Strategy (Version 1.2), European Rail Infrastructure 
Managers, https://ec.europa.eu/transport/sites/transport/files/themes/strategies/consul 
tations/doc/2009_03_27_future_of_transport/20090305_eim.pdf.
Environmental and Energy Study Institute (EESI) (2019) Fact sheet: The growth in greenhouse 
gas emissions from commercial aviation, Environmental and Energy Study Institute Ideas, 
Insights, Sustainable Solutions, https://www.eesi.org/papers/view/fact-sheet-the-growth- 
in-greenhouse-gas- emissions-from-commercial-aviation.
EPA (2020) Greenhouse gas equivalencies calculator, US EPA, https://www.epa.gov/energy/
greenhouse-gas-equivalencies-calculator.
EPD (International EPD Consortium) (2019) Environmental Product Declaration for passenger 
transport on the Bothnia Line (Reg. no. S-P-00194), Botniabanan AB, https://portal.environdec.
com/api/api/v1/EPDLibrary/Files/3fa98013-e848-4dbc-ae38-ae496671833a/Data.
Eurocontrol (2018) European Aviation in 2040, European Organisation for the Safety of Air 
Navigation, https://www.eurocontrol.int/sites/default/files/2019-07/challenges-of-growth- 
2018-annex1_0.pdf.




Eurostat (2021a) Air passenger transport between main airports in each reporting country and partner 
reporting countries, Eurostat Data Browser, https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/databrowser/
view/avia_paoac/default/table?lang=en.
Eurostat (2021b) Air passenger transport between reporting countries, Eurostat Data Browser, 
https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/databrowser/view/avia_paocc/default/table?lang=en. 
Fraunhofer ISI (2020, March 24) Methodology for GHG Efficiency of Transport Modes (Final 
Report), https://www.eea.europa.eu/publications/rail-and-waterborne-transport/rail-and- 
waterborne-best/d3b-eea-ghg-efficiency-indicators/view.
Grossrieder, C. (2011) Life-cycle assessment of future high-speed rail in Norway, Norwegian 
University of Science and Technology.
Holzner, M., P. Heimberger and A. Kochnev (2018) A ‘European Silk Road’, wiiw Research Report, 
No. 430, https://wiiw.ac.at/a-european-silk-road-dlp- 4608.pdf.
Holzner, M. (2019) One Trillion Euros for Europe. How to finance a European Silk Road with the help 
of a European Silk Road Trust, backed by a European Sovereign Wealth Fund and other financing 




12. Environmental Impact of a Railway Network along the “European Silk Road”  201
IATA (2019) The Importance of Air Transport to The Russian Federation, Russian Federation, https://
www.iata.org/en/iata-repository/publications/economic-reports/russian-federation- 
-value-of-aviation/.
IEA (2019) Transport—Topics, https://www.iea.org/topics/transport.
Jones, H., F. Moura and T. Domingos (2016) ”Life cycle assessment of high-speed rail: A case 
study in Portugal”, The International Journal of Life Cycle Assessment 22(3): 410–22, https://
doi.org/10.1007/s11367-016-1177-7.
Kortazar, A., G. Bueno and D. Hoyos (2021) “Environmental balance of the high speed rail 
network in Spain: A life cycle assessment approach”, Research in Transportation Economics 
36(101035), 107006, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.retrec.2021.101035.
ÖBB Austrian Federal Railway (2021, January 21) Personal communication, Online interview.
Von Rozycki, C. V., H. Koeser and H. Schwarz (2003) “Ecology profile of the German high-
speed rail passenger transport system, ICE”, The International Journal of Life Cycle Assessment 
8(2): 83–91, https://doi.org/10.1007/bf02978431.
Russian Federal Agency for Air transport and Aviation (2021) Ob’emy perevozok cherez 
aeroporty Rossii, Russian Federal Agency for Air transport and Aviation, https://favt.gov.
ru/dejatelnost-ajeroporty-i-ajerodromy-osnovnie-proizvodstvennie-pokazateli-aeroportov-
obyom-perevoz/.
Sanz, A., P. Vega and M. Mateos (2014) Las cuentas ecológicas del transporte en España, https://
www.gea21.com/archivo/cuentas-ecologicas-del-transporte- en-espana.
Steer Davies Gleave (2006) Air and Rail Competition and Complementarity, https://ec.europa.eu/
transport/modes/air/studies/internal_market_en.
UIC (2017) Railway Handbook 2017, International Union of Railways, https://uic.org/IMG/pdf/
handbook_iea-uic_2017_web3.pdf.
Wappelhorst, S. (2020) The end of the road? An overview of combustion engine car phase- out 
announcements across Europe, International Council on Clean Transportation, https://theicct.
org/sites/default/files/publications/Combustion-engine-phase-out-briefing-may11.2020.
pdf.
Yue, Y., T. Wang, S. Liang, J. Yang, P. Hou, S. Qu,J. Zhou, X. Jia, H. Wang and M. Xu (2015) “Life 
cycle assessment of High-Speed Rail in China”, Transportation Research Part D: Transport and 
Environment 41: 367–76, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.trd.2015.10.005.
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Introduction
The Cohesion Policy is certainly the most important policy area for the EU budget. 
Over the decades it has also progressively grown in size and relevance. The founding 
fathers’ acute awareness of the centripetal forces that the Union would determine 
in the economic sphere, and consequently of the need for a policy to counteract the 
potential polarisation between central, high-growth regions and peripheral, lagging 
areas, determined the adoption of an EU-wide policy for territorial cohesion. The main 
funds of the policy are regional in nature, although nothing precludes their use in a 
coordinated manner at the national level. As such, the ERDF is the development policy 
fund, and the ESF, the social pillar fund. From 2007 on, due to the accession of new 
member states with lower per capita incomes, some resources have been allocated 
to a “national” fund, the Cohesion Fund (CF). This fund has mostly been used for 
infrastructure development in the new MS (as well, since 2013, as in some of the old 
MS whose per capita average income slipped below the 90% EU average threshold).
Discussing the relevance of the Cohesion Policy for investment in the EU is a 
difficult task as expenditure on EU programming is not categorised according to the 
current nature of its investment. A report (Prota et al. 2020) on last year’s outlook 
mainly discussed the history of cohesion policy. It adopted a simple accounting view 
in reporting its size (only ERDF and CF) relative to the total public investment in 
each member state (a measure provided by Eurostat) and some ad hoc measures of 
investments financed by cohesion policy in specific fields like transport or energy. This 
idea is based on the implicit view that ERDF and CF are development policy funds, 
and therefore the whole expenditure on them can be attributed to investment. This 
view has also been used in the past to advocate in favour of cohesion policy as a tool for 
reducing the damage from decreasing capital expenditure in some countries. Brasili 
et al. (2021) in this handbook show clearly that most, if not all, of fiscal consolidation 
comes in the form of reduced capital expenditure and that this was particularly the case 
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for Southern European member states of the EU during and after the Great Recession. 
The argument is that cohesion policy could have slowed this trend, although there is 
little evidence of that happening.
While the idea that much of the cohesion expenditure is capital is generally correct 
for many items, still the fact that some expenditure items refer for example to social 
infrastructure or better employment leaves many doubts about its integral use for this 
aim. This may also explain why in some countries the ratio of cohesion “development” 
expenditure to total public capital expenditure is extremely high (even unreasonably 
high).1 
Cohesion policy probably contributes positively to public investment, but there are 
at least two open issues in using the total cohesion expenditure over public capital 
expenditure as a measure of its contribution. On the one hand, not all cohesion 
expenditure is an investment as it is stated to be, and therefore the ratio mentioned 
above is not normalised across countries to 100, as the numerator is not a part of the 
denominator. This makes it important to have a better measure of cohesion policy’s 
real contribution to public investment expenditure. Our approach will consider the 
different “themes” in the EU budget (expenditure categorisation) to isolate the items 
that are, with a high probability, associated with capital expenditure, at least under a 
proper statistical definition.
However, this brings to the fore the issue of the correct definition of investment 
expenditure. The current statistical definition includes traditional items of physical 
capital and some items of intangible capital, notably R&D expenditure. Infrastructure 
expenditure and R&D expenditure, therefore, are certainly part of any capital definition. 
Also, most transfers to firms are probably finalised as investment and therefore can be 
accounted as capital account transfer (gross fixed capital formation).
On the other hand, a growing body of literature claims that a rising and increasingly 
unstable share of investment takes forms that were in the past less important and are 
more difficult to account for. Intangibles are becoming ever more relevant for defining 
the amount of capital embedded in a firm, for example (Haskel and Westlake 2018). 
The clearest way to understand this argument is to ask the value of the capital of firms 
like Microsoft or Google. The enormous divergence between an accounting measure 
of capital invested and the market value of these firms can be partly explained by 
their dominant positions. But, according to a stream of literature, this divergence is 
also down to the intangible (and therefore more difficult to evaluate) nature of the 
investment. According to this view, the value of a firm is equivalent to the value of 
the human capital working in it, and the network of relationships embedded in its 
organisation. In other terms value stems mostly from these forms of capital, rather 
than from traditional tangible items.
1  For some smaller countries, usually the beneficiaries of the highest per capita transfer, such as 
Hungary and Portugal, this ratio is close to 60% in the period 2015–17. It is very unlikely, however, 
that the whole of the Cohesion Policy expenditure is capital in a traditional accounting sense. The 
same proportions are negligible in larger and richer countries like Germany.
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It can also be argued that a growing share of public capital is intangible, and therefore 
the traditional, narrow definition of capital can be misleading, particularly if we are 
examining a policy aimed at stimulating development in underdeveloped regions. 
It can be safely assumed for example that a large share of expenditure in education 
increases human capital and therefore should be accounted for as an investment. We 
will account for it separately. By the same token, we could claim that some types of social 
expenditure increase social capital and therefore constitute investments in an even 
broader sense. This would lead, however, to the view that all cohesion expenditure—
and, in a more extreme view, also all of the public expenditure—is, one way or another, 
a form of capital expenditure. This would make the whole exercise of evaluating public 
capital expenditure, and specifically the cohesion policy contribution, meaningless. So 
we will adopt a more reasonable approach.
Based on this approach we will compare capital expenditure (traditional and 
human) in the wider context of cohesion policy and its share over time in different 
countries. In our opinion, this exercise may also shed some light on the recent literature 
on the effects of cohesion policy on growth. Several papers claim that the effects of 
cohesion policy are highly differentiated across countries and regions, not only in their 
overall effects on growth but also in the type of effects observed (see, for example, 
Crescenzi and Giua 2020; Fratesi and Perucca 2020). As suggested by Berkovitz et al. 
(2020) in a study about Greece, the key for understanding the differences may be to 
look at the composition of the expenditure. 
The second interesting question we will tackle is whether cohesion policy actually 
increases capital expenditure in MS or whether it just substitutes national capital 
expenditure. Some investigations in member states have questioned the additionality 
of the public investment component of cohesion policy (for a recent example, see 
Psycharis et al. 2020, for Greece). In general, one would expect that if cohesion policy 
were able to increase capital expenditure then one should observe some correlation 
between its intensity at a regional level and public capital expenditure. But much of 
the anectodal evidence does not confirm this view (see also in this volume, Barbieri 
and Cerniglia 2021, for the Italian case). To investigate this question directly we should 
ideally compare public investment at a regional level, but unfortunately, Eurostat does 
not collect such data. We will therefore look in particular at the regions receiving the 
largest contributions from cohesion policy. For these regions, we will compare the total 
gross fixed capital formation (GFCF) normalised by regional GDP to the national value 
of the same ratio. This comparison will give us information about the effectiveness of 
the EU cohesion policy in increasing investment (public and private) at the regional 
level and, indirectly, will also give us a clue on the additionality of public investment 
in different countries. Unfortunately, Eurostat does not provide a measure of public 
capital formation at the regional level, but gross fixed capital formation provides an 
interesting clue, in particular if one subscribes to the hypothesis of crowding in of 
public investments, convincingly put forward also in this volume by Durand et al. 
(2021).
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A purely additional cohesion policy expenditure would increase capital formation 
in regions that receive more transfers relative to the national average. Of course, 
we expect some substitution effect, but the extent of this substitution is important 
information as it offers important clues on whether the policy really increases capital 
expenditure in the member states, and therefore if a European cohesion policy is really 
useful (at least for investment).
13.1 Disentangling Capital Expenditure from Other 
Cohesion Items
It is a generally held view that the EU cohesion policy increases capital expenditure. 
However, the claim is usually assumed away based on the view that most, or all, of 
the cohesion expenditure particularly in the “development” funds (notably the ERDF 
and the Cohesion Fund) are allocated to capital expenditure, while the ESF is allocated 
to current social expenditure. This is not necessarily the case, as we will see. National 
accounts (and the EU database on cohesion) do not provide a statistical measure of 
the amount of funds allocated to capital expenditure, and therefore only an indirect 
estimate is possible. An estimate of cohesion contribution to investment would be 
valuable for estimating the share of cohesion resources that generate investment. Even 
more importantly, we could identify which countries allocate a comparatively larger 
share of funds to capital expenditure. This information could be tentatively used to 
investigate the effects of the composition of expenditure on the success of cohesion 
policy in different countries and, ultimately, its effects on growth.
To allocate cohesion expenditure to current and capital expenditure, we will 
consider the items (“themes”) identified in the Cohesion Policy Framework Budget for 
the period 2014–20 and isolate the items that are directly linked to capital formation 
in the statistical definition of fixed capital and R&D. We group these items in a High 
Content of Capital Expenditure (HCC) bundle and then calculate its share in each 
country. We then identify an intermediate content of capital expenditure (ICC) group 
of items, mostly linked to the Green Deal and Transition, that is likely linked to energy 
infrastructure and capacity, sustainable mobility, and therefore at least partially capital 
expenditure. The residual type of expenditure (low capital content) is generally 
social infrastructure expenditure. Within this group of items, special attention will 
be devoted to expenditure in “Education and vocational training”. As discussed in 
the introduction, this item is linked to human capital formation and therefore can be 
considered a capital expenditure in a broader sense. It is useful to analyse its distribution 
in the context of capital formation. Table 1 shows the themes of the cohesion policy 
expenditure and their grouping in the above-named categories.
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Table 1 European Structural and Investment Funds by Theme (2014–2020) (in billion euros, 
Current Prices)
Source of data: Authors ’calculation on data, Open Data Portal for the European Structural Investment 
Funds―European Commission | Data | European Structural and Investment Funds (europa.eu), 
https://cohesiondata.ec.europa.eu/themes.
From the table above, it is easy to calculate that roughly 66.66% of cohesion expenditure 
is devoted respectively to the narrow category of “High Capital Content” expenditure 
and the broader category of “Intermediate Capital Content” (ICC). Of the remaining 
33.34%, 7% is devoted to “Education and formation” and can be accounted for as a 
form of investment. On the whole, only 25% of cohesion expenditure at the EU level 
cannot be labelled as capital expenditure. 
Table 2 shows the allocations to different “Capital Content” categories across 
member states in units of €1 bn. Of course, aside from the policy choices of member 
states, the amounts shown reflect both the size of the country and the overall allocation 
of cohesion funds. It is however worth noting the enormous allocation of expenditure 
to the ”High Capital Content” category for Poland, €55 bn of the overall EU budget of 
€642 bn.
 
Table 3 reports the share of the different categories of expenditure for each member 
country, normalised to total cohesion expenditure by country. This table really 
highlights the policy choices of MS (which are, of course, coordinated and agreed 
with the EU Commission).
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Table 2 MS Budget for 2014–20 by Level of Capital Content (Billion Euros, Current Prices)







Austria 3.13 5.47 2.45 11.05
Belgium 1.95 1.61 2.72 6.28
Bulgaria 3.99 4.24 3.76 12.00
Cyprus 0.35 0.57 0.34 1.26
Czech Republic 14.56 9.38 9.18 33.12
Germany 14.32 14.11 18.41 46.83
Danmark 0.48 1.48 0.82 2.78
Estonia 2.32 1.36 2.32 6.00
Spain 24.85 13.47 18.28 56.60
Finland 2.64 5.65 2.24 10.53
France 15.04 17.99 15.91 48.94
Greece 9.86 8.60 7.81 26.26
Croatia 5.36 3.60 3.70 12.66
Hungaria 11.62 8.12 10.02 29.76
Ireland 1.32 4.70 1.58 7.60
Italy 28.82 17.44 26.16 72.42
Latva 2.93 2.10 1.88 6.91
Lithuania 3.82 2.85 3.60 10.27
Luxemburg 0.13 0.27 0.13 0.52
Malta 0.37 0.34 0.42 1.13
Netherlands 1.49 1.31 2.00 4.80
Poland 54.80 24.06 26.40 105.25
Portugal 9.45 7.56 16.19 33.21
Romania 13.93 11.04 11.80 36.77
Sweden 2.64 3.25 2.46 8.35
Slovenia 2.08 1.54 1.33 4.95
Slovakia 8.94 4.67 5.85 19.46
UK 7.84 7.52 10.81 26.17
Total 249.03 184.29 208.56 641.88
Source of data: Author’s calculation on data, Open Data Portal for the European Structural Investment 
Funds―European Commission | Data | European Structural and Investment Funds (europa.eu), 
https://cohesiondata.ec.europa.eu/themes.
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Table 3 MS Budget for 2014–20 (Daily Update) by Content of Capital (% Share of Country 
Allocation)










training (% on 
total budget)
Austria 28.3% 49.5% 22.2% 5.00%
Belgium 31.1% 25.6% 43.3% 11.20%
Bulgaria 33.3% 35.3% 31.3% 5.80%
Cyprus 27.8% 45.2% 27.0% 1.30%
Czech Republic 44.0% 28.3% 27.7% 8.00%
Germany 30.6% 30.1% 39.3% 8.70%
Denmark 17.3% 53.2% 29.5% 5.30%
Estonia 38.7% 22.7% 38.7% 9.80%
Spain 43.9% 23.8% 32.3% 6.90%
Finland 25.1% 53.7% 21.3% 4.20%
France 30.7% 36.8% 32.5% 5.90%
Greece 37.5% 32.7% 29.7% 5.90%
Croatia 42.3% 28.4% 29.2% 7.10%
Hungaria 39.0% 27.3% 33.7% 6.90%
Ireland 17.4% 61.8% 20.8% 4.50%
Italy 39.8% 24.1% 36.1% 9.10%
Latva 42.4% 30.4% 27.2% 7.70%
Lithuania 37.2% 27.8% 35.1% 1.60%
Luxemburg 25.0% 51.9% 25.0% 8.70%
Malta 32.7% 30.1% 37.2% 7.00%
Netherlands 31.0% 27.3% 41.7% 0.80%
Polonia 52.1% 22.9% 25.1% 5.20%
Portugal 28.5% 22.8% 48.8% 17.00%
Romania 37.9% 30.0% 32.1% 3.50%
Sweden 31.6% 38.9% 29.5% 6.90%
Slovenia 42.0% 31.1% 26.9% 6.00%
Slovakia 45.9% 24.0% 30.1% 3.80%
UK 30.0% 28.7% 41.3% 11.50%
Total 38.8% 28.7% 32.5% 7.35%
Source of data: Author’calculation on data, Open Data Portal for the European Structural Investment 
Funds―European Commission | Data | European Structural and Investment Funds (europa.eu), 
https://cohesiondata.ec.europa.eu/themes.
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Most new accession members, and particularly all eastern countries, allocate a very 
large share of cohesion funds to HCC Themes. This partly reflects the significance for 
these countries of the Cohesion Fund (CF), which is mostly allocated to infrastructure. 
However, note that there are important exceptions among “new” members, in particular 
Romania and Bulgaria, which allocate below-average shares to HCC expenditure. 
Most Nordic countries allocate larger-than-average shares to the intermediate category 
(ICC, the green transition section in Table 1), with a staggering share of 61.8% for 
Ireland. Older members allocate larger-than-average shares to non-capital expenditure, 
in particular Germany, Belgium, the Netherlands, and the UK. Also, some southern 
countries allocate a comparatively larger share to LCC expenditure, in particular 
Portugal and, to a lesser extent, Italy. Most of these countries however also allocate a 
large share of these resources to education and training, and are hence still investing, 
albeit in human capital. Particularly large are the shares of human capital investment 
of Portugal, Belgium, and the UK. 
13.2 Does Cohesion Policy Increase Investment?
The last question we would like to address concerns the extent to which cohesion 
policy generates further net capital expenditure of potential crowding-out effects. It 
is indeed possible that cohesion funds are used to substitute for capital expenditure 
that would have been carried out with national funds anyway in the absence of an 
EU policy. Both at the EU level, and in certain individual countries, this possibility 
has generated heated debate about the real additionality of cohesion expenditure, and 
in particular of its investment.2 To investigate this matter we will look at per capita 
capital expenditure in those regions that are more interested in cohesion policy: those 
that received the largest cohesion budgets over the last two budget cycles. We will 
therefore calculate at the regional level gross fixed capital expenditure (normalised to 
regional GDP) and compare this data to national gross fixed capital formation (again 
normalised to GDP). If cohesion expenditure adds value and contributes to the overall 
capital formation, we would expect to find that it exerts a significant positive effect on 
regional gross fixed capital formation. The gap between regional and national capital 
formation should be correlated with cohesion expenditure. A lower-than-the-national 
ratio of GFCF to GDP for a region receiving a large cohesion contribution would signal 
strongly that cohesion policy is ineffective in delivering investment. The next figure 
displays the transfers from cohesion policy over the last two programming periods to 
the largest recipient regions.
2  At the EU level, this originated a procedure for ex-post verification (see EU Commission 2017). For a 
description of the problem and the institutional attempt to tackle it in Italy, see Coco and De Vincenti 
(2020).
Table 4 compares the ratio of gross fixed capital formation to the region’s GDP for 
these regions over the period 2007–20, with the national average of the same ratio. If 
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cohesion policy significantly contributes to public (and private) investment we would 
expect the regional ratio to be larger than the national one. 
Table 4 Comparison of Ratio of GFCF to GDP with National Averages, Selected Regions, 2007–20 
(Constant Price, 2015), %




ES61 Andalucía 19.44 19.82
PL12 Mazowieckie 20.71 19.16
PT11 Norte 19.02 17.95
LT00 Lietuva 24.17 24.17
PL22 Śląskie 18.26 19.16
PT16 Centro 17.82 17.95
ITG1 Sicilia 16.56 18.88
PL21 Małopolskie 18.23 19.16
ITF3 Campania 17.08 18.88
PL41 Wielkopolskie 18.98 19.16
PL32 Podkarpackie 20.79 19.16
PL51 Dolnośląskie 19.49 19.16
PL31 Lubelskie 17.33 19.16
PL11 Łódzkie 19.29 19.16
LV00 Latvija 24.17 24.17
HU32 Észak-Alföld 24.33 22.68
ITF4 Puglia 17.67 18.88
HU33 Dél-Alföld 24.01 22.68
PL63 Pomorskie 21.26 19.16
HU10 Közép-Magyarország 27.24 22.68
Source of data: Author’s elaboration on ARDECO database https://knowledge4policy.ec.europa.eu/
territorial/ardeco-online_en
Table 4 shows a complex picture, with different outcomes for different countries. While 
the Hungarian regions (e.g., Közép-Magyarország, Észak-Alföld), some Polish regions 
(e.g., Mazowieckie and Podkarpackie), and, to a lesser extent, the Portuguese regions 
(e.g., Norte) display significantly higher-than-national GFCF ratios, the regions of Italy 
and Spain display lower-than-the-national-average ratios of capital formation. This 
certainly indicates that the cohesion policy has been ineffective in the main regions of 
Italy in raising the level of total capital formation. Moreover, it may also indicate that 
national public investment expenditure has been substituted by EU cohesion policy 
funds in those regions. Certainly, there is no indication that public investment has been 
increased significantly by cohesion policy in these countries.
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13.3 Conclusion
In this paper, we explored data on Cohesion Policy expenditure to assess its real 
contribution, both directly and indirectly, to public capital formation in the EU. A 
significant proportion of Cohesion Policy, particularly in certain regions, is capital 
expenditure, although the standard approach of assuming that it is always entirely 
capital expenditure definitely appears wrong. We have tried to disentangle the likely 
share of capital expenditure in the budget cycle 2014–20 by exploring the themes of the 
policy. Some of them are mainly capital expenditures, others less so. By this method, we 
ascertained that some two thirds of cohesion expenditure has a significant investment 
nature. Another 7% is directed at increasing human capital (through education and 
formation). For 25% of the total, it is safe to assume that there is not an investment 
element. The composition of the expenditure according to the likely capital content is 
highly differentiated across countries. While some countries, notably Poland, spend a 
high proportion of funds on fixed capital formation, others spend considerably less. 
This may explain why cohesion policy is associated with very different outcomes 
(for example relating to productivity or employment without growth) in different 
countries (Crescenzi and Giua 2020).
In a second exercise, we explored the relationship between gross fixed capital 
formation at the regional level and cohesion policy, in an attempt to discover whether 
the latter has been able to increase investment and public investment in the regions 
receiving more transfers relative to the national average. The data show large 
differences between different regions and countries. In particular, the Italian regions 
seem not to benefit from cohesion policy in terms of overall investment.
Although this may also signal a lack of additionality of cohesion expenditure in 
some countries, a satisfactory test can only be conducted with public investment data 
at the regional level, which are currently not available in Eurostat. We believe it must 
be a priority for policy and statistical purposes to produce these data.
A final observation should be made on the effects of COVID-19 on cohesion 
investments. In 2020, the EU Commission launched two initiatives to allow the use of 
cohesion resources for a swift response to the coronavirus emergency, starting a large 
reprogramming of funds (EU Commission 2021). The use of cohesion funds for the 
emergency was necessary, but we must be aware that this may have an adverse impact 
on public investment. The initiatives allowed the transfer of funds across priorities 
and even among funds. Roughly €20 bn were transferred to health actions, emergency 
business support, and direct support of vulnerable groups of people. None of these 
actions are investments, hence we should to some degree expect a decrease in public 
investments in underdeveloped regions.
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